Joseph says that "Luhmann perhaps deserves some historical credit for
basing his theory on information". I would not give him any special
credit for this, but I do see value elsewhere.
To my mind Luhmann does not base his theory on information, in the sense
of establishing a theory of information and then applying that theory to
understand how society works. Rather I see him trying to answer the
question "what is an institution, that it should be able to survive
longer than the people who operate within it, and how does it achieve
this?". In any case, that is the question that his work helps me to
think about. In addressing this issue, and thinking about patterns of
communication in autopoietic terms, Luhmann of course had to take a
position on what information might be.
Institutions are indeed, as I see it, a kind of abstraction standing
above, and often pathologically ignoring or intervening in, the
'contradictorial relations and dynamics' of individuals. /Pace /Fuchs, I
find it helpful to understand the mechanisms through which institutions
maintain this position. If we can understand this, then we are better
able to formulate how we might deal with the problems and opportunities
that institutions generate. Some or many institutions (according to
one's political position) have Fascist implications. Alternatively (or
simultaneously) they may have benefits. But in any event, they are
objects of study, not artifacts of Luhmanns methodology, whatever we may
think of it.
What Luhmann does not do is provide any insight about important related
questions, such as how political processes interact with and flow
through institutions, nor how individuals can or should orient ourselves
within those processes, nor what we should do about pathological
institutions. Nor (as far as I know) does Luhmann offer a theory of
information that makes claims for application beyond the scope of his
own inquiry. I don't think it makes sense to consult Luhmann when
looking for the answers to these questions, nor to dismiss him for not
providing the answers.
There are many on this list who know Luhmann's work much better than I
do, so I stand ready to be corrected!
Dai
On 08/11/17 18:27, Joseph Brenner wrote:
Dear Jose Javier,
Thank you very much for your constructive response to my note. I
respect your view of Luhmann and his constructivism (?), which you
have certainly correctly summarized in a few words.
However, what the Lupasco theory of actuality and potentiality does is
to offer some ontological basis for both, grounded in physics and is
hence in my opinion hence worthy of some modicum of our attention. It
/is /possible to talk about reality without the pretty little diagrams
and calculus of Spencer-Brown.
Luhmann talks about the "constant interplay" between actual and
potential, their /ineinanderstehen/, but there is no functional
relation to the mundane properties of real physical systems. As Loet
showed at the time, Luhmannian structures can be defined
/analytically/, but that is not enough for me. And a key point: why
'constant' interplay? Is there something wrong, or is it just too
real, to include discontinuities as equally important as continuities?
It should be clear that I completely disagree with the place given to
Luhmann in current thought. Luhmann perhaps deserves some historical
credit for basing his theory on information. However, I follow
Christian Fuchs who said in 2006 that "The function of Luhmann's
theory for society is that it is completely useless".
Society does not "contain" human beings: society is a group of human
beings composed of individuals and the group and their contradictorial
relations and dynamics. Luhmann stated that the "ground of being" is
at the same time actuality and potentiality, but tells us nothing
about their nature and rules for their evolution. Meaning cannot be a
/unity/ of actualization and potentialization (or re- and re-). In
unity, the two lose their necessary specificity and basis for change.
Luhmann took human beings as agents out of his system, and replaced
them with abstractions. Fascist ideology is not far away.
If people would spend 1/20 the time on Lupasco that they do on Pierce
and Luhmann, . . .
Best regards,
Joseph
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Jose Javier Blanco Rivero <mailto:javierwe...@gmail.com>
*To:* Joseph Brenner <mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>
*Sent:* Wednesday, November 08, 2017 11:20 AM
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism
Dear Joseph,
Luhmann's concept of meaning (Sinn) is defined exactly as the unity of
the difference between actuality and potentiality. Maybe there an
answer can be found.
Besides, Luhmann's Sinn can also be translated as information since it
regards redundancy and selection. Luhmann self referred to Sinn (which
I'd rather to translate as sensemaking) as information processing.
