David,
    Please consider this thread as "usability" posting - just giving you feedback about user experiences.
 
    I do understand the intent and the case presented in the documentation. The posting simply indicates the current status of the model as it appears to a new or other platform developer who needs crossdomain functionality for external servers in the application. As such they do not care about LAN access and it would seem a rather simple task for Flash security manager to identify and make separate case for intranet zone and local access. That would allow to keep intranet safe (at much lower performance cost then reading external file) while allowing client control of external crossdomain access.
 
 
As far as behind firewall spying, the second half of the posting said that DOS, poking and other trojan activity can be done anyway from AJAX client that can be navigated through fscommand or such. I do understand the power and danger of socket API opened in Flex 2, and do think that in order to be utilized properly, the security manager needs to be extended. However, I am not sure that crossdomain is an adequate answer though - most likely corporate security services would not be able to support it in timely fasion needed for development/deployment.
 
    We have been producing commercial ActiveX for the last 5 years for wide distribution that had to maintain list of "trusted" servers/domains via custom security manager. That would be configurable by either end-user, system administrator or being disabled outright depending on the distribution mode. The same lockdown features for corporations can be offered in Flash. I did not hear about any issues with crossdomain security on our control yet.
 
Sincerely,
Anatole Tartakovsky
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2006 9:53 PM
Subject: RE: [flexcoders] Benefits of Flash Security Model and crossdomain.xml

Hi,
 
It has nothing to do with license validation.
 
Others have answered this question numerous time on this list, but this is the first I have heard anyone think it has to do with license enforcement.
 
It would be a gaping security hole to not do this.
 
_David


From: [email protected] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Anatole Tartakovsky
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2006 9:37 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [flexcoders] Benefits of Flash Security Model and crossdomain.xml

IMHO. it does not serve security purposes - the only thing it can be used for is license validation. Let us say you want to wrap access to yahoo financial services that has limits on number of free requests per IP address per day. The only way you bypass crossdomain.xml is by proxing all the requests through your server as the only way to get the data. That in turn inforces usual industry licensing requirements - enabling real data provider identify your server.
I think the documentation has to clearly identify crossdomain as not security, but license enforcement feature - or be changed to give control to the client application rather then server.
Thank you,
Anatole Tartakovsky
PS: DOS attack protection is unlikely as Flash 1.5 uses the same amount of connections that are allowed by the browser to AJAX (2 by default) and can not be a threat as it offer less control to the offender then usual HTTPRequest in mxml (Microsoft XML) parser.
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2006 9:11 PM
Subject: [flexcoders] Benefits of Flash Security Model and crossdomain.xml

I must be missing something, but I'm a bit confused as to the design
of the Flash Security Model and crossdomain.xml.

My main question is who is this model intended to protect?

As I undestand it, this protects third party servers from disclosing
their "data" to flash clients.  That is, if you do not have a cross
domain file on a third party server, a flash program cannot access the
data.  But, any other program (e.g. ,a web browser, socket program,
etc) could easily access this data. It's up to the client to recuse
itself (and only flash clients recuse themselves).  It would seem for
a server to protect itself, it would have to enforce the protection,
not the client.

My expectation was that this was more like a Java sandbox which
prevented a program from accessing other sites for the protection of
the client, not the server.  In such a scheme one might expect the
crossdomain.xml file to be controlled by the server which served the
flash application (not the 3rd party server)  ... a chain of trust.
If it's controlled by the 3rd party, then there's not a huge amount of
protection.

So I can't see any benefit of letting the thrid party server be in
control of this file.  If the crossdmain.xml file is to protect the
server, then it misses the case where non-flash clients can access the
server.  If it is to protect the client from a malicious thrid party,
the third party can simply add a crossdomain.xml file to their site.

Perhaps this is to avoid DOS'ing a third party site from a flash app,
but attempting to grab the crossdomain.xml file could be a form of
attack (although arguably less intensive).

So what am I missing here?

Perhaps there are use cases that I don't see that this model affords
protection either to the client or the server.






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