On 6 Nov 2017 at 5:30AM, John Collier wrote:
In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to find what underlies both. Yes, there have already been serious attempts in this direction, though which may not yet have received due attention from the folks interested in the issue of information. One example is the entropy production fluctuation theorem by Gavin Crooks (1999). The agenda is on the distinction between states and events in thermodynamics. An essence is seen in the uniqueness of thermodynamics allowing for even the non-state or history-dependent variable such as heat. This perspective is powerful enough to precipitate a dependable synthesis out of integrating both the state and the process descriptions. When a microscopic system of interest contacts a heat bath, its development along an arbitrary trajectory of the state attributes of the system necessarily accompanies the associated event of heat flow either to or from the bath. If the trajectory is accompanied by the heat flow to the bath over any finite time interval, it would be far more likely compared with the reversed trajectory absorbing the same amount of heat flow from the bath. This has been a main message from Crooks’ fluctuation theorem. One practical implication of the theorem is that if the trajectory happens to constitute a loop, the likely loop must be the one having the net positive heat flow to the bath. For the reversed loop trajectory would have to come to accompany the same amount of heat flow from the bath back into the inside of the system, and that would be far less likely. Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must be either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the two. A lesson we could learn from this pedagogical example is that thermodynamics is a naturalized tool for making macroscopic events out of the state attributes on the microscopic level irrespectively of whether or not it may have already been called informational. It is quite different from what statistical mechanics has accomplished so far. Something called quantum thermodynamics is gaining its momentum somewhere these days. Koichiro Matsuno From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of John Collier Sent: Monday, November 6, 2017 5:30 AM To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism Loet, I have no disagreement with this. at least in the detailed summary you give. In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to find what underlies both. My mention of the Scholastics was to Pierce's version, not the common interpretation due to a dep misunderstanding about what they were up to. I recommend a serous study of Peirce on te issues of meaning and metaphysics. He wa deeply indebted to their work iin logic. Of course there may be no common ground, but the our project is hopeless. Other things you have said on this group lead me to think it is not a dead end of confused notions. In that case we are wasting our time. John
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