> Your claim that information is SPECIES SPECIFIC is completely at variance 
> with the EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE that I presented in my 3 week session that the 
> minds of different animal species have used the same encoding of gestalt 
> forms for the past 400 million years since the evolution of the amniotes.

Pedro’s assertion that biological information is species specific is amply 
supported by massive amounts of molecular biological evidence.
One of the critical “differences that make a difference” between species is 
that each member of a specific species  has a DNA sequence that is compatible 
with reproduction within the species. (Even though the concept of a species is 
that of homology of individuals, not homogeneity of individuals.)

From a molecular biological perspective, the assertion of “same encoding” of 
information is contrary to fact.



> On Jun 30, 2016, at 11:45 PM, Alex Hankey <> wrote:
> Pedro suggested that I send these comments to the whole group, so here they 
> are
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Alex Hankey" < <>>
> Date: 29 Jun 2016 21:20
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?
> To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" < 
> <>>
> Cc: 
> Dear Pedro,
> Your claim that information is SPECIES SPECIFIC is completely at variance 
> with the EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE that I presented in my 3 week session that the 
> minds of different animal species have used the same encoding of gestalt 
> forms for the past 400 million years since the evolution of the amniotes.
> Study of response of plants to human intentions has simlar implications 
> related to Rupert Sheldrake's 'Sense of being stared at'. These WELL 
> authenticated phenomena have hugely important implications for our 
> understanding of information in Experience - the topic of my presentation. 
> Best wishes, 
> Alex Hankey
> On 29 Jun 2016 4:24 pm, "Pedro C. Marijuan" < 
> <>> wrote:
> Dear Marcus, Loet, Bob... and All,
> Again very briefly, your exchanges make clear the limits of the received 
> Shannonian approach and the (narrow?) corridors left for advancement. I find 
> this situation highly reminiscent of what happened with Mechanics long ago: 
> an excellent theory (but of limited scope) was overstretched and used as a 
> paradigm of what All science should be... it contributed well to technology 
> and to some other natural science disciplines, but was far from useful 
> --nefarious?-- for humanities and for the future of psychological and social 
> science studies. 
> The figure from Weaver in Loet's excellent posting leaves a few aspects 
> outside. The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other aspects of 
> the information phenomenon do not enter. By doing that we have streamlined 
> the phenomenon... and have left it ready for applying a highly successful 
> theory, in the technological and in many other realms (linguistics, artif. 
> intelligence, neurodynamics, molec. networks, ecol. networks, applied soc. 
> metrics, etc). Pretty big and impressive, but is it enough? Shouldn't we try 
> to go beyond?
> I wonder whether a far wider "phenomenology of information" is needed 
> (reminding what Maxine argued months ago about the whole contemplation of our 
> own movement, or Plamen about the "war on cancer"?). If that inquiry is 
> successful we could find for instance that:
> 1. There are UNIVERSALS of information. Not only in the transmission or in 
> the encoding used, well captured by the present theory, but also in the 
> generation, in the "purpose", the "meaning", the targeted subject/s, in the 
> duration, the cost, the value, the fitness or adaptive "intelligence", etc.
> 3. Those UNIVERSALS would be organized, wrapped, around an ESSENTIAL CORE. It 
> would consist in the tight ingraining of self-production and communication 
> (almost inseparable, and both information based!). In the human special case, 
> it is the whole advancement of our own lives what propels us to engage in 
> endless communication --about the universals of our own species-- but with 
> the terrific advantage of an open-ended communication system, language.
> 4. Those UNIVERSALS would have been streamlined in very different ways and 
> taken as "principles" or starting points for a number of 
> disciplines--remembering the discussion about the four Great Domains of 
> Science. A renewed Information Science should nucleate one of those domains. 
> Best regards to all, 
> (and particular greetings to the new parties joined for this discussion)
> --Pedro
> El 27/06/2016 a las 12:43, Marcus Abundis escribió:
>> Dear Loet,
>>     I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS I 
>> often sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I have 
>> difficulty in precisely grasping your views – the reason for my delay.
>> >[while Shannon’s] concept of information (uncertainty) <
>> > is counter-intuitive. It enables us among other things <
>> > to distinguish between "information" and "meaningful <
>> > information". <
>> • Easily agreed; *how* to distinguish a presumed meaning (or 
>> meaningless-ness) then becomes the remaining issue.
>> > Providing . . . meaning presumes the specification <
>> > of a system of reference; for example, an observer.< 
>> • It is telling for me (in viewing our differences and likenesses) that you 
>> suggest an observer. My “system of relating“ accommodates but does not 
>> require an observer (okay – observer, defined how?), as shown immediately 
>> below.
>> >Different[ly] . . . expected information is dimensionless<
>> > ("a priori"). <
>> • I suggest the act of “expectation“ already infers minimal dimensions – for 
>> example, who/what/how is doing the expecting? Thus, in my view, this is not 
>> truly a priori. A “readiness“ or a compelling functional need innate to any 
>> “system of relating“ has bearing. For example, a single Oxygen atom has a 
>> compelling/innate need to react with other elements, just as any agent is 
>> compelled to react to “nutrients.“ Both imply dimensional expectations, no? 
>> (obviously – of different orders/types).
>> > In my opinion, a "real theory of meaning" should enable <
>> > us to specify/measure meaning as redundancy / reduction <
>> > of uncertainty given . . . I took this further in . . . <
>> > The Self-Organization of Meaning and the Reflexive . . .<
>> • My weak grasp of the concepts in this paper leads me to think you are 
>> actually modeling the “processing of meaning,“ related-to-but-distinct-from 
>> “generating meaning“ that I target. I also vaguely recall(?) in an offline 
>> exchange I asked you if you saw this paper as presenting a “theory of 
>> meaning“ and you answered “No.“ 
>> • In your later response to Pedro, I found your citation matrix a 
>> interesting example of your thinking, but still too “high-order“ for my 
>> reductive-but-meaningful aim. Your matrix (for me) presents an essential 
>> complexity of high-order views, but in itself it is too simple to detail 
>> *how* a citation is *meaningfully used.* Still, an intriguing concept that 
>> might be meaningfully expanded? Perhaps there are more useful details in the 
>> additional papers you list, which I have not had a chance to explore.
>> • Your last post then reinforces my sense you are actually exploring the 
>> processing of meaning, rather than the generation of meaning. Diverse 
>> “systems of relating“ you name seem to be “on point“ and 
>> > can be considered as a semantic domain (Maturana,1978)<
>> But I find this unsatisfying as exactly *what(s)* is being related, and 
>> exactly *how* it is being related, does not seem to be covered. It is in 
>> precisely naming those “whats“ and “hows“ that true a priori models become 
>> possible. For example, a *system of relating* between “a hominid and a rock“ 
>> affords certain types of meaning, equally a *system of relating* between 
>> “the same rock and an ant“ affords wholly different types of meaning – all 
>> in regards to an identical (autonomous) rock.
>> > the same information is delineated differently and <
>> > considered from a different perspective <
>> arguing for essential subjectivity? This seems to point to my use of delta O 
>> and delta S in the video.
>> • I am unsure if we are in: radical agreement, radical disagreement, or if 
>> we just name subtle differences. . . but I thought I should at least attempt 
>> a reply to your posts and see what ensues. 
>> > In my opinion, the task is to specify mechanisms which <
>> > generate redundancy <
>> This leads me to believe we essentially agree but focus on different levels 
>> of operation and complexity. Any thoughts you have to share are appreciated.
>> Sincerely,
>> Marcus
> -- 
> -------------------------------------------------
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> <>
> <>
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