Hi,

Exploit code can be used to figure out the kind of vulnerability that 
application/system has. Hence the signatures developed once the vulnerability 
is understood can be said that they are vulnerability based signatures as per 
your terminology. But there are exceptions though.

If the vulnerability can be mapped to standard protocol and the exploitation 
happening due to protocol information, then there is a very big possibility 
that the signature developed stops different variations of exploit taking 
advantage of the vulnerability. 

But if the protocol is proprietary and not publicly known, then it can become 
difficult to create signature with good confidence.  There can be false 
positives and false negatives.  This may be called exploit based signature.  
But these signatures at the minimum protect internal resources from script 
kiddies.

Other cases where there could be problem in developing good signatures are:

- Sensor not having protocol intelligence:  Signatures would be based on raw 
content and can result into false positives and negatives.

- Data based vulnerabilities such as vulnerabilities in ActiveX and Java 
scripts:  Many signature developed in this area would be mostly based on 
exploits, especially if the IDS/IPS doesn't have intelligence of interpreting 
Java script and HTML pages.

Since many IDP devices in the market today don't do good analysis on data 
portion (Email attachment, HTML pages, HTML download files, FTP transferred 
files etc..) probability of a signature being 'exploit based' is more in case 
of client protection.

Regards
Srini



-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On 
Behalf Of tanyoo10
Sent: Friday, March 13, 2009 10:21 AM
To: focus-ids
Cc: 肖斌
Subject: Exploit-based signature is dead, or not?

Greetings to everyone.

  I have some questions about exploit-based and vulnerability-based signature 
of IDS.

  I heard that exploit-based signature is dead (useless), since 
vulnerability-based signatures are more effective than exploit-based signatures 
in that they can detect unknown exploits if a vulnerability can be utilized by 
many exploits. However, I don't agree with this argument, for the following 
reasons: 
(1) When a vulnerability is unknown, exploit-based might be a good solution. 
(2) Exploit-based signatures are still irrepetable for early defense of 
zero-day worms or zero-day exploits, since exploit-based signatures can be 
generated more timely. 
(3) In the perfect world, we need to generate both types of signatures (even 
finally we only use vulnerability-based signature in detection). That way we 
not only know we were attacked, but we know with what type of exploit; or that 
it's a new unknown variant of an exploit. That's useful information in and of 
itself. 

        To support the above viewpoints, I have some concrete questions needed 
to be answered: 
(1) Were there some attacks that have exploit-based signature but have not 
vulnerability-based signature? Can someone give me some exmples? 
(2) Were there some examples to show that exploit-based signatures were 
generated much quickly and timely than the generation of vulnerability-based 
signatures for the historical worms or attacks ? 
(3) Does current IDS (e.g. Snort) use both signature types of exploit-based and 
vulnerability? If so, what percentage of sigantures are exploit-based? 
     
 
Thanks for you any input of discussing "exploit-based vs. vulnerability-based 
signature" ! 




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