At Monday, May 15, 2006 10:29 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I'm curious about how people are implementing FE/BE Exchange > communication. It absolutely kills me that all of this traffic is > being transported through all of these ports via clear text.
IPSec is the recommended way to secure it. > I thought about encrypting all of it using IPSEC but we are using NAT > between the DMZ and the Internal firewall. So all the traffic will > get dropped. You can pass IPSec through NAT firewalls: NAT-T (NAT Traversal). However, that design has got to breaking other functionality. Your FE server (in your DMZ) has to be a member of the AD domain/forest, which means it needs to be able to initiate connections into the protected network. At the very least, you need to get these two subnets on a routing relationship with each other (that is, have your firewall perform NAT if it's coming from the protected network destined externally, but not between the protected network and the DMZ). Your firewall people (if they're not you) will probably stop listening right about now, but you should remind them that NAT *is not* a security measure and is intended to conserve publicly routable IP addresses. > Another > question is, even if you do use IPSEC do you still need to open the > individual ports? My understanding is that you don't but someone is > telling me that you do. What do you mean by "open the individual ports"? You're not using IPSec to tunnel traffic in this config, so you can just say "Encrypt all communications to IP address M.N.O.P" -- but then the intervening firewall will need to allow the proper protocols through (and there are a LOT of them for an FE in the DMZ). Better yet, get an ISA Server 2004 box and put *that* in your DMZ. Then you can move the FE back to the protected network where it belongs, with all of the advantages: 1) You can easily apply a single IPsec policy via Group Policies for your Exchange servers. Any new Exchange servers you stand up in the future will automatically use IPSec just by being a member of the correct OU. 2) Your firewall configuration between the DMZ and protected network stops resembling Swiss cheese, as you can close down the holes for Kerberos, LDAP, GC lookups, SMB, DNS, SMTP, MAPI, and more. 3) You get an application-level proxy that filters incoming SMTP and HTTP requests and drops malformed/corrupt ones on the floor before they ever get to your Exchange server. Microsoft publishes some good guidance on the various FE/BE options and their security implications. The first guide you should read (if you haven't already) is the _Exchange Server 2003 and Exchange 2000 Server Front-End and Back-End Topology_ guide: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/exchange/2003/library/febet op.mspx -- Devin L. Ganger Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 3Sharp LLC Phone: 425.882.1032 x 109 15311 NE 90th Street Cell: 425.239.2575 Redmond, WA 98052 Fax: 425.702.8455 (e)Mail Insecurity: http://blogs.3sharp.com/blog/deving/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
