Dear FIS Colleagues,


For most of the time, I restrain myself from taking part in the FIS
discussions - we speak different languages and adhere to different
principles. My paper invited for publication in MDPI Informatics Special
Issue: Selected Papers from the ISIS Summit Vienna 2015 has been declined
for publication. (Never mind, it was published afterwards in the Research
Gate repository ).


In the concluding part of the paper I enumerate 8 topics in Neuroscience
research that require immediate revision taking into consideration the new
principles that follow from my definition of information. For example, that
information is a material, palpable string of letters and linguistic signs,
a piece of text, a textual description. That means that all derivatives of
semantic information (thoughts, memories, feelings, and so on) are material
entities ("Information as a thing" - once there was a fierce debate around
this subject). Or, as Mark Burgin claims: "Now assuming that information
exists, we have only one option, namely, to admit that information is
physical because only physical things exist". (I do not use the term
"physical", I distinguish Physical and Semantic Information. In place of
Burgin's "physical" I prefer to use the term "material").


I would not remind you of our old controversies but recently UCLA
researchers reported that they have transferred a memory from one marine
snail to another (Biologists 'transfer' a memory,
<> Neuroscience ,
<> May 14, 2018, University of
California, Los Angeles,
<> ). 


I hope that the UCLA finding will put an end to the question "Is information
material (physical, in Burgin's inquiry)?" Yes, information is material.
Other options do not exist.



Best regards, Emanuel.


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