Foreign Correspondent
Inside Track On World News
By International Syndicated Columnist & Broadcaster
Eric Margolis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
www.foreigncorrespondent.com
NATO�s flaws exposed by war in Kosovo
By Eric Margolis
September 6, 1999
PARIS - Few recent conflicts have produced so many confusing military
lessons or such a muddled political outcome as the recent, 78-day conflict
in Kosovo. Post mortem analysis reveals:
*NATO almost splintered over military operations against Serbia, due to
bitter opposition from the Italian and German left, and from Greece. If
Serb dictator Slobodan Milosevic had held on a few weeks longer, he might
have actually won the lopsided conflict.
* President Clinton and his national security advisor, Sandy Berger
committed NATO's biggest blunder by proclaiming there would be no ground
invasion, nearly handing Milosevic victory. Ironically, it was
Milosevic's mistaken belief that NATO was preparing a full-scale invasion
of Kosovo that made him sue for peace. Clinton's foreign team displayed
incompetence and amateurishness in waging the war and then bringing Russia
- Serbia's ally and backer - into the peace process.
*Even so, had it not been for resolute American and British opposition to
Serbia's barbaric race crimes, the rest of NATO's weak-willed members
would have done nothing. Morality without muscle is simply voyeurism.
Once again, the United States demonstrated that however flawed or
self-serving its actions may sometimes be, notably in the Mideast, it
remains the world's pre-eminent force for good and decency.
*Militarily, the air-war was a major disappointment. At first, NATO
delivered only pinprick attacks on Serb forces, mistakenly convinced
Milosevic would quickly surrender, as he had in Bosnia. Sandy Berger's
foolish strategy of slowly increasing military pressure on Serbia was a
replay of Robert McNamara's catastrophic strategy of `gradual escalation'
that led to America's defeat in Vietnam. NATO commander Wesley Clark, who
opposed this stupid policy and urged a ground invasion, was rudely sacked
by the Clinton Administration once the war ended.
*When NATO finally got serious about punishing Serbia, its decision to
keep strike aircraft above 15,000 ft to avoid losses from AA fire saved
air crews, but killed more Albanian civilians than Serb soldiers. NATO
claims to have destroyed 500 Serb tanks and 1,000 guns proved absurd.
Clever concealment techniques and decoys used by the Serbs spoofed NATO's
pilots and reconnaissance. Actual Serb losses were only 10% of those
claimed. The Serbs simply parked their tanks in farm houses, moved only at
night, and used Albanian civilians as human shields. Serb paramilitary
gangs who committed the worst atrocities in Kosovo suffered almost no
casualties.
*The only time NATO air power had any tactical success was when KLA
fighters flushed hidden Serb units into the open, or designated them with
lasers for air attack. Otherwise, timidly-employed tactical air power
proved a failure in Kosovo. In Serbia, however, widescale destruction of
infrastructure and factories caused great damