Deprogramming Jihadists 
By KATHERINE ZOEPF
Published: November 7, 2008 

http://www.nytimes. com/2008/ 11/09/magazine/ 09jihadis- t.html?_r= 
1&ref=world& pagewanted= all&oref= slogin

The sunset prayer had just ended, and Sheik Ahmad al-Jilani was already calling 
his class to order. When the latecomers slipped into the front row, Jilani 
nodded at them briskly. “Young men,” he began, “who can tell me why we do 
jihad?”

The members of the class were still new and a bit shy. Jilani clasped his hands 
and smiled encouragingly. Before him, sitting in school desks, were a dozen 
young Saudi men who had served time in prison for belonging to militant Islamic 
groups. Now they were inmates in a new rehabilitation center, part of a Saudi 
government initiative that seeks to deprogram Islamic extremists.

Jilani has been teaching his class, which is called Understandings of Jihad, 
since the center was established early last year. A stout man who makes 
constant, self-deprecating references to his weight, the sheik is an avuncular 
figure, popular with his students. On this chilly evening he had on a woolly, 
brocade-trimmed bisht, the cloak that Saudi men wear on formal occasions or in 
cool weather, which gave him a slightly imposing air. But behind his thick 
glasses, his eyes shone warmly as he surveyed the classroom.

Finally, someone answered: “We do jihad to fight our enemies.”

“To defeat God’s enemies?” another suggested.

“To help weak Muslims,” a third offered.

“Good, good,” Jilani said. “All good answers. Is there someone else? What about 
you, Ali?” Ali, in the second row, looked away, then faltered: “To . . . answer 
. . . calls for jihad?”

Jilani frowned slightly and wrote Ali’s answer up on the white board behind 
him. He read it out to the class before turning back to Ali. “All right, Ali,” 
the sheik said. “Why do we answer calls for jihad? Is it because all Muslim 
leaders want to make God’s word highest? Do we kill if these leaders tell us to 
kill?”

Ali looked confused, but whispered, “Yes.”

“No — wrong!” Jilani cried as Ali blushed. “Of course we want to make God’s 
word highest, but not every Muslim leader has this as his goal. There are right 
jihads and wrong jihads, and we must examine the situation for ourselves. For 
example, if a person wants to go to hajj now, is it right?”

The class chuckled obligingly at Jilani’s little joke. The month for performing 
hajj, the holy pilgrimage to Mecca that observant Muslims hope to complete at 
least once in their lives, had ended five weeks earlier, and the suggestion was 
as preposterous as throwing a Fourth of July barbecue in November.

“Well, just as there is a proper time for hajj, there is also a proper time for 
jihad,” Jilani explained.

Jilani’s students, who range in age from 18 to 36, are part of a generation 
brought up on heroic tales of Saudi fighters who left home to fight alongside 
the mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the 1980s and who helped to force the 
Soviets to withdraw from the country. The Saudi state was essentially built on 
the concept of jihad, which King Abdul Aziz al-Saud used to knit disparate 
tribal groups into a single nation. The word means “struggle” and in Islamic 
law usually refers to armed conflict with non-Muslims in defense of the global 
Islamic community. Saudi schools teach a version of world history that 
emphasizes repeated battles between Muslims and nonbelieving enemies. Whether 
to Afghanistan in the 1980s or present-day Iraq, Saudi Arabia has exported more 
jihadist volunteers than any other country; 15 of the 19 hijackers on Sept. 11 
were Saudis.

But jihad can go too far. The Saudi government has condemned the Sept. 11 
attacks and arrests jihadists who attempt to enter Iraq. Some Saudi veterans of 
overseas jihads have adopted one form of the doctrine of takfir, in which a 
Muslim is judged by another Muslim to be an unbeliever. Because traditional 
Islamic law calls for the execution of apostates, some have used takfir to 
justify attacks on the Saudi state. In recent years, these attacks have raised 
fears that the chaos in some of the world’s conflict zones is being brought 
home to Saudi Arabia by radicalized jihadists. The Saudi government thus finds 
itself in the awkward position of needing to defend the principle of jihad to 
its citizens while discouraging them from actually taking up arms. One step it 
has taken is simply to talk to those who have proved to be most vulnerable to 
the temptations of jihad, the captured militants themselves. As Jilani put it 
to me, “The kingdom of Saudi Arabia
has the confidence to fight thoughts with thoughts.”

Jilani and his colleagues are not just fighting a war of ideas. Though the 
Saudi government tends to explain its rehabilitation program in purely Islamic 
terms, as an effort to correct theological misunderstandings, the new program 
also addresses the psychological needs and emotional weaknesses that have led 
many young men to jihad in the first place. It tries to give frustrated and 
disaffected young men the trappings of stability — a job, a car, possibly a 
wife. Though international human rights groups continue to sound the alarm 
about Saudi Arabia’s habit of detaining suspects without charging them and of 
punishing certain crimes with floggings and amputations, these young men seem 
to have become the subjects of a continuing experiment in counterterrorism as a 
kind of social work.

If the Saudi rehabilitation program succeeds, it could reduce the ranks of 
dangerous extremists and have a far-reaching impact: domestic and regional 
stability and, though it’s not a stated goal, increased safety for potential 
targets in the West. Program administrators claim that the Saudi initiative 
could also provide a model for other Muslim countries struggling with Islamic 
militancy. They say that Saudi Arabia — home to Islam’s two holiest cities, 
Mecca and Medina — has an unmatched moral authority among the world’s Muslims 
and is uniquely placed to find the intellectual and spiritual vulnerabilities 
of organizations like Al Qaeda and to fight Islamic extremism on its own terms.

Though the exact nature of the role that religious belief plays in the 
recruitment of jihadists is the subject of much debate among scholars of 
terrorism, a growing number contend that ideology is far less important than 
family and group dynamics, psychological and emotional needs. “We’re finding 
that they don’t generally join for religious reasons,” John Horgan told me. A 
political psychologist who directs the International Center for the Study of 
Terrorism at Penn State, Horgan has interviewed dozens of former terrorists. 
“Terrorist movements seem to provide a sense of adventure, excitement, vision, 
purpose, camaraderie,” he went on, “and involvement with them has an allure 
that can be difficult to resist. But the ideology is usually something you 
acquire once you’re involved.”

Other scholars emphatically disagree, stressing the significance of political 
belief and grievance. But if the Saudi program is succeeding, it may be because 
it treats jihadists not as religious fanatics or enemies of the state but as 
alienated young men in need of rehabilitation.

In 2004, the Saudi Interior Ministry started the Munasaha, or Advisory 
Committee, program, to reform prison inmates convicted of involvement in 
Islamic extremism. Abdulrahman al-Hadlaq, the program administrator, says that 
a committee of senior Saudi clerics interviews inmates about their beliefs 
before placing them in appropriate classes. Enrollment in the Munasaha program 
is not voluntary, and Human Rights Watch reports that some participants have 
been in detention for months or even years without trial or access to lawyers. 
But graduates of the program say the treatment is far from harsh.

In January 2007, the Interior Ministry began renting small vacation compounds 
in the Riyadh suburb of al-Thumama. Half-a-dozen adjoining compounds now house 
the Care Center, a post-prison continuation of the Munasaha program offering 
more intensive rehabilitation activities. Each compound holds up to about 20 
men, who study, eat and sleep together for the duration of the program.

On arrival, each prisoner is given a suitcase filled with gifts: clothes, a 
digital watch, school supplies and toiletries. Inmates are encouraged to ask 
for their favorite foods (Twix and Snickers candy bars are frequent requests). 
Volleyball nets, PlayStation games and Ping-Pong and foosball tables are all 
provided. The atmosphere at the center — which I visited several times earlier 
this year — is almost eerily cozy and congenial, with mattresses and rugs 
spread on stubbly patches of lawn for inmates to lounge upon. With few 
exceptions, the men wear their beards untrimmed and their thobes, the long 
garments that most Saudi men wear, cut above their ankles in the style favored 
by those who wish to demonstrate strict devotion to Islam. The men are pleasant 
but many seem a bit puffy and lethargic; one 19-year-old inmate, Faisal 
al-Subaii, explained that they are encouraged to spend most of their daytime 
hours in either rest or prayer.

In Saudi Arabia, psychological disorders are often understood as the results of 
a person finding himself somehow outside the traditional circle of family and 
community. Most of the counseling that the inmates receive is focused on 
helping them to develop more healthful family relationships. “We use Western 
psychiatric techniques together with Islamic techniques,” T. M. Otayan, the 
center’s staff psychologist, says, referring to the intensive religion classes. 
A number of the inmates have received diagnoses of antisocial personality 
disorder, he adds, but he claims serious mental illness among the former 
jihadists is rare.

