Dear Gordana,

On 19 Nov 2017, at 00:28, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic wrote:

Dear All,
In the discussion about the nature of science and the role of quantitative and qualitative methods I would like to add the following statement:
Logic is the science of rational thinking or reasoning.
Logic is not a quantitative science.

I can't agree more. I would say that most of mathematics is not on quantitative things, like topology is concerned with global invariant. Some modal logic are meta-theories of things which are not formalizable, or even not definable. Modal logics was invented for complex metaphysical/theological issue (and is "redeemed", as Boolos said, by the incompleteness phenomenon, also an hardly purely quantitative result).

The logic has the sub-branch "model theory", which studies the semantics of theories, and which are usually not purely syntactical matter, not quantitative at all, I would say.

But now, I agree that even in "non quantitative field" the theories should be testable. That is possible for the theories which are able to connect their qualitative results to quantitative results.

Mathematical logic is the same as Metamathematics, and is basically the mathematical study of the (classical, intuitionist, ...) mathematicians.

Mathematicians are typically not quantitative things, ... even when the computationalist and his digital surgeon saves his body and soul on some hard disk, temporarily.

This connects to ancient Greek science that sprung out of philosophy of nature (even Newton was still natural philosopher) which relied more on reason than on observation/experience. And where they indeed made quantitative predictions like Eratosthenes who calculated the circumference of the Earth, the central part of his prediction was based on logical reasoning.

The main works of Aristotle were the Prior Analytics (Logic), the Physics, the Animal History, the Rhetorics, the Poetics, the Metaphysics, the Ethics, and the Politics. Today we consider Logic, Physics and Biology to be sciences, while Rhetorics, Poetics, Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics are not. How compulsory is it for something to be “science” in order to be a respectable form of knowledge? Perhaps it is useful at some point in the development of human knowledge to have a holistic view bridging across sciences and other fields? Rational, logical view.

Then I would suggest, even just as a toy, the theology of the universal universal machine. Incompleteness makes Gödel beweisbar arithmetical predicate into a form of rational justifiability, not "knowledge", as Gödel saw in 1933. Indeed the non provable consistency ~Bf is the same as Bf -> f, so Bp -> p is not provable in general, as it should be for being an operator of knowledge, but that is exactly why we get, for the ideally sound machine, the equivalence between all Theaetetus' variant of probability (they all "see" the same reality), but obeying quite different logic:

p  (true, the ONE)
Bp (Justifiable, the INTELLECT)
Bp & p (Knowable, the SOUL)
Bp & ~Bf (Observable, the INTELLIGIBLE MATTER)
Bp & ~Bf & p (Sensible, the SENSIBLE MATTER)

Note that by Tarski theorem, the machine cannot provide any arithmetical representation of their first person self (the knower). They would need a predicate Vp (Verity of p), and the diagonal lemma soild lead to an epimenidian proposition k asserting k <-> ~Vk. So Bp & p is not translatable into a Bp & Vp, and indeed that can be shown necessary. The universal machine has a soul and she knows that this soul is not a machine/number!

Science itself is not everywhere quantitative in its various layers and branches. There are theoretical non-observables in quantum mechanics and other physical theories and they play important role in their construction and operation.

I agree.

Regarding the other discussion point, the necessity to differentiate between "the difference that makes the difference" for a machine and for a living organism I would say that the difference exists but is becoming less and less clear-cut the more machines become cognitive and intelligent. It is not difficult to imagine a limit case where intelligent machine talks to other intelligent machine. Would that be then mixing Shannon with (bio)semiotics?

It would lead to interesting arithmetical interpretation of biosemiotics.

Then the human themselves, in the long run, will get more and more prosthetical parts. Some humans benefits already from electronical implants, and some teams work hard on an artificial rat hypo-campus.

The question is not "is Mechanism true?", but the more ethico- qualitative question "do you accept your daughter or your son marry someone who already got a digital brain transplant"; etc.

The notion of communication might be constructed in a useful way to cover different levels of organisation of phenomena. As growth of a crystal is different from a growth of a plant is different from a growth of a child – and yet it makes sense to talk about growth. So I see using the word “communication” to machines or why not simplest physical systems that interact with other physical systems causing "the difference that makes the difference” for the system itself. Definitions indeed are just the question of making good sense – they are matter of choice.

I agree.

Best Regards,



Mark Burgin and I have sent invitations to contribute to World Scientific books: Vol 1 Philosophy and Methodology of Information (G. Dodig-Crnkovic and M. Burgin, edts.)
Part 1. Philosophy of information
Part 2. Methodology of information
Part 3. Philosophy of information studies
Part 4. Methodology of information studies

Vol 2 Theoretical Information Studies (M. Burgin and G. Dodig- Crnkovic, edts.)
Part 1. Foundations of information
Part 2. Information theory
Part 3. Information as a natural phenomenon
Part 4. Cognition and intelligence in natural and artificial systems
Part 5. Social, economic and legal aspects of information
Part 6. Technological aspects of information

Please let us know as soon as possible if you intend (and even if you do not intend) to contribute, in order to help us keep the deadlines.

From: Fis <> on behalf of " " <>
Reply-To: "" <>
Date: Friday, 17 November 2017 at 17:44
To: Sungchul Ji <>, "" < >
Subject: [Fis] R: Re: some notes

Dear Sungchul,
I do not have anything against you, therefore sorry for my words, but your propositions gave me the opportunity to demonstrate the weirdness of such approaches for science.

YOU find it convenient to define communication as an irreducibly triadic process (physical, chemical, biological, physiological, or mental). YOU identify such a triadic process with the Peircean semiosis (or the sign process) often represented as the following diagram which is isomorphic with the commutative triangle of the category theory. Thus, to YOU, communication is a category.

I do not agree at all: therefore, could your proposition be kept as science? All the scientists agree on the definition (even if operational) of an atom, or agree that E=mc^2. If we are talking of something qualitative, that one agrees and another do not, we are not in front of Science.

Nothing personal.

Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

----Messaggio originale----
Da: "Sungchul Ji" <>
Data: 17/11/2017 17.12
A: "Pedro C. Marijuan"<>, "fis"< >, "Loet Leydesdorff"<>
Ogg: Re: [Fis] some notes

Hi FISers,

I find it convenient to define communication as an irreducibly triadic process (physical, chemical, biological, physiological, or mental). I identify such a triadic process with the Peircean semiosis (or the sign process) often represented as the following diagram which is isomorphic with the commutative triangle of the category theory. Thus, to me, communication is a category:

                               f                g
                        A ------>  B  -------> C
                         |                               ^
                         |                               |

Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of semiosis, sign process, or communication. The names of the nodes and edges can vary depending on the communication system under consideration, which can be chemical reaction systems, gene expression mechanisms, human communication using symbols, computer systems using electrical signals. If applied to the Shannon communication system, A = source, B = signals, C = receiver, f = encoding, g = decoding, and h = information transfer/flow. When applied to human symbolic communicatioin, A = object, B = sign, C = interpretant, f = sign production, g = interpretation, and h = information flow.

One usefulness of Figure 1 is its ability to distinguish between "interactions" (see Steps f and g) and "communication" (see Steps f, g and h); the former is dyadic and the latter triadic.

All the best.


From: Fis <> on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff <>
Sent: Friday, November 17, 2017 8:06 AM
To: Pedro C. Marijuan; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] some notes

Dear Pedro and colleagues,

2. Eigenvectors of communication. Taking the motif from Loet, and continuing with the above, could we say that the life cycle itself establishes the eigenvectors of communication? It is intriguing that maintenance, persistence, self-propagation are the essential motives of communication for whatever life entities (from bacteria to ourselves). With the complexity increase there appear new, more sophisticated directions, but the basic ones probably remain intact. What could be these essential directions of communication?
I am not so convinced that there is an a priori relation between life and communication. Communication is not alive. Non-living systems (e.g., computers, robots) also communicate. Perhaps, it matters for the communication whether the communicators are living systems; but this needs to be specified.

Communication studies is not biology. Perhaps, there is a specific biological communication as Maturana claims: when molecules are exchanged, one can expect life. Can one have life without communication? It seems to me that one can have communication without life. Communication would then be the broader category and life a special case.


3. About logics in the pre-science, Joseph is quite right demanding that discussion to accompany principles or basic problems. Actually principles, rules, theories, etc. are interconnected or should be by a logic (or several logics?) in order to give validity and coherence to the different combinations of elements. For instance, in the biomolecular realm there is a fascinating interplay of activation and inhibition among the participating molecular partners (enzymes and proteins) as active elements. I am not aware that classical ideas from Jacob (La Logique du vivant) have been sufficiently continued; it is not about Crick's Central Dogma but about the logic of pathways, circuits, modules, etc. Probably both Torday and Ji have their own ideas about that-- I would be curious to hear from them.

4. I loved Michel's response to Arturo's challenge. I think that the two "zeros" I mentioned days ago (the unsolved themes around the cycle and around the observer) imply both multidisciplinary thinking and philosophical speculation...

Best wishes--Pedro

Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta 0
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)

Fis mailing list

Fis mailing list

Fis mailing list

Reply via email to