-------- Messaggio inoltrato --------
Da:  tozziart...@libero.it A: Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be Cc:  
fis@listas.unizar.es Data: giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 03:23PM +02:00
Oggetto: Re[2]: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

>Dear Bruno, 
>You state: 
>"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
>THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
>“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
>description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
>change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
>brain/body at that level of description".
>The problem of your account is the following:
>You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
>Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested and 
>it is not empirically testable.  You are starting with a sort of postulate: I, 
>and other people, do not agree with it.  The current neuroscience does not 
>state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a digital machine.
>In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not exist in 
>our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.  
>Inviato da Libero Mail per Android giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da 
>Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :
>>(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it, with 
>>minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first comment 
>>to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”.
>>Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
>>Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new 
>>computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
>>This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the end 
>>of the week.
>>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < mbur...@math.ucla.edu > wrote:
>>>Dear Colleagues,
>>>I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
>>>                                      Is information physical?
>>That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on. 
>>My result here is that 
>>IF  indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, 
>>THEN   “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. 
>>“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>>The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from 
>>Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of “model" 
>>(logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory").
>>Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of 
>>description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any 
>>change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the 
>>brain/body at that level of description.
>>Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all 
>>physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. Physics 
>>is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery. 
>>Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic) is 
>>Turing complete (Turing Universal).
>>The basic idea is that:
>>1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an arithmetical 
>>reality or by a physical reality. And,
>>2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are 
>>necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in 
>>That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my 
>>actual state, and see from some first person points of view (something I can 
>>describe more precisely in some future post perhaps).
>>Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we 
>>cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to 
>>recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano 
>>arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first and 
>>third person views (and six others!).
>>I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this (including 
>>the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago.  I was about sure this 
>>would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum mechanics, which 
>>verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical Mechanism, unless we 
>>add the controversial wave collapse reduction principle.
>>The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many 
>>computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy 
>>becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter 
>>becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the result of the first person 
>>indeterminacy (the first person view of the amoeba undergoing a duplication, 
>>…) on infinitely many computations. This entails also that neither matter 
>>appearance nor consciousness are Turing emulable per se, as the whole 
>>arithmetical reality—which is a highly non computable notion as we know since 
>>Gödel—plays a key role. Note this makes Digital Physics leaning to 
>>inconsistency, as it implies indexical computationalism which implies the 
>>negation of Digital Physics (unless my “body” is the entire physical 
>>universe, which I rather doubt).
>>>My opinion is presented below:
>>>    Why some people erroneously think that information is physical
>>>    The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong 
>>>belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical 
>>>reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter 
>>>something that they call information.
>>>    When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information 
>>>because with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, 
>>>i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking that information 
>>>is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend that it is 
>>>information because with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail 
>>>comes to the computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, which are 
>>>physical. As a result, people start thinking even more that information is 
>>>    However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical 
>>>objects are only carriers or containers of information.
>>>    To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to 
>>>say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the 
>>>textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, 
>>>the textbook contains information but is not information itself. The same is 
>>>true for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects 
>>>because all of them only contain information but are not information. For 
>>>instance, as we know, different letters can contain the same information. 
>>>Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or any other text, then the 
>>>letter and its copy will be different physical objects (physical things) but 
>>>they will contain the same information.
>>>    Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, 
>>>data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on physical 
>>>objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who think 
>>>that information is physical.
>>OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non physical 
>>objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem faced by 
>>dualist ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover many 
>>dualities, but they belong to the phenomenologies.
>>>    One more misleading property of information is that people can measure 
>>>it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only 
>>>physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous conclusion 
>>>that information is physical. However, measuring information is essentially 
>>>different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight. There are no 
>>>“scales” that measure information. Only human intellect can do this.
>>OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one.
>>Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of the 
>>“knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you will not 
>>tell me that this table is unreal”.
>>I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made dreams in 
>>which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by that argument … 
>>until I wake up.
>>When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream argument” 
>>illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything ontological. A 
>>subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of 
>>consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty of 
>>strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a 
>>primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle assumes it 
>>quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against Pythagorus).
>>Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the 
>>world of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very 
>>elementary arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is 
>>already Turing complete (it contains what I have named a Universal 
>>Dovetailer: a program which generates *and* executes all programs).
>>So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we assume 
>>Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not *primarily* 
>>physical: it is all in the “head of the universal machine/number” (so to 
>>And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if there is 
>>a discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the observation, and the 
>>physics that we extract from “the head” of the machine. This took me more 
>>than 30 years of work, but the results obtained up to now is that there is no 
>>discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness 
>>(formally) on the semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1) propositions, 
>>with most quantum logics given by physicists, and it fits rather well.
>>Best regards,
>>Fis mailing list
Fis mailing list

Reply via email to