Caro Mark e cari tutti,
la patologia finanziaria è determinata dall'ignoranza e dalla disonestà.
L'una e l'altra vanno condannate, non tanto per ragioni morali, quanto per
incapacità e corruzione. Si: corruzione o falsificazione della scienza
economica qual è quella che ha portato alla formulazione di algoritmi
falsi, pseudo teorici e non corrispondenti alla effettiva realtà dei
Questo non ha niente a che vedere con la fiducia o la sfiducia nei
confronti degli economisti. Tranne che non si abbia a che fare con correnti
o tendenze economiche che scambiano l'apparenza con la realtà e la luce con
le ombre. E viceversa.
Nessuno nega che le scienze non sono tutte uguali. Tuttavia, servono tutte,
se sono vere o fino a quando non vengono falsificate.
Nella confusione (di parole e di concetti) che spesso si crea tra
significazione, informazione e comunicazione bisogna non perdere di vista
un fondamento: informazione sta a neg-entropia come dis-informazione sta ad
Tutto ciò a prescindere dalla teoria dell'informazione alla fonte o
matematica che definisce l'informazione di un messaggio con una formula che
ricorda quella dell'entropia non avente alcun significato semantico, se non
dopo avere introdotto un s-codice. In conclusione:i entropia è degradazione
o deformazione (mortale), neg-entropia è informazione od ordine (vitale).
Anche nella scienza dell'economia.
Un abbraccio augurale.

2016-10-14 14:38 GMT+02:00 Pedro C. Marijuan <>:

> -------- Mensaje reenviado --------
> Asunto: Re: [Fis] Scientific communication (from Mark)
> Fecha: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 13:04:06 +0100
> De: Mark Johnson <> <>
> Para: fis <> <>, Pedro C.
> Marijuan <> <>
> Dear Karl, Loet and Bruno,
> On reflection, I had been thinking this discussion about scientific
> communication had been a bit 'quiet'... now it is less quiet: there's
> nothing like throwing 'god' into the equation to liven up discussions!
> Why?
> More seriously (and sorry, this is a long post) there are three
> fundamental distinctions and an example which I want to draw in the
> light of your comments. They are:
> 1. The distinction between IS and OUGHT in arguments about scientific
> communication
> 2. The distinction between an EXPLANATION and a DESCRIPTION
> 3. Issues about ONTOLOGY and INFORMATION
> 4. A musical example
> 1. IS - OUGHT
> There are critical worries in Bruno's comments about making "theology,
> the science, vulnerable, as reason is no more allowed in, and that
> leaves the place for emotion and wishful thinking, which are quickly
> exploited by manipulators, usually to steal our money, or control us
> in some ways". Clearly, we ought not allow this to happen. In my
> second video, I used the example of the swindler whose speech acts are
> chosen in full knowledge of the constraints of the victim. Of course
> there are unscrupulous religious people who do this; but there are
> equally (and possibly more so) unscrupulous scientists (particularly,
> I'm afraid, psychologists and economists (if they are to be considered
> scientists - as they would like)). I like Bruno's theology of the
> machine - it looks very similar to Ashby's concept of variety (the set
> of propositions true about the machine = the set of possible states
> the machine can exist in)... which brings us back to information,
> Shannon, etc.
> I agree with Karl in his suggestion "to focus on the dichotomy
> creating the foreground, lifting it off from the background. Patterns
> connect the two: it is reasonable, in my view, to work on the subject
> of patterns.". But it is easy to say that we "ought" to do this. I'd
> prefer to see the pathologies that we see in education and publishing
> are a direct consequence of our not doing this, and to describe the
> ontological mechanisms. It is the business of arguing how our
> scientific communication should be conducted in the light of what we
> know about our science.
> Hume's famous passage in dealing with the dichotomy of "is" and
> "ought" is worth reflecting on:
> "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
> always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the
> ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or
> makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am
> surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
> propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not
> connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
> imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this
> ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis
> necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same
> time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether
> inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others,
> which are entirely different from it."
> His complaint is about slippage from "is" to "ought" (he does not deny
> the possibility of deriving an ought from an is - the logical
> positivists misrepresented him).
> In my argument about scientific publishing I have tried to be careful
> in avoiding 'oughts' and ground an argument for a richer embrace of
> technological expression on the basis of describing how today's
> science is. I'm arguing (not much differently from David Bohm whose
> work on communication is new to me) that the nature of the science
> entails the need for new practices of communication.
> There is a critical dimension (which I don't think is an Ought - it's
> just a warning): if we continue to communicate in the way that we did
> in the 17th century, then our communication won't work because it
> works against the scientific ontology. I'm speculating that this
> pathology feeds into financialisation processes which produce social
> crisis. In Hume's argument, communication between scientists and an
> ontology of regularity were tied together; now we have have to admit
> multiple contingencies in our scientific practices, the communication
> cannot be unchanged - can it?
> In the posts of Bruno and Karl, there is reference to science's search
> for universal explanation. This is clearly a very deep issue, but it
> fundamentally concerns our conception of causation. What is causation?
> What is causal explanation? For Hume, causal explanations are
> constructs produced in discourse (i.e. communication) between
> scientists in the light of regular successions of events produced in
> experiments. However, it is also worth considering that Hume was
> deeply sceptical about the articulation of any rational foundation
> which could underpin the production of regularities in nature. That
> cast doubt on assumptions about inductive reasoning (and for anyone
> who would champion Peirce's 'abduction', I think it suffers from the
> same problem at a different level)
> Scientists certainly produce totalising explanations, cosmologies,
> etc, and these can be very useful to organise discourse and scientific
> activity, and also creating a sense of hubristic excitement which
> moves things on. But whilst universalist claims will be made, all we
> can safely say is that it is a "description of understanding".
> Scientific communication occurs when different scientist's
> "descriptions of understanding" coincide. I prefer to think of this as
> a recognition between scientists that they operate within related or
> shared constraints. We should inquire into the conditions when this
> happens.
> To describe phenomena, and one's understanding of phenomena is to
> reveal one's constraints. Describing doubt is a very important part of
> this. Explanation is to attempt to remove doubt - not just of the
> explainer, but of those they wish to convince.
> Loet spotted a constraint in my understanding about redundancy and
> made an intervention which has (this time - sorry for not getting it
> until now!) really clarified things, and also opened up a connection
> between ontology, information and redundancy.
> Essentially, to calculate the redundancy one must have the maximum
> entropy, and the maximum entropy can only be gained from what Loet
> calls the "specification of the system": that, in my understanding, is
> an agreed ontology of what the system IS.
> I think this makes the relationship between Shannon information and
> redundancy recursive. In order to agree the ontology of the system,
> one must communicate; in order to communicate we must agree the
> constraints; in order to apprehend constraints, we must identify the
> redundancy... which can be identified through the maximum entropy,
> which entails agreeing an ontology. And so on. This makes me think my
> intuition about the importance of Lou Kauffmann's work isn't wide of
> the mark.
> Information appears like a recursive version of Wittgenstein's
> duck-rabbit, where there is a smaller duck-rabbit inside the larger
> duck-rabbit. In Karl's terms, the dynamic of dichotomy between
> foreground and background operates at all levels of recursion:
> identify it at one level is an unavoidable constraint imposed on it.
> Of course, it is impractical to go to these recursive depths.
> Shannon's equations constrain us to a simple empirically observable
> domain. But I think it is important to recognise that the recursion is
> there, and that we are effectively 'cutting into it' (or constraining
> it)
> It may be that the point hangs on the identification of analogy, or
> identity: of what is counted as "the same as" or "another one".
> I'm preparing a video to explore this which uses a musical example.
> I'll try and explain in text what I want the video to explain (you
> will at least have two descriptions!):
> Music analysts identify those features in a score or some other record
> of performance which are "the same" and "another" and produce their
> analyses which show how different combinations of categories change
> over time. But when we listen to a piece of music for the first time,
> we know little of what is about to come, except that our expectations
> are shaped as the music unfolds. What emerges over time is a
> multiplicity of what might be called "descriptions" (although they
> need not be verbalised, they can be expressed analytically to some
> extent). These concern many different dimensions of what we hear,
> including:
> 1. the rhythmic patterns
> 2. melodic patterns
> 3. timbral patterns
> 4. dynamics (loud and soft)
> 5. phrasing
> 6. pitch
> 7. intervals... and so forth.
> Each description exists within constraints which are partly produced
> by the other descriptions, and by other factors (like, for example,
> one's familiarity with the style). As the music unfolds, new
> descriptions (about form, climactic moments, harmonic progressions,
> etc) emerge and whose constraints will interact with (and transform)
> existing constraints - even (most powerfully in music) our emotional
> constraints.
> I mention music because it is a form of communication which is
> extremely powerful and which does not make any external reference. Yet
> it tells us something about how we communicate, but there is an
> analytical puzzle here. The specification of the system is beyond
> reach, yet we sense the patterns, the repetition, the redundancy
> without having a sophisticated way of calculating it. We also identify
> that what we might consider to be "the same" at one moment in one
> context, we might later count as being fundamentally "different" in
> another (e.g. perhaps the same melody with a different harmony).
> Moreover, I suggest that at these moments of seeing something to be
> different that we once thought to be "the same" are moments of gaining
> deeper insight into the meaning being conveyed. My deepened
> understanding of the relationship between redundancy and the
> "specification of the system" explained by Loet is an example.
> This, it seems to me, is the essence of what happens when we really
> communicate. The process, I suggest, is an emergent interaction of
> constraints. It requires multiple descriptions. As long as we attempt
> to convey singular descriptions in academic papers alone,
> communication in this sense is going to be very difficult - if not
> impossible.
