Dear folks, I feel I should mention our book on structural realism, Every Thing Must Go, which argues that it is only relations and not things in themselves that really exist, according to the best most recent physics. On this account, looking for more is a mug's game. There are skeptical objections to structural realism as well, but they are much weaker than for an actuality beneath the observable phenomena. We also, argue, though, that we can access what we can interact with through its potentials for interaction, so some degree of realism is maintained. Some of the basic argument is in my Necessity of Natural Kinds available on my web site. It is in a way a sort of minimalist answer to the Humean extreme nominalism about causation. There is further relevance to information theory in my papers relating information transfer to causation, also on my web site.
John -----Original Message----- From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Alex Hankey Sent: December 24, 2016 6:02 AM To: karl.javors...@gmail.com Cc: bindem...@verizon.net; fis <fis@listas.unizar.es> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41: On the relation between information and meaning RE: "The same situation is here with gravitation. We have a name for it, can measure it and integrate the concept - more or less seamlessly – into a general explanation. We just do not know, in an epistemological sense, what gravitation is. We have to take the normative power of the factual seriously and admit that we may have problems in the naming of an observed fact. This does not absolve us from the task of philosophers, that is, to try to understand and find good explanations for the facts that we perceive and to our thoughts about the perceptions and the facts. Dear Karl, I do not quite see how the point you are making here differs from the very simple statement that 'we do not know what anything in the physical world is' (where the word 'is' is being used in some loosely defined Absolute sense). We only know how it interacts and how it behaves in given experimental / experiential situations. Of course in the case of sugar (sucrose, for example) we know what it is as crystals we see, as something we taste, use to sweeten our desserts, and our tea / coffee etc., and its chemical structure. I am then comfortable with the feeling that I 'know what sugar is'. The same applies to a superconductor or a Josephson junction between two superconductors. In the case of elementary particles, we say that 'a free electron is a spin 1/2 representation of the Poincare Group', and this gives it a meaning of a slightly more precise kind than sugar. It becomes a precisely stated element of mathematics, that I personally equate with a kind of 'Platonic Form'. Equally in my heart, I feel that I have quite a good idea of what 'goodness' is, and I am equally clear that the IS - Daesh members who murder innocent victims in Iraq / Syria etc. do not. We communicate on a day to day basis taking these things for granted. Am I missing something? I would sincerely like to know if I am, because I am about to write up an account of cognition of gestalts from the perspective of the ancient Vedic science of Shiksha concerning the memorization and understanding of texts, and I would like to get it as water-tight as possible. PLEASE comment!! Best wishes for Christmas, New Year and the Holiday season, Alex P.S. You say that 'Wittgenstein begot Frege', but surely Frege was completing his work just when Russell discovered his paradox at the end of writing the Principia with Whitehead, which Wiki say was published, 1910, 1912 and 1913, whereas Wittgenstein wrote his Tractatus while a prisoner of war in Italy in 1917-18. On 24/12/2016, Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com> wrote: > Information and Wittgenstein > > > > We should keep the self-evident in focus and refrain from descending > into a philosophical nihilism. We are, after all, reasonable people, > who are able to use our intelligence while communicating, and usually > we understand each other quite well. The idea, that information is > just a mental creation, evades the point: conceding that information > is only a mental image, then what is that which determines, which > amino acid comes to which place and is apparently contained in the > sequence of the DNA triplets? If information is just an erroneous > concept, then what is that what we receive as we ask at the airport, which > gate to go for boarding? > > No, information does exist and we do use it day by day. Shannon has > developed a method of repeatedly bifurcating a portion of N until > finding that n of N that corresponds to the same n of which the sender > encoded the search pattern for the receiver. The task lies not in > negating the existence of the phaenomenon, but in proposing a more > elegant and for biology useful explanation of the phaenomenon. The > object of the game is still the same: identifying an n of N. > > The same situation is here with gravitation. We have a name for it, > can measure it and integrate the concept - more or less seamlessly – > into a general explanation. We just do not know, in an epistemological > sense, what gravitation is. We have to take the normative power of the > factual seriously and admit that we may have problems in the naming of > an observed fact. This does not absolve us from the task of > philosophers, that is, to try to understand and find good explanations > for the facts that we perceive and to our thoughts about the perceptions and > the facts. > > Adorno summarised the critique on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, by saying, > that W. apparently had not read the job description of a philosopher > carefully > enough: the task is not to investigate that what can be said exactly > about a subject that is well known to all, but the task is to chisel > away the border separating that what can be only felt and that what > can be expressed understandably. This is the envy speaking of someone > who suffered an Oedipus tragedy. Socrates said that the perpetrator of > a crime suffers more than the victim, and post-war German philosophy > understandably had no time to be interested in rules of exact speech. > The grammar of the logical language, as a subject for serious study, > was swept aside by historical cataclysms, although Wittgenstein begot > Frege and Carnap who begot von Neumann and Boole who begot Shannon and > Chomsky. That he in his later life put aside his epoch-generating work > is completely in the consequence of what he had said. It is not > disowning the ladder one has built to climb up a level of abstraction > while doing a cartography of what exact talking really means, but a > wise and truthful modesty of an artist who had fabricated a tool for a > specific project. No self-respecting artist would want to be > remembered for a practical tool he had assembled for a specific task. > Roughly citing, he says so much: those who have understood what is > written here, may throw [this book] away, like one has no need for a > ladder after one has climbed a level. Having found out how the > technical people speak (or should speak), he withdraws from that > field, having clarified the rules of exact thinking, closing the > subject in a conclusive fashion for about 4 generations, and acts in later > life as if precognisant of Adorno’s words. > > Information is a connection of a symbol with a different symbol, if > this state of the world can have a background and alternatives. If > something can be otherwise, then the information is contained in the > enumeration of the cases of being otherwise. > > By the use of computers, we can now create a whole topography and > dramaturgy of exact speech. Had we the creativity of the Greeks, we > would write a comedy, performed in public, by actors and narrators. > The title could be: “All acting dutifully, striving their right place, > catharsia are inevitable”. The best youth of Sparta, Athens etc. would > compete for prominent places in diverse disciplines, but the results > are not satisfactory, as the debate emerges, which of the disciplines > are above the others. The wise people of Attica have come up with a > perpetual compromise, its main points repeatedly summarised by the > chorus, ruling that being constantly underway between both correct > positions: p1 in discipline d1 and position p2 in discipline d2, is > the divine sign of a noble character. If every athlete follows the > same rule, imagine the traffic jams on the stage of the amphitheatre! > The Greeks would have built an elaborate system of philosophy about > the predictable collisions among actors representing athletes who have > attended many of the concourses. They could have come up with specific > names for typical results and would have named the agglomerations > “elements” and “isotopes” that differ among each other on how many of > the actors are glued together for lack of space to pass through, where > too many paths cross, and on the form of the squeeze they constitute. > They would no doubt have categorised and sub-classified and tabulated > the inevitable melee that comes from having competing requirements to > serve, a subject not far from their preoccupations with logic and > predictable, consistent, rule observing behaviour by all, that by its very > nature creates cooperation and conflict, destruction and growth. > > As long as the background and the alternatives to the statements, that > describe what is the case, are conceptually discouraged or disallowed, > it appears not very easy to use the term “information” in a consistent > fashion. Information describes that what is not the case. (The DNA > eliminates all the alternatives to that specific amino acid on that > specific place; we have received information by knowing all those > gates where we will not board the plane.) > > > > Thank you for this enjoyable year. > > Karl > > > > 2016-12-24 2:39 GMT+01:00 Louis H Kauffman <kauff...@uic.edu>: > >> Dear Steve, >> You write >> "But in later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of >> relating propositions in language to facts concerning the world could >> not in itself be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. >> Once the validity of using language to describe the world ini a >> rigorous and unambiguous way is questioned, not much is left.” >> >> I do not think that the issue of proof was foremost for Wittgenstein. >> Rather, he later understood that a pure mirroring of language and >> world was untenable and worked directly with language and its use to >> show how complex was the actuality. The result is that one can still >> read the Tractatus meaningfully, knowing that it states and discusses >> an ideal of (formal) language and a view of the world so created that >> is necessarily limited. >> Indeed the later Wittgenstein and the Tractatus come together at the >> point of the Tractatus showing how meagre is that ‘that can be said’ >> from its mirrored and logical point of view. >> The Tractatus indicates its own incompleteness, and in do doing >> invalidates its use by the logical positivists as a model for the >> performance of science. It was in this background that (through >> Goedel) the Incompleteness Theorem arose in the midst of the Vienna >> Circle. And here we are in a world generated by formal computer >> languages, facing the uncertainties of models that are sensitive >> enough (as in economics and social science) to cross the boundary and >> affect what is to be modeled. >> Best, >> Lou Kauffman >> >> On Dec 23, 2016, at 11:27 AM, steven bindeman <bindem...