Best regards
El nov 8, 2017 6:59 AM, "Joseph Brenner" <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
<mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>> escribió:
Dear Colleagues,
This is simply to register a dissenting opinion, for similar
reasons, with the last two notes, if nothing else to say that
there can be one:
1. Regarding John C.'s view of the value of Pierce, there can be
no common ground. Scholastic, propositional logic is part of the
problem. His metaphysics has no ground in physics. Only Pierce's
intuitions, to which he gives less value, have some value for me.
2. Koichiro presents some good science, but it is misapplied.
Nothing tells us that information, or another complex natural
process, evolves according to the trajectories that he describes:
Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology
must be either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an
undisciplined mix of the two.
Rather, like this discussion, such processes follow follow a 'mix'
but is by no means undisciplined, even if it is partly backwards
and forwards at the same time. Such scare words should not be
used. /Pace /John, I think what underlies both has been found in
part, and it is the linked movement of systems from actual to
potential and /vice versa. /
//
What is missing from /my/ picture, since no-one seems to point to
it, are the detailed values of the path from actuality to
potentiality, which themselves may go from maxima to minima, as
discussed by Michel Godron. Michel has left us . . .
Best regards,
Joseph
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Koichiro Matsuno <mailto:cxq02...@nifty.com>
*To:* fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
*Sent:* Wednesday, November 08, 2017 1:18 AM
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism
On 6 Nov 2017 at 5:30AM, John Collier wrote:
In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in
physics is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive
sciences. Our problem is to find what underlies both.
Yes, there have already been serious attempts in this direction,
though which may not yet have received due attention from the
folks interested in the issue of information.
One example is the entropy production fluctuation theorem by Gavin
Crooks (1999). The agenda is on the distinction between states
and events in thermodynamics. An essence is seen in the uniqueness
of thermodynamics allowing for even the non-state or
history-dependent variable such as heat. This perspective is
powerful enough to precipitate a dependable synthesis out of
integrating both the state and the process descriptions.
When a microscopic system of interest contacts a heat bath, its
development along an arbitrary trajectory of the state attributes
of the system necessarily accompanies the associated event of heat
flow either to or from the bath. If the trajectory is accompanied
by the heat flow to the bath over any finite time interval, it
would be far more likely compared with the reversed trajectory
absorbing the same amount of heat flow from the bath. This has
been a main message from Crooks’ fluctuation theorem. One
practical implication of the theorem is that if the trajectory
happens to constitute a loop, the likely loop must be the one
having the net positive heat flow to the bath. For the reversed
loop trajectory would have to come to accompany the same amount of
heat flow from the bath back into the inside of the system, and
that would be far less likely. Any robust loop trajectory
appearing in biochemistry and biology must be either clockwise or
anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the two.
A lesson we could learn from this pedagogical example is that
thermodynamics is a naturalized tool for making macroscopic events
out of the state attributes on the microscopic level
irrespectively of whether or not it may have already been called
informational. It is quite different from what statistical
mechanics has accomplished so far. Something called quantum
thermodynamics is gaining its momentum somewhere these days.
Koichiro Matsuno
*From:*Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>] *On Behalf Of *John Collier
*Sent:* Monday, November 6, 2017 5:30 AM
*To:* fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism
Loet, I have no disagreement with this. at least in the detailed
summary you give. In fact I would argue that the notion of
information as used in physics is empirically based just as it is
in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to find what underlies both.
My mention of the Scholastics was to Pierce's version, not the
common interpretation due to a dep misunderstanding about what
they were up to. I recommend a serous study of Peirce on te issues
of meaning and metaphysics. He wa deeply indebted to their work
iin logic.
Of course there may be no common ground, but the our project is
hopeless. Other things you have said on this group lead me to
think it is not a dead end of confused notions. In that case we
are wasting our time.
John
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