Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues, > On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote: > > >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between “reality” > >and “data” > > That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that which > we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we cannot > perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.
If not the whole of mathematics. To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an observer tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never distinguishes possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams. In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some machine/number program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some universal number getting the machine and the data has its input. Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I identify the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its subset of true beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well. > > > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the > > note printed on the partiture, > > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between the > > description of the position > > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his hands. > > I do not think that these are the same case. I think that equating reality and data would lead to solipsism (which is phenomenologically correct but ontologically incorrect). Also, is there a reality? And what could it be? We can’t answer, but we can do hypothesis/theory, and with mechanism the physical reality becomes a phenomenological mode of self-reference of the universal (in the sense of Post, Church, Kleene, Turing, …) machine/number. The biological evolution explains the biological origin of the humans, but to avoid the behaviourist error of avoiding consciousness, eventually, we get a “physical evolution”, where the physical laws somehow percolate from the dreams of all universal numbers. The key is that from the universal machines' first person perspectives it is “executed” by infinitely many universal numbers below their computationalist substitution level. A fact that I saw a long time before this is confirmed by Everett quantum mechanics (which is the old one minus the collapse of the wave packet postulate). Data are indexicals, defined relatively to the universal machine/number which interpret it, correctly, or incorrectly, relatively to its most probable computations (among an infinity of them). With mechanism the big picture is very simple, arithmetic and its enumerable, but non mechanically enumerable set of universal numbers. But the first person phenomenology is “uncertain” on non enumerable computations, making them “living” on the border of the uncomputable. Related to this is that the original doubt of the greek theologians/metaphysicians was between "is reality what we see” or is reality something else from which what we see is the shadow, the border, the symptom, ... > > The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I could > note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board, mix them > up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed for the > players. The physical chess set and the physical context are also largely > irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed coffee or aquavit, > go back into another room with a duplicate of the game with different pieces > on another board, and continue with little disturbance. > > But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From the > starting point of the sheet music, the performer has to decide on volumes, > intonation and timing, and in some cases also ornament and variations. These > issues arouse deep passions and ferocious debate! Nor would we be happy to > buy a recording of a symphony in which different orchestras played different > movements in different concert halls (although it might be interesting to > hear). I might agree with Karl, but as expressing a first person phenomenology. With mechanism that keeps enumerability, but loss “recursive enumerability. Even the simple Gödel-Löbian self-observing universal system/number/machine is confronted to the uncomputable main part of the (arithmetical) Truth by just this introspection. The senses comes from the multi-relations in between different universal machine. Best Regards, Bruno > > Dai > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis