Cari Joseph, Loet, Pedro e Terry, Cari tutti, grazie per le Vostre parole che ap-prezzo "molto", ma merito "poco". Ricchi come siamo o siete di anni di giovinezza dobbiamo o dovete coltivare ed usare la massima sapienza saggia o saggezza sapiente in modo da essere garanzia onto-logica o memoria paradigmatica che non impedisca, ma stimoli la creatività scientifica o la passione conoscitiva di coloro che avendo meno anni di giovinezza proiettano nel futuro con le loro profezie o rivelazioni l'interminabile e fecondo cammino della conoscenza.della conoscenza. Beninteso, con la co-scienza dell'amore o l'amore della co-scienza, perché la scienza da sola non ce la fa! Che il 2017 sia un anno buono per colmare le nostre lacune. Insieme. Francesco
2016-12-31 8:15 GMT+01:00 Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net>: > We agree that such a theory is a ways off, though you some are far more > pessimisitic about its possibility than me. I believe that we would do best > to focus on the hole that needs filling in rather than assuming that it is > an unfillable given. > > > > Dear Terrence and colleagues, > > > > It is not a matter of pessimism. We have the example of “General Systems > Theory” of the 1930s (von Bertalanffy and others). Only gradually, one > realized the biological metaphor driving it. In my opinion, we have become > reflexively skeptical about claims of “generality” because we know the > statements are framed within paradigms. Translations are needed in this > fractional manifold. > > > > I agree that we are moving in a fruitful direction. Your book “Incomplete > Nature” and “The Symbolic Species” have been important. The failing options > cannot be observed, but have to be constructed culturally, that is, in > discourse. It seems to me that we need a kind of calculus of redundancy. > Perspectives which are reflexively aware of this need and do not assume an > unproblematic “given” or “natural” are perhaps to be privileged > nonetheless. The unobservbable options have first to be specified and we > need theory (hypotheses) for this. Perhaps, this epistemological privilege > can be used as a vantage point. > > > > There is an interesting relation to Husserl’s *Critique of the European > Sciences* (1935): The failing (or forgotten) dimension is grounded in > “intersubjective intentionality.” Nowadays, we would call this “discourse”. > How are discourses structured and how can they be translated for the > purpose of offering this “foundation”? > > > > Happy New Year, > > Loet > > > > My modest suggestion is only that in the absence of a unifying theory we > should not privilege one partial theory over others and that in the absence > of a global general theory we need to find terminology that clearly > identifies the level at which the concept is being used. Lacking this, we > end up debating incompatible definitions, and defending our favored one > that either excludes or includes issues of reference and significance or > else assumes or denies the relevance of human interpreters. With different > participants interested in different levels and applications of the > information concept—from physics, to computation, to neuroscience, to > biosemiotics, to language, to art, etc.—failure to mark this diversity will > inevitably lead us in circles. > > > > I urge humility with precision and an eye toward synthesis. > > > > Happy new year to all.\ > > > > — Terry > > > > On Thu, Dec 29, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Thanks Stan, > > Yes, it's a powerful and useful process. > > My problem is that in this list, and in other places were such matters are > discussed, we don't seem to be able to agree on the big picture, and the > higher up the generalisations we go, the less we agree. > > I'd like to keep open the possibility that we might be yoking ideas > together which it may be more useful to keep apart. We are dealing with > messy concepts in messy configurations, which may not always map neatly > onto a generalisation model. > > Dai > > > > On 22/12/16 16:45, Stanley N Salthe wrote: > > Dai -- > > {phenomenon 1} > > {phenomenon 2} --> {Phenomena 1 & 2} ---> {phenomena 1.2,3} > > {phenomenon 3} > > The process from left to right is generalization. > > ‘Information’ IS a generalization. > > generalities form the substance of philosophy. Info happens to a case > > of generalization which can be mathematized, which in turn allows > > it to be generalized even more. > > So, what’s the problem? > > STAN > > > > On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 7:44 AM, Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > Information is not “something out there” which “exists” otherwise than > as our construct. > > I agree with this. And I wonder to what extent our problems in discussing > information come from our desire to shoe-horn many different phenomena into > the same construct. It would be possible to disaggregate the construct. It > be possible to discuss the topics which we address on this list without > using the word 'information'. We could discuss redundancy, variety, > constraint, meaning, structural coupling, coordination, expectation, > language, etc. > > In what ways would our explanations be weakened? > > In what ways might we gain in clarity? > > If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our > discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human experience. > But many scientific discussions are remote from everyday human experience. > > Dai > > On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote: > > Dear colleagues, > > > > A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of bits > of information. > > Alternatively: the expected information content *H *of a probability > distribution is . > > *H* is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb’s formulation > of the entropy . > > > > This definition of information is an operational definition. In my > opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the > question of “what is information?” As the discussion on this list > demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one can > answer the question “how is information defined?” Information is not > “something out there” which “exists” otherwise than as our construct. > > > > Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move > forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman’s and Bob Logan’s (2007) definition > of information “as natural selection assembling the very constraints on the > release of energy that then constitutes work and the propagation of > organization.” I asked several times what this means and how one can > measure this information. Hitherto, I only obtained the answer that > colleagues who disagree with me will be cited. J Another answer was that > “counting” may lead to populism. J > > > > Best, > > Loet > > > ------------------------------ > > Loet Leydesdorff > > Professor, University of Amsterdam > Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) > > l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ > Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of > Sussex; > > Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, > Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, > <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing; > > Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of > London; > > http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en > > > > *From:* Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.sto...