Hi,

Some thoughts on moving ports.

Moving the TS port is for the most part unnecessary, silly and not
"smart". In fact, moving your TS port around might even make you machine
less accessible from some networks depending on the vigilance of network
administrators there by reducing the utility of the service.

By moving the port you gain some degree of security through obscurity.
Though, no real tangible gains have been made on the safety of the
system. This is in my opinion no security at all - moving the port does
not mitigate a human threat, and it does not mitigate threats from
somewhat intelligent worms. Only in the case of a self propagating
"dumb" worm or program that specifically targets 3389 (and no others)
will one find themselves in trouble. Terminal services has an excellent
(as far as MS is concerned) track record in regards to security and
while this is no degree of insurance it does lead me to believe that it
can be trusted.

The "smart" solution here would involved isolating access to Terminal
Services to authorized users of your network. Access to the terminal
serviced machine should be provided via a VPN connection. If you want to
be really paranoid about it - the VPN connection should not be provided
by your DC (tempting on smaller networks) but instead by another network
device or server. You should also make sure that the device
authenticates with a higher level of credentials than a preshared key
(IPSec comes to mind).

In my experience TS can stand on it's own. It's a hardy service that has
managed to prove itself through so many catastrophes with other windows
services. Moving the port only has the capacity to restrict your ability
to use the service as intended and does not truly provide any sort of
security. It also adds to the complexity of the network.

Changing the administrative login is a good idea though - as it is
nearly impossible to guess in a reasonable amount of time both a user
and a pass for the machine in question.

Make sure that your lockout policy is defined such that there is a long
pause between incorrect logins and a lockout for an extended period of
time after no more than 5 failed authentication attempts. Also, if you
do use terminal services you should enable both successful and failed
authentication events. Periodically reviewing the logs is always a good
idea and not just when you think you've been compromised ;-)

Logan

-----Original Message-----
From: maralisa [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Saturday, November 12, 2005 12:00 PM
To: [email protected]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: break in? - terminal services on alternate port

Paul,
 
The smartest and best thing to do if you must open the terminal services
port to the world is to change the port that terminal services runs on.
I do this, and it never gets attacked. You should also change the name
of your administrator account. This is best practice. I've had my
terminal server accessible to the worls for literally year now with no
problems.
 
Read this and give it a shot.
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;q187623  When
you connect using the terminal services client, you put a : and the port
number after the server name, like this, server:6432
 
-steve

________________________________

From: Paul Greene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Fri 11/11/2005 9:18 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: break in?



Hello,

I have a Win2K domain controller running on my home network that had
Terminal Services enabled through my firewall so that I could access the
box from my office at work. I had configured the firewall to only all TS
access from the IP block of the company where I work. (the firewall is
an openbsd box that also acts as the gateway to my ISP)

Well, I went out on a road trip and allowed TS access from "any" so that
I could access the DC from my hotel room, and then forgot to restrict
access again when finished. Ooops!! Big mistake.

I was looking through Event viewer troubleshooting another issue a few
days ago, then noticed a whole bunch of failed administrator logins in
the security logs. Oh, crap what happened now. I ran Symantec AV, Spybot
search and destroy, and Adware and none of them found anything. I ran MS
Update service and realized I was out of date on several patches (going
back about 2 months worth of patches).

Another ominous sign was that the DC had two printers configured that I
use at the office, but I have never configured a printer for this DC. I
deleted the printers, and they came right back.

I wanted to see what was going on with the DC, so rather than wipe it
clean and re-install, I locked the firewall down real tight and started
logging everything to see if the DC was going to try to "phone home"
somewhere. I'm only allowing outgoing http access to the MS Update site,
and outgoing DNS queries (UDP port 53) because this is also the dns
server for the network.

More ominous signs. The server was trying a few times a day to make
connection attempts to some outbound websites and ftp sites. Some of the
IP addresses were located in Rumania and Poland. All connection attempts
were getting blocked and logged.

Based on these symptoms, can anyone tell me what happened? In
particular, for educations sake, can anyone tell what the specific
exploit that was used in this case, and possibly a reference where I can
go analyze further what happened?

I don't have anything especially valuable on this server, so I won't
lose much by wiping it and starting over again. I think I've also locked
it down enough now with firewall ACL's that some turkey isn't going to
be stealing my bandwidth for some nefarious purpose either.

Thanks in advance,

Paul Greene

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