Deprogramming Jihadists
By KATHERINE ZOEPF
Published: November 7, 2008
http://www.nytimes. com/2008/ 11/09/magazine/ 09jihadis- t.html?_r=
1&ref=world& pagewanted= all&oref= slogin
The sunset prayer had just ended, and Sheik Ahmad al-Jilani was already calling
his class to order. When the latecomers slipped into the front row, Jilani
nodded at them briskly. “Young men,” he began, “who can tell me why we do
jihad?”
The members of the class were still new and a bit shy. Jilani clasped his hands
and smiled encouragingly. Before him, sitting in school desks, were a dozen
young Saudi men who had served time in prison for belonging to militant Islamic
groups. Now they were inmates in a new rehabilitation center, part of a Saudi
government initiative that seeks to deprogram Islamic extremists.
Jilani has been teaching his class, which is called Understandings of Jihad,
since the center was established early last year. A stout man who makes
constant, self-deprecating references to his weight, the sheik is an avuncular
figure, popular with his students. On this chilly evening he had on a woolly,
brocade-trimmed bisht, the cloak that Saudi men wear on formal occasions or in
cool weather, which gave him a slightly imposing air. But behind his thick
glasses, his eyes shone warmly as he surveyed the classroom.
Finally, someone answered: “We do jihad to fight our enemies.”
“To defeat God’s enemies?” another suggested.
“To help weak Muslims,” a third offered.
“Good, good,” Jilani said. “All good answers. Is there someone else? What about
you, Ali?” Ali, in the second row, looked away, then faltered: “To . . . answer
. . . calls for jihad?”
Jilani frowned slightly and wrote Ali’s answer up on the white board behind
him. He read it out to the class before turning back to Ali. “All right, Ali,”
the sheik said. “Why do we answer calls for jihad? Is it because all Muslim
leaders want to make God’s word highest? Do we kill if these leaders tell us to
kill?”
Ali looked confused, but whispered, “Yes.”
“No — wrong!” Jilani cried as Ali blushed. “Of course we want to make God’s
word highest, but not every Muslim leader has this as his goal. There are right
jihads and wrong jihads, and we must examine the situation for ourselves. For
example, if a person wants to go to hajj now, is it right?”
The class chuckled obligingly at Jilani’s little joke. The month for performing
hajj, the holy pilgrimage to Mecca that observant Muslims hope to complete at
least once in their lives, had ended five weeks earlier, and the suggestion was
as preposterous as throwing a Fourth of July barbecue in November.
“Well, just as there is a proper time for hajj, there is also a proper time for
jihad,” Jilani explained.
Jilani’s students, who range in age from 18 to 36, are part of a generation
brought up on heroic tales of Saudi fighters who left home to fight alongside
the mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the 1980s and who helped to force the
Soviets to withdraw from the country. The Saudi state was essentially built on
the concept of jihad, which King Abdul Aziz al-Saud used to knit disparate
tribal groups into a single nation. The word means “struggle” and in Islamic
law usually refers to armed conflict with non-Muslims in defense of the global
Islamic community. Saudi schools teach a version of world history that
emphasizes repeated battles between Muslims and nonbelieving enemies. Whether
to Afghanistan in the 1980s or present-day Iraq, Saudi Arabia has exported more
jihadist volunteers than any other country; 15 of the 19 hijackers on Sept. 11
were Saudis.
But jihad can go too far. The Saudi government has condemned the Sept. 11
attacks and arrests jihadists who attempt to enter Iraq. Some Saudi veterans of
overseas jihads have adopted one form of the doctrine of takfir, in which a
Muslim is judged by another Muslim to be an unbeliever. Because traditional
Islamic law calls for the execution of apostates, some have used takfir to
justify attacks on the Saudi state. In recent years, these attacks have raised
fears that the chaos in some of the world’s conflict zones is being brought
home to Saudi Arabia by radicalized jihadists. The Saudi government thus finds
itself in the awkward position of needing to defend the principle of jihad to
its citizens while discouraging them from actually taking up arms. One step it
has taken is simply to talk to those who have proved to be most vulnerable to
the temptations of jihad, the captured militants themselves. As Jilani put it
to me, “The kingdom of Saudi Arabia
has the confidence to fight thoughts with thoughts.”
Jilani and his colleagues are not just fighting a war of ideas. Though the
Saudi government tends to explain its rehabilitation program in purely Islamic
terms, as an effort to correct theological misunderstandings, the new program
also addresses the psychological needs and emotional weaknesses that have led
many young men to jihad in the first place. It tries to give frustrated and
disaffected young men the trappings of stability — a job, a car, possibly a
wife. Though international human rights groups continue to sound the alarm
about Saudi Arabia’s habit of detaining suspects without charging them and of
punishing certain crimes with floggings and amputations, these young men seem
to have become the subjects of a continuing experiment in counterterrorism as a
kind of social work.
If the Saudi rehabilitation program succeeds, it could reduce the ranks of
dangerous extremists and have a far-reaching impact: domestic and regional
stability and, though it’s not a stated goal, increased safety for potential
targets in the West. Program administrators claim that the Saudi initiative
could also provide a model for other Muslim countries struggling with Islamic
militancy. They say that Saudi Arabia — home to Islam’s two holiest cities,
Mecca and Medina — has an unmatched moral authority among the world’s Muslims
and is uniquely placed to find the intellectual and spiritual vulnerabilities
of organizations like Al Qaeda and to fight Islamic extremism on its own terms.
Though the exact nature of the role that religious belief plays in the
recruitment of jihadists is the subject of much debate among scholars of
terrorism, a growing number contend that ideology is far less important than
family and group dynamics, psychological and emotional needs. “We’re finding
that they don’t generally join for religious reasons,” John Horgan told me. A
political psychologist who directs the International Center for the Study of
Terrorism at Penn State, Horgan has interviewed dozens of former terrorists.
“Terrorist movements seem to provide a sense of adventure, excitement, vision,
purpose, camaraderie,” he went on, “and involvement with them has an allure
that can be difficult to resist. But the ideology is usually something you
acquire once you’re involved.”
Other scholars emphatically disagree, stressing the significance of political
belief and grievance. But if the Saudi program is succeeding, it may be because
it treats jihadists not as religious fanatics or enemies of the state but as
alienated young men in need of rehabilitation.
In 2004, the Saudi Interior Ministry started the Munasaha, or Advisory
Committee, program, to reform prison inmates convicted of involvement in
Islamic extremism. Abdulrahman al-Hadlaq, the program administrator, says that
a committee of senior Saudi clerics interviews inmates about their beliefs
before placing them in appropriate classes. Enrollment in the Munasaha program
is not voluntary, and Human Rights Watch reports that some participants have
been in detention for months or even years without trial or access to lawyers.
But graduates of the program say the treatment is far from harsh.
In January 2007, the Interior Ministry began renting small vacation compounds
in the Riyadh suburb of al-Thumama. Half-a-dozen adjoining compounds now house
the Care Center, a post-prison continuation of the Munasaha program offering
more intensive rehabilitation activities. Each compound holds up to about 20
men, who study, eat and sleep together for the duration of the program.
On arrival, each prisoner is given a suitcase filled with gifts: clothes, a
digital watch, school supplies and toiletries. Inmates are encouraged to ask
for their favorite foods (Twix and Snickers candy bars are frequent requests).
Volleyball nets, PlayStation games and Ping-Pong and foosball tables are all
provided. The atmosphere at the center — which I visited several times earlier
this year — is almost eerily cozy and congenial, with mattresses and rugs
spread on stubbly patches of lawn for inmates to lounge upon. With few
exceptions, the men wear their beards untrimmed and their thobes, the long
garments that most Saudi men wear, cut above their ankles in the style favored
by those who wish to demonstrate strict devotion to Islam. The men are pleasant
but many seem a bit puffy and lethargic; one 19-year-old inmate, Faisal
al-Subaii, explained that they are encouraged to spend most of their daytime
hours in either rest or prayer.
In Saudi Arabia, psychological disorders are often understood as the results of
a person finding himself somehow outside the traditional circle of family and
community. Most of the counseling that the inmates receive is focused on
helping them to develop more healthful family relationships. “We use Western
psychiatric techniques together with Islamic techniques,” T. M. Otayan, the
center’s staff psychologist, says, referring to the intensive religion classes.
A number of the inmates have received diagnoses of antisocial personality
disorder, he adds, but he claims serious mental illness among the former
jihadists is rare.
Though it might seem out of place in a society whose religion proscribes the
representation of animal or human forms, art therapy is practiced. Awad
al-Yami, who studied the subject at Penn State, leads the classes, and chalk
drawings by former jihadists decorate the walls of his classroom. Although the
sketches — mostly ornate Arabic calligraphy and depictions of flowers — do not
especially suggest that demons are being wrestled with, art therapy helps
inmates to examine the consequences of their actions, Yami says. “I ask them,
‘If you blow up a car, what will happen?’ The paper gives them a safe place to
express some destructive emotions.”
Most prisoners complete the program within two months. Upon release, each
former jihadist is required to sign a pledge that he has forsaken extremist
sympathies; the head of his family must sign as well. Some also receive a car
(often a Toyota) and aid from the Interior Ministry in renting a home. Social
workers assist former jihadists and their families in making post-release plans
for education, employment and, usually, marriage. “Getting married stabilizes a
man’s personality,” Hadlaq says. “He thinks more about a long term future and
less about himself and his anger.”
Other countries have experimented with efforts to rehabilitate Islamic
extremists. In Egypt and Yemen, moderate clerics counsel prisoners accused of
militant activity. The Religious Rehabilitation Group in Singapore has been
widely praised for reducing the influence of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist
organization. But the Saudi approach is unusual and, according to Bernard
Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University, “is
consistent with Saudi history in that you try through nonviolent means to
cajole, to bribe, to buy off the opposition.”
Sheik Jilani likes to encourage class discussions by asking the men to share
their experiences, and on one of the occasions I visited, he asked a student
named Azzam to explain why he spent five months in Iraq. Referring to the
infamous Mahmudiyah killings of 2006, Azzam replied that he had seen an article
on the Internet about “the little girl named Abeer who was raped and killed by
the Americans.”
“I felt so much sympathy for the Muslims,” Azzam continued. “The infidel rape
women and kill children. I decided then that I should join the Muslims in Iraq
in order to drive the Americans out.”
The desert evening was growing chilly. Jilani removed his bisht and handed it
to a shivering student. He turned back to Azzam. “Tell us, Azzam. What did you
find in Iraq? Did you feel good when you went there?”
Azzam frowned. “To tell you the truth, I didn’t find what I was expecting,” he
said. “In Iraq, even the Muslims fight each other. I was expecting them to be
well organized, but they weren’t.”
Jilani nodded. “So did you fight?”
“I didn’t have the chance,” Azzam said, sounding defensive. “For months, we
went from safe house to safe house. There wasn’t anything to do — no action, no
training. Finally, they asked me to be a suicide bomber. But I know that
suicide is forbidden in Islam, so I came back home.”
Many of the former jihadists seemed to feel unappreciated, their sense of
injury plain. Jilani and his colleagues encourage the former militants to
examine those feelings, even to think of themselves as victims. Yes, they were
tricked and manipulated by deviant ideology (a favorite Saudi catchphrase for
Islamic extremism), but now they have a chance to turn back.
Of all the concepts addressed in classes at the rehabilitation center, takfir
is the one that tends to evoke the most anger among mainstream Saudi Muslims.
The idea that there’s a slippery slope from jihad to takfir comes up regularly
in discussions with Saudi clerics.
“Some of our young people don’t listen to the right scholars,” Jilani told me.
“First they start to think that they have the right to go to jihad at any time.
After that, they start to think that we have the right to kill any non-Muslim.
“Then they start to say that our leaders are kuffar, infidels,” the sheik
continued. “After that they start to say that our scholars, too, are kuffar.
Before long, they’ve declared war against the whole world.”
The Saudi government has recently intensified efforts to fight extremism and to
turn public sympathy away from terrorist groups. Several prominent clerics have
taken public stands against Al Qaeda, and late last year Saudi Mufti Sheik Abd
al-Aziz bin Abdallah Al al-Sheik issued a fatwa prohibiting Saudi youth from
traveling overseas to wage jihad. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs has initiated
a new program called Serenity to fight terrorism online by drawing terrorist
recruiters into one-on-one ideological chat-room combat with moderate-minded
clerics.
The government maintains that no graduates of the Munasaha program have
returned to violence. But the program is still relatively new, and there are
unanswered questions. Is the government dealing with captured militants while
really failing to address the root causes of extremism? Will released
extremists, now counted as successes, eventually return to jihad?
A consulting psychiatrist at the King Faisal hospital in Riyadh says that to
truly fight jihadism would mean fundamentally changing how Islam is taught in
Saudi schools and mosques in a way that the Saudi government has until now been
unwilling to attempt. “The government is never going to say, full stop, that
jihad is wrong,” he explains. The doctrine is an integral part of Islamic law,
and arguing against it would raise the ire of religious scholars and possibly
call the Islamic credentials of the Saudi government into question.
And global jihad is still a socially acceptable path for a young Saudi man with
few options, the psychiatrist says. “You have a young man who’s depressed,
frustrated with life, maybe he fails an exam. He can go from being a loser, a
failure, to being a jihadi, someone with status.”
How and why violent extremists come to leave their organizations are a fairly
new focus in academic studies of terrorism. Horgan’s findings — that simple
fear and disillusionment can play a major role in an individual’s decision to
disengage from his group — seem to be echoed by a recent RAND Corporation
report on the demise of terrorist groups, which found that efforts by police
and intelligence agents to create intense internal pressure within terrorist
groups are more successful at fighting extremism than military actions.
Consider Abu Sulayman, a stocky 32-year-old who spent more than three years in
prison at Guantánamo and says he fought alongside Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora.
Abu Sulayman spoke on the condition that I would use only his old nom de
guerre. He completed the Munasaha program but was released shortly before the
Care Center was established; he joked that he envies the current batch of
former jihadists their “resort vacation.”
“Getting captured and Guantánamo — it was all a good lesson,” Abu Sulayman told
me. “I mean, the main idea of jihad is good — no one disagrees with that.”
His first jihad was in 1996, when he traveled to the Philippines to fight with
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. “They had guys from everywhere, all these
different countries, working together,” Abu Sulayman said. “The majority are
always Saudis.” In 1997, Abu Sulayman went on to Afghanistan. Four years later,
after his second trip to the country, he grew disillusioned with bin Laden and
planned to leave for the Philippines because “Chechnya said they didn’t need
anyone at the moment.” Instead, he was captured.
Today he notes that the Qaeda camps where he worked as a training instructor
offered him clear professional advancement. His new life — in a middle-class
Jeddah suburb, doing shift work at an electrical company — doesn’t provide the
same sense of purpose. Even so, he has little regard for those who have
followed in his footsteps.
“Most people just want to carry weapons,” Abu Sulayman said. They do not, as he
put it, have especially sophisticated religious arguments. “For me, it was
always more about the feeling that I wanted to help the Muslims. But jihad is
complicated. If you’re heading to Afghanistan or Iraq, do you really have the
facts you need to get involved on the right side?
“With Al Qaeda, the training was really excellent,” Abu Sulayman went on.
“These people they’ve got going to Iraq nowadays, they have no training, so
they’re just sent to explode themselves.
“Now our government is saying: ‘Don’t go to Iraq. It’s not in our interests,’ ”
Abu Sulayman continued. “Now I think, At least I did something with my life. I
went out and fought for my beliefs, and I found that things were not as I had
planned. But at least I fought for my beliefs. God knows my heart.”
The sheiks who were charged with rehabilitating him were startled by his
easygoing attitude, Abu Sulayman recalled. Even though Saudi public opinion has
largely turned against Al Qaeda, many Saudis remain concerned that American-led
efforts to fight terrorism are anti-Muslim and are infuriated by Guantánamo.
“They thought that after all this time in Guantánamo I’d have some hate in me,”
Abu Sulayman told me. “But I never look back. I said, ‘O.K., now I’ll start a
new life.’ ”
Katherine Zoepf, who writes regularly for The Times, is working on a book about
young women in the contemporary Arab world.
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Don't tell ALLAH how big is ur problem but tell ur problem that how big Ur
ALLAH is.
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