@gmail.com <dick.sto...@gmail.com>] > > *Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM > *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net > *Cc:* James Peters; u...@umces.edu; Alex Hankey; FIS Webinar > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? > > > > List, > > > > Please allow me to respond to Loet about the definition of information > stated below. > > > > 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive > ("bizarre"); (p. 27) > > > > I agree. I struggled with this definition for a long time before > realising that Shannon was really discussing "amount of information" or the > number of bits needed to convey a message. He was looking for a formula > that would provide an accurate estimate of the number of bits needed to > convey a message and realised that the amount of information (number of > bits) needed to convey a message was dependent on the "amount" of > uncertainty that had to be eliminated and so he equated these. > > > > It makes sense to do this, but we must distinguish between "amount of > information" and "information". For example, we can measure amount of > water in liters, but this does not tell us what water is and likewise the > measure we use for "amount of information" does not tell us what > information is. We can, for example equate the amount of water needed to > fill a container with the volume of the container, but we should not think > that water is therefore identical to an empty volume. Similarly we should > not think that information is identical to uncertainty. > > > > By equating the number of bits needed to convey a message with the "amount > of uncertainty" that has to be eliminated Shannon, in effect, equated > opposites so that he could get an estimate of the number of bits needed to > eliminate the uncertainty. We should not therefore consider that this > equation establishes what information is. > > > > Dick > > > > > > On 18 December 2016 at 15:05, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> > wrote: > > Dear James and colleagues, > > > > Weaver (1949) made two major remarks about his coauthor (Shannon)'s > contribution: > > > > 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive > ("bizarre"); (p. 27) > > 2. "In particular, information must not be confused with meaning." (p. 8) > > > > The definition of information as relevant for a system of reference > confuses information with "meaningful information" and thus sacrifices the > surplus value of Shannon's counter-intuitive definition. > > > > information observer > > > > that integrates interactive processes such as > > > > physical interactions such photons stimulating the retina of the eye, > human-machine interactions (this is the level that Shannon lives on), > biological interaction such body temperature relative to touch ice or heat > source, social interaction such as this forum started by Pedro, economic > interaction such as the stock market, ... [Lerner, page 1]. > > > > We are in need of a theory of meaning. Otherwise, one cannot measure > meaningful information. In a previous series of communications we discussed > redundancy from this perspective. > > > > Lerner introduces mathematical expectation E[Sap] (difference between of a > priory entropy [sic] and a posteriori entropy), which is distinguished from > the notion of relative information Iap (Learner, page 7). > > > > ) expresses in bits of information the information generated when the a > priori distribution is turned into the a posteriori one . This follows > within the Shannon framework without needing an observer. I use this > equation, for example, in my 1995-book *The Challenge of Scientometrics* > (Chapters 8 and 9), with a reference to Theil (1972). The relative > information is defined as the *H*/*H*(max). > > > > I agree that the intuitive notion of information is derived from the Latin > “in-formare” (Varela, 1979). But most of us do no longer use “force” and > “mass” in the intuitive (Aristotelian) sense. J The proliferation of the > meanings of information if confused with “meaningful information” is > indicative for an “index sui et falsi”, in my opinion. The repetitive > discussion lames the progression at this list. It is “like asking whether a > glass is half empty or half full” (Hayles, 1990, p. 59). > > > > This act of forming forming an information process results in the > construction of an observer that is the owner [holder] of information. > > > > The system of reference is then no longer the message, but the observer > who provides meaning to the information (uncertainty). I agree that this is > a selection process, but the variation first has to be specified > independently (before it can be selected. > > > > And Lerner introduces the threshold between objective and subjective > observes (page 27). This leads to a consideration selection and > cooperation that includes entanglement. > > > > I don’t see a direct relation between information and entanglement. An > observer can be entangled. > > > > Best, > > Loet > > > > PS. Pedro: Let me assume that this is my second posting in the week which > ends tonight. L. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > -- > > > 4 Austin Dr. Prior Park St. James, Barbados BB23004 > Tel: 246-421-8855 <%28246%29%20421-8855> > Cell: 246-243-5938 <%28246%29%20243-5938> > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Fis mailing list > > Fis@listas.unizar.es > > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > -- > > ----------------------------------------- > > > > Professor David (Dai) Griffiths > > Professor of Education > > School of Education and Psychology > > The University of Bolton > > Deane Road > > Bolton, BL3 5AB > > > > Office: T3 02 > > http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC > > > > SKYPE: daigriffiths > > UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559 <+44%207491%20151559> > > Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912 <+34%20687%2095%2059%2012> > > Work: + 44 (0)7826917705 <+44%207826%20917705> > > (Please don't leave voicemail) > > email: > > d.e.griffi...@bolton.ac.uk > > dai.griffith...@gmail.com > > _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > _______________________________________________ > > Fis mailing list > > Fis@listas.unizar.es > > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > -- > > ----------------------------------------- > > > > Professor David (Dai) Griffiths > > Professor of Education > > School of Education and Psychology > > The University of Bolton > > Deane Road > > Bolton, BL3 5AB > > > > Office: T3 02 > > http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC > > > > SKYPE: daigriffiths > > UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559 <+44%207491%20151559> > > Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912 <+34%20687%2095%2059%2012> > > Work: + 44 (0)7826917705 <+44%207826%20917705> > > (Please don't leave voicemail) > > email: > > d.e.griffi...@bolton.ac.uk > > dai.griffith...@gmail.com > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > -- > > Professor Terrence W. 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