@verizon.net> >> wrote: >> >> I would like to contribute to the current ongoing discussion >> regarding the relation between information and meaning. I agree with >> Dai Griffiths and others that the term information is a problematic >> construction. Since it is often used as an example of fitting the >> details of a specific worldly situation into a linguistic form that >> can be processed by a computer, this fact in itself introduces >> various distortions from the reality that is being represented. The >> degree of distortion might even be an example of the degree of >> uncertainty. >> >> I believe that reference to the early work of Wittgenstein might be >> of use in this context, especially since his work in his Tractatus >> text on problems related to logical atomism influenced the design of >> the von Neumann computer, led to the creation of the Vienna Circle >> group and later inspired the philosophical movement of logical >> positivism. Alan Turing was also one of his students. >> >> In this early work Wittgenstein had believed that a formal theory of >> language could be developed, capable of showing how propositions can >> succeed in representing real states of affairs and in serving the >> purposes of real life. He believed that language is like a picture >> which is laid against reality like a measuring rod and reaches right >> out to it. But in later years he eventually recognized that the >> possibility of relating propositions in language to facts concerning >> the world could not in itself be proved. Without proof, the house of >> cards collapses. Once the validity of using language to describe the >> world ini a rigorous and unambiguous way is questioned, not much is >> left. Although propositions are indeed capable of modeling and >> describing the world with a rigor not unlike that of mathematical >> representations of physical phenomena, they cannot themselves >> describe how they represent this world without becoming self-referential. >> Propositions are consequently essentially meaningless, since their >> meaning consists precisely in their ability to connect with the world >> outside of language. A perfect language mirrors a perfect world, but >> since the latter is nothing more than a chimera so is the former. >> >> Here are some quotes (taken out of their original contexts) from >> Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that I believe are relevant to the >> discussion on information and meaning: >> >> The facts in logical space are the world. What is the case — a fact— >> is the existence of states of affairs. A state of affairs (a state >> of >> things) >> is a combination of objects (things). It is essential to things that >> they should be possible constituents of states of affairs. If I know >> an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of >> affairs. Objects contain the possibility of all situations. The >> configuration of objects produces states of affairs. The totality of >> existing states of affairs is the world. The existence and >> non-existence of states of affairs is reality. >> States of affairs are independent of one another. A picture is a >> model of reality. A picture is a fact. Logical pictures can depict >> the world. A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of >> existence and non-existence of states of affairs. Situations can be >> described but not given names. (Names are like points; propositions >> like arrows — they have >> sense.) Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a >> proposition does a name have meaning. >> >> Finally, with regards to the problems about information, I would add >> that Alfred Korzybski (and later Marshall McLuhan) once wrote that >> “the map is not the territory.” The map is merely a picture of >> something that it represents. Increasing the amount of information >> may reduce the granularity of the picture, but it remains a picture. >> This means that accumulation greater and greater amounts of >> information can never completely replace or represent the infinite >> complexity of any real-lilfe situation — and this is an insight that >> Wittgenstein realized only in his later philosophical work. >> >> Steve Bindeman >> >> >> On Dec 22, 2016, at 7:37 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote: >> >> Send Fis mailing list submissions to >> fis@listas.unizar.es >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> fis-ow...@listas.unizar.es >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Fis digest..." >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: What is information? and What is life? (Dai Griffiths) >> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> - >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 12:44:59 +0000 >> From: Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com> >> To: fis@listas.unizar.es >> Subject: Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? >> Message-ID: <dbbfa511-b4e1-79b5-f800-bad1c231b...