Accounting is not a science

There is an old joke about the mafia boss, who needs a new accountant.
Proband 1 is asked: how much is 2+2? Answer: 4. Next candidate: How much is
2+2? Answer: anything between 3 and 5. No good. Next candidate, same
question. Answer: whatever you wish, boss. He gets hired.

More traditional approaches to accounting disqualify the art from being a
science, as there is no room for error. Accounting embodies all that
Wittgenstein stood for: true statements that rely on each other and are
invariably inherently – grammatically – correct, otherwise it would not be
accounting but spaghetti.  Science, like philosophy, deals with such, what
is presently unknown, while trying to explore, understand, qualify and
quantify it. There is room for error in philosophy and science, which room
does not exist in an ideal Wittgenstein set of sentences. Among
tautologies, nothing can turn out to be otherwise.

Theoretical genetics has forced us to leave the traditional understanding
of what a number is and where it is placed. Its place has been heretofore
inseparably fused with its value, form, appearance, properties and
associations. By repeatedly sorting, one denies the connection, naively
believed to be inherent, of a value with its place. What is a king, if he
is among beggars? Can the Captain of Koepenick be represented in a numeric
tale? Are some changes more problematic than others?

One never knows, what hidden revolutionary instincts slumber deep in the
hearth of an individual. Maybe mathematicians are not so much given to
overthrowing age-old agreements, definitions, rules and conventions.
Biologists, however, should maintain the idea of sudden, *deus ex
machina*  type
improvements, as tools of evolution by mutation and variation. It could
well be, that a rupture from its place of a number does introduce a new
species of counting.

If numbers are no more married to their place, where are they then? Here,
accounting helps. We know that they cannot simply disappear; furthermore,
we add them up and expect grand totals that match. We add them up actually
twice, once according to place occupied and once as carriers of symbols.  This
one can only do, if one switches to cycles as units of counting.

Accounting in units of cycles may sound more complicated than it is in
actual practice. Classical logic degenerates into the special case of a
plane across the number line: as the ever-present moment of “now”, which is
eternal, because it is timeless. In this cross-section of time, the rules
of Wittgenstein apply. The actual content of the “now” is one of the
varieties made possible by its neighbours, the predecessor and the

The intermediate state of actual (real, existing, true) state does have
a-priori rules in it. These are given by the fact that the predecessor and
the successor states are ordered.

If we take the table we have constructed with (a,b) and watch the process
of reordering between the two sorted states <set sorted on AB> vs. <set
sorted on BA>, then we see that the collection is subject to very potent
sets of restrictions, on what can be where. Knowing the end state allows
building estimates about what is missing, that is: yet to come. Cycles are
of a great help here, as they are successions, ordered in specific ways. Of
that, what has happened before, human intelligence can confer, what will
happen next. That, what we deduct, is different to that, what we observe.
The former is meta-physic to the latter’s physic, meaning to the latter’s
message. Learning is basically an ability to improve the efficacy of
predictions. To be able to imagine the continuation of partly finished
cycles, periods and rhythms is to be able to respond intelligently.

One enters a territory here, which separates accounting from predicting the
future. Classical logic will not speak about the future, because the future
is not tautologic. Seen, however, as an exercise in combinatorics, one may
be able to construct – at least, theoretically – all true sentences that
can be consistently said about up to 136 objects. In this hypothetical
case, whichever state the set is in, possible predecessors and successors
of this state can be established. Taking the most probable of among the
possible next steps, the system begins a walk. It is then possible to find
such walks that are a closed loop. If the version is included, that some
facts that relate to the sequence of arguments restrict the ways
commutative assemblies can be contemporary, and that the configuration of
symbols of commutative assemblies restricts the ways arguments can be
sequenced: in this case theoretical genetics has been made accessible to a
Wittgenstein type logical discourse, reduced to tautologies and
probabilities, that is: predictions, which are again part of the art of
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