> Best wishes,
> Mark
> On 13 October 2016 at 10:32, Karl Javorszky <> 
> <> wrote:
> > Theology and Information
> >
> >
> >
> > Once again, Bruno has put his finger on the central point of interest: it is
> > irrelevant, what we call the problem, the subject-matter remains the same
> > over the generations. In times long gone, thinkers have called the same
> > problems THEOLOGICAL questions, because it was usual to discriminate the
> > known from the unknown by saying: what we know belongs to the realm of
> > humans, what we don’t know is the domain of God.
> >
> > Irrespective of the name given to the target of research, it remains in a
> > contrast to the knowledge accessible (presently) to us humans. It builds the
> > BACKGROUND to that what we can understand, and therefore talk reasonably
> > about.
> >
> > The background of perception, of understanding, of knowledge, of opinions,
> > or even the background as such, as an epistemological construct, is a
> > central theme in psychology. There, one treats it as a necessary correlate
> > to the foreground and the trade has looked into the processes of
> > dichotomisation which he human brain uses to perceive the foreground. The
> > flip-flop technique – exchanging the background with the foreground – allows
> > research into the mechanisms of recognition.
> >
> > The main point is to overcome the dichotomies which distinguish the
> > foreground from the background. One such approach is to recognise that
> > “contemporary” and “successive” are man-made (perception-induced)
> > categories. This approach has allowed understanding, how the succession of
> > the DNA’s elements relate to the contemporary properties of the temporally
> > identical elements of the organism. This riddle has been solved.
> >
> > The task presently before us is to understand the meaning of the term
> > PATTERNS. Once we understand patterns, we can explain how the recurring is
> > related to the expected and the unexpected. Causality itself appears to be a
> > corollary of patterns.
> >
> > Let me conclude by asserting that that we in the 21st century still labour
> > on the same basic questions e.g. Giordano Bruno has raised, namely: what is
> > the ultimate, unifying principle which drives the world. In today’s
> > parlance, we do not discuss the same problems in terms of theology, (“what
> > are the properties of God and how does He organise us and the world”) but in
> > terms of quanta, energy and information (“what are the properties of
> > information and how does it organise us and the world”), yet the approach is
> > the same: we try to understand the properties of that what is the background
> > to that what we can understand well.
> >
> > My suggestion is to focus on the dichotomy creating the foreground, lifting
> > it off from the background. Patterns connect the two: it is reasonable, in
> > my view, to work on the subject of patterns. Do patterns contain
> > information?
> >
> > Karl
> >
> >
> > 2016-10-11 19:58 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff <> 
> > <>:
> >>
> >> Dear Mark and colleagues,
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Loet, clearly the redundancy is apophatic, although one has to be cautious
> >> in saying this: the domain of the apophatic is bigger than the domain of
> >> Shannon redundancy. At some point in the future we may do better in
> >> developing measurement techniques for 'surprise' in communication (I wonder
> >> if Lou Kauffman's Recursive Distinguishing is a way forwards...).
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The extension of the redundancy is not primarily a matter of measurement
> >> techniques, but of theorizing. The redundancy depends on the specification
> >> of the system. The Shannon-type information is empirical, but only the
> >> specification of the system enables us to specify the H(max) and therefore
> >> the redundancy.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> As the system grows, it may develop new dimensions which are manifest as
> >> bifurcations. (Reaction-diffusion dynamics; Rashevsky, Turing.) When one
> >> goes from one dimension n to a two-dimensional system [n,m], the number of
> >> options [H(max)] goes from log(n) to log(n * m), and thus the redundancy
> >> increases rapidly.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> For example: as long as transport over the Alps is limited to passes like
> >> the Brenner, the capacity can become exhausted. Digging tunnels or flying
> >> over the Alps adds degrees of freedom to the transport system. The number 
> >> of
> >> options (n * m * k * ….) can “explode” by cultural and technological
> >> developments.  The transitions come as surprises (e.g., the demise of the
> >> Soviet-Union). Suddenly, the relevant systems definitions have to be
> >> revised.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The systems definitions have the status of hypotheses. Hypotheses can be
> >> considered as theoretically informed expectations. The world of 
> >> expectations
> >> proliferates with a dynamic different from the actualizations. The two
> >> realms are coupled since the actualizations can be considered as
> >> instantiations of the order of expectations; but only if the latter is
> >> specified as different from the empirical order of realizations.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >> Loet
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ________________________________
> >>
> >> Loet Leydesdorff
> >>
> >> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> >> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
> >>
> >> ;
> >> Associate Faculty, SPRU, University of Sussex;
> >>
> >> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> >> Beijing;
> >>
> >> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London;
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Fis mailing list
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Fis mailing list
> >
> >
> >
> --
> Dr. Mark William Johnson
> Institute of Learning and Teaching
> Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
> University of Liverpool
> Phone: 07786 064505
> Email:
> Blog:
> .
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