@gmail.com> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed" >> >> Information is not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise >> >> than as our construct. >> >> I agree with this. And I wonder to what extent our problems in >> discussing information come from our desire to shoe-horn many >> different phenomena into the same construct. It would be possible to >> disaggregate the construct. It be possible to discuss the topics >> which we address on this list without using the word 'information'. >> We could discuss redundancy, variety, constraint, meaning, structural >> coupling, coordination, expectation, language, etc. >> >> In what ways would our explanations be weakened? >> >> In what ways might we gain in clarity? >> >> If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our >> discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human >> experience. But many scientific discussions are remote from everyday >> human experience. >> >> Dai >> >> On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote: >> >> >> Dear colleagues, >> >> A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of >> bits of information. >> >> Alternatively: the expected information content /H /of a probability >> distribution is . >> >> /H/is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb?s >> formulation of the entropy . >> >> This definition of information is an operational definition. In my >> opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the >> question of ?what is information?? As the discussion on this list >> demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one >> can answer the question ?how is information defined?? Information is >> not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise than as our construct. >> >> Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move >> forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman?s and Bob Logan?s (2007) >> definition of information ?as natural selection assembling the very >> constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes work and >> the propagation of organization.? I asked several times what this >> means and how one can measure this information. Hitherto, I only >> obtained the answer that colleagues who disagree with me will be >> cited. JAnother answer was that ?counting? may lead to populism. J >> >> Best, >> >> Loet >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> --- >> >> Loet Leydesdorff >> >> Professor, University of Amsterdam >> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) >> >> l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>; >> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ Associate Faculty, SPRU, >> <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of Sussex; >> >> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, >> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, >> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing; >> >> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of >> London; >> >> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en >> >> *From:*Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.sto...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM >> *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net >> *Cc:* James Peters; u...@umces.edu; Alex Hankey; FIS Webinar >> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? >> >> List, >> >> Please allow me to respond to Loet about the definition of >> information stated below. >> >> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive >> ("bizarre"); (p. 27) >> >> I agree. I struggled with this definition for a long time before >> realising that Shannon was really discussing "amount of information" >> or the number of bits needed to convey a message. He was looking for >> a formula that would provide an accurate estimate of the number of >> bits needed to convey a message and realised that the amount of >> information (number of bits) needed to convey a message was dependent >> on the "amount" of uncertainty that had to be eliminated and so he >> equated these. >> >> It makes sense to do this, but we must distinguish between "amount of >> information" and "information". For example, we can measure amount >> of water in liters, but this does not tell us what water is and >> likewise the measure we use for "amount of information" does not tell >> us what information is. We can, for example equate the amount of >> water needed to fill a container with the volume of the container, >> but we should not think that water is therefore identical to an empty volume. >> Similarly we should not think that information is identical to >> uncertainty. >> >> By equating the number of bits needed to convey a message with the >> "amount of uncertainty" that has to be eliminated Shannon, in effect, >> equated opposites so that he could get an estimate of the number of >> bits needed to eliminate the uncertainty. We should not therefore >> consider that this equation establishes what information is. >> >> Dick >> >> On 18 December 2016 at 15:05, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net >> <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>> wrote: >> >> Dear James and colleagues, >> >> Weaver (1949) made two major remarks about his coauthor (Shannon)'s >> contribution: >> >> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive >> ("bizarre"); (p. 27) >> >> 2. "In particular, information must not be confused with meaning." >> (p. 8) >> >> The definition of information as relevant for a system of reference >> confuses information with "meaningful information" and thus >> sacrifices the surplus value of Shannon's counter-intuitive definition. >> >> information observer >> >> that integrates interactive processes such as >> >> physical interactions such photons stimulating the retina of the eye, >> human-machine interactions (this is the level that Shannon lives on), >> biological interaction such body temperature relative to touch ice or >> heat source, social interaction such as this forum started by Pedro, >> economic interaction such as the stock market, ... [Lerner, page 1]. >> >> We are in need of a theory of meaning. Otherwise, one cannot measure >> meaningful information. In a previous series of communications we >> discussed redundancy from this perspective. >> >> Lerner introduces mathematical expectation E[Sap] (difference between >> of a priory entropy [sic] and a posteriori entropy), which is >> distinguished from the notion of relative information Iap (Learner, >> page 7). >> >> ) expresses in bits of information the information generated when the >> a priori distribution is turned into the a posteriori one . This >> follows within the Shannon framework without needing an observer. I >> use this equation, for example, in my 1995-book /The Challenge of >> Scientometrics/ (Chapters 8 and 9), with a reference to Theil (1972). >> The relative information is defined as the /H///H/(max). >> >> I agree that the intuitive notion of information is derived from the >> Latin ?in-formare? (Varela, 1979). But most of us do no longer use >> ?force? and ?mass? in the intuitive (Aristotelian) sense. JThe >> proliferation of the meanings of information if confused with >> ?meaningful information? is indicative for an ?index sui et falsi?, >> in my opinion. The repetitive discussion lames the progression at >> this list. It is ?like asking whether a glass is half empty or half full? >> (Hayles, 1990, p. 59). >> >> This act of forming forming an information process results in the >> construction of an observer that is the owner [holder] of information. >> >> The system of reference is then no longer the message, but the >> observer who provides meaning to the information (uncertainty). I >> agree that this is a selection process, but the variation first has >> to be specified independently (before it can be selected. >> >> And Lerner introduces the threshold between objective and subjective >> observes (page 27). This leads to a consideration selection and >> cooperation that includes entanglement. >> >> I don?t see a direct relation between information and entanglement. >> An observer can be entangled. >> >> Best, >> >> Loet >> >> PS. Pedro: Let me assume that this is my second posting in the week >> which ends tonight. L. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> 4 Austin Dr. Prior Park St. James, Barbados BB23004 >> Tel: 246-421-8855 >> Cell: 246-243-5938 >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> -- >> ----------------------------------------- >> >> Professor David (Dai) Griffiths >> Professor of Education >> School of Education and Psychology >> The University of Bolton >> Deane Road >> Bolton, BL3 5AB >> >> Office: T3 02 >> http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC >> >> SKYPE: daigriffiths >> UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559 <+44%207491%20151559> Spanish Mobile: + >> 34 687955912 <+34%20687%2095%2059%2012> >> Work: + 44 (0)7826917705 <+44%207826%20917705> (Please don't leave >> voicemail) >> email: >> d.e.griffi...@bolton.ac.uk >> dai.griffith...@gmail.com >> >> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was >> scrubbed... >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment.html> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was >> scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 497 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was >> scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 829 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0001.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was >> scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 560 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0002.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was >> scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 975 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0003.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was >> scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 497 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0004.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was >> scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 495 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0005.png> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Subject: Digest Footer >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> End of Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41 >> *********************************** >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> > -- Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.) Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science, SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789 ____________________________________________________________ 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3> _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
