Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues, 

> On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
> >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between “reality” 
> >and “data”
> That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that which 
> we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we cannot 
> perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.

If not the whole of mathematics.

To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an observer 
tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never distinguishes 
possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.

In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some machine/number 
program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some universal number 
getting the machine and the data has its input. 

Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite 
differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I identify 
the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its subset of true 
beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well.

> > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the 
> > note printed on the partiture,
> > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between the 
> > description of the position
> > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his hands.
> I do not think that these are the same case.

I think that equating reality and data would lead to solipsism (which is 
phenomenologically correct but ontologically incorrect).

Also, is there a reality?

And what could it be?

We can’t answer, but we can do hypothesis/theory, and with mechanism the 
physical reality becomes a phenomenological mode of self-reference of the 
universal (in the sense of Post, Church, Kleene, Turing, …) machine/number.

The biological evolution explains the biological origin of the humans, but to 
avoid the behaviourist error of avoiding consciousness, eventually, we get a 
“physical evolution”, where the physical laws somehow percolate from the dreams 
of all universal numbers. The key is that from the universal machines' first 
person perspectives it is “executed” by infinitely many universal numbers below 
their computationalist substitution level. A fact that I saw a long time before 
this is confirmed by Everett quantum mechanics (which is the old one minus the 
collapse of the wave packet postulate).

Data are indexicals, defined relatively to the universal machine/number which 
interpret it, correctly, or incorrectly, relatively to its most probable 
computations (among an infinity of them).

With mechanism the big picture is very simple, arithmetic and its enumerable, 
but non mechanically enumerable set of universal numbers. But the first person 
phenomenology is “uncertain” on non enumerable computations, making them 
“living” on the border of the uncomputable.

Related to this is that the original doubt of the greek 
theologians/metaphysicians was between "is reality what we see” or is reality 
something else from which what we see is the shadow, the border, the symptom, 

> The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I could 
> note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board, mix them 
> up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed for the 
> players. The physical chess set and the physical context are also largely 
> irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed coffee or aquavit, 
> go back into another room with a duplicate of the game with different pieces 
> on another board, and continue with little disturbance.
> But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From the 
> starting point of the sheet music, the performer has to decide on volumes, 
> intonation and timing, and in some cases also ornament and variations. These 
> issues arouse deep passions and ferocious debate! Nor would we be happy to 
> buy a recording of a symphony in which different orchestras played different 
> movements in different concert halls (although it might be interesting to 
> hear).

I might agree with Karl, but as expressing a first person phenomenology. With 
mechanism that keeps enumerability, but loss “recursive enumerability. Even the 
simple Gödel-Löbian self-observing universal system/number/machine is 
confronted to the uncomputable main part of the (arithmetical) Truth by just 
this introspection. The senses comes from the multi-relations in between 
different universal machine.

Best Regards,


> Dai
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