Though it might seem out of place in a society whose religion proscribes the 
representation of animal or human forms, art therapy is practiced. Awad 
al-Yami, who studied the subject at Penn State, leads the classes, and chalk 
drawings by former jihadists decorate the walls of his classroom. Although the 
sketches — mostly ornate Arabic calligraphy and depictions of flowers — do not 
especially suggest that demons are being wrestled with, art therapy helps 
inmates to examine the consequences of their actions, Yami says. “I ask them, 
‘If you blow up a car, what will happen?’ The paper gives them a safe place to 
express some destructive emotions.”

Most prisoners complete the program within two months. Upon release, each 
former jihadist is required to sign a pledge that he has forsaken extremist 
sympathies; the head of his family must sign as well. Some also receive a car 
(often a Toyota) and aid from the Interior Ministry in renting a home. Social 
workers assist former jihadists and their families in making post-release plans 
for education, employment and, usually, marriage. “Getting married stabilizes a 
man’s personality,” Hadlaq says. “He thinks more about a long term future and 
less about himself and his anger.”

Other countries have experimented with efforts to rehabilitate Islamic 
extremists. In Egypt and Yemen, moderate clerics counsel prisoners accused of 
militant activity. The Religious Rehabilitation Group in Singapore has been 
widely praised for reducing the influence of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist 
organization. But the Saudi approach is unusual and, according to Bernard 
Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University, “is 
consistent with Saudi history in that you try through nonviolent means to 
cajole, to bribe, to buy off the opposition.”

Sheik Jilani likes to encourage class discussions by asking the men to share 
their experiences, and on one of the occasions I visited, he asked a student 
named Azzam to explain why he spent five months in Iraq. Referring to the 
infamous Mahmudiyah killings of 2006, Azzam replied that he had seen an article 
on the Internet about “the little girl named Abeer who was raped and killed by 
the Americans.”

“I felt so much sympathy for the Muslims,” Azzam continued. “The infidel rape 
women and kill children. I decided then that I should join the Muslims in Iraq 
in order to drive the Americans out.”

The desert evening was growing chilly. Jilani removed his bisht and handed it 
to a shivering student. He turned back to Azzam. “Tell us, Azzam. What did you 
find in Iraq? Did you feel good when you went there?”

Azzam frowned. “To tell you the truth, I didn’t find what I was expecting,” he 
said. “In Iraq, even the Muslims fight each other. I was expecting them to be 
well organized, but they weren’t.”

Jilani nodded. “So did you fight?”

“I didn’t have the chance,” Azzam said, sounding defensive. “For months, we 
went from safe house to safe house. There wasn’t anything to do — no action, no 
training. Finally, they asked me to be a suicide bomber. But I know that 
suicide is forbidden in Islam, so I came back home.”

Many of the former jihadists seemed to feel unappreciated, their sense of 
injury plain. Jilani and his colleagues encourage the former militants to 
examine those feelings, even to think of themselves as victims. Yes, they were 
tricked and manipulated by deviant ideology (a favorite Saudi catchphrase for 
Islamic extremism), but now they have a chance to turn back.

Of all the concepts addressed in classes at the rehabilitation center, takfir 
is the one that tends to evoke the most anger among mainstream Saudi Muslims. 
The idea that there’s a slippery slope from jihad to takfir comes up regularly 
in discussions with Saudi clerics.

“Some of our young people don’t listen to the right scholars,” Jilani told me. 
“First they start to think that they have the right to go to jihad at any time. 
After that, they start to think that we have the right to kill any non-Muslim.

“Then they start to say that our leaders are kuffar, infidels,” the sheik 
continued. “After that they start to say that our scholars, too, are kuffar. 
Before long, they’ve declared war against the whole world.”

The Saudi government has recently intensified efforts to fight extremism and to 
turn public sympathy away from terrorist groups. Several prominent clerics have 
taken public stands against Al Qaeda, and late last year Saudi Mufti Sheik Abd 
al-Aziz bin Abdallah Al al-Sheik issued a fatwa prohibiting Saudi youth from 
traveling overseas to wage jihad. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs has initiated 
a new program called Serenity to fight terrorism online by drawing terrorist 
recruiters into one-on-one ideological chat-room combat with moderate-minded 
clerics.

The government maintains that no graduates of the Munasaha program have 
returned to violence. But the program is still relatively new, and there are 
unanswered questions. Is the government dealing with captured militants while 
really failing to address the root causes of extremism? Will released 
extremists, now counted as successes, eventually return to jihad?

A consulting psychiatrist at the King Faisal hospital in Riyadh says that to 
truly fight jihadism would mean fundamentally changing how Islam is taught in 
Saudi schools and mosques in a way that the Saudi government has until now been 
unwilling to attempt. “The government is never going to say, full stop, that 
jihad is wrong,” he explains. The doctrine is an integral part of Islamic law, 
and arguing against it would raise the ire of religious scholars and possibly 
call the Islamic credentials of the Saudi government into question.

And global jihad is still a socially acceptable path for a young Saudi man with 
few options, the psychiatrist says. “You have a young man who’s depressed, 
frustrated with life, maybe he fails an exam. He can go from being a loser, a 
failure, to being a jihadi, someone with status.”

How and why violent extremists come to leave their organizations are a fairly 
new focus in academic studies of terrorism. Horgan’s findings — that simple 
fear and disillusionment can play a major role in an individual’s decision to 
disengage from his group — seem to be echoed by a recent RAND Corporation 
report on the demise of terrorist groups, which found that efforts by police 
and intelligence agents to create intense internal pressure within terrorist 
groups are more successful at fighting extremism than military actions.

Consider Abu Sulayman, a stocky 32-year-old who spent more than three years in 
prison at Guantánamo and says he fought alongside Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora. 
Abu Sulayman spoke on the condition that I would use only his old nom de 
guerre. He completed the Munasaha program but was released shortly before the 
Care Center was established; he joked that he envies the current batch of 
former jihadists their “resort vacation.”

“Getting captured and Guantánamo — it was all a good lesson,” Abu Sulayman told 
me. “I mean, the main idea of jihad is good — no one disagrees with that.”

His first jihad was in 1996, when he traveled to the Philippines to fight with 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. “They had guys from everywhere, all these 
different countries, working together,” Abu Sulayman said. “The majority are 
always Saudis.” In 1997, Abu Sulayman went on to Afghanistan. Four years later, 
after his second trip to the country, he grew disillusioned with bin Laden and 
planned to leave for the Philippines because “Chechnya said they didn’t need 
anyone at the moment.” Instead, he was captured.

Today he notes that the Qaeda camps where he worked as a training instructor 
offered him clear professional advancement. His new life — in a middle-class 
Jeddah suburb, doing shift work at an electrical company — doesn’t provide the 
same sense of purpose. Even so, he has little regard for those who have 
followed in his footsteps.

“Most people just want to carry weapons,” Abu Sulayman said. They do not, as he 
put it, have especially sophisticated religious arguments. “For me, it was 
always more about the feeling that I wanted to help the Muslims. But jihad is 
complicated. If you’re heading to Afghanistan or Iraq, do you really have the 
facts you need to get involved on the right side?

“With Al Qaeda, the training was really excellent,” Abu Sulayman went on. 
“These people they’ve got going to Iraq nowadays, they have no training, so 
they’re just sent to explode themselves.

“Now our government is saying: ‘Don’t go to Iraq. It’s not in our interests,’ ” 
Abu Sulayman continued. “Now I think, At least I did something with my life. I 
went out and fought for my beliefs, and I found that things were not as I had 
planned. But at least I fought for my beliefs. God knows my heart.”

The sheiks who were charged with rehabilitating him were startled by his 
easygoing attitude, Abu Sulayman recalled. Even though Saudi public opinion has 
largely turned against Al Qaeda, many Saudis remain concerned that American-led 
efforts to fight terrorism are anti-Muslim and are infuriated by Guantánamo. 
“They thought that after all this time in Guantánamo I’d have some hate in me,” 
Abu Sulayman told me. “But I never look back. I said, ‘O.K., now I’ll start a 
new life.’ ” 

Katherine Zoepf, who writes regularly for The Times, is working on a book about 
young women in the contemporary Arab world.
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 Don't tell ALLAH how big is ur problem but tell ur problem that how big Ur 
ALLAH is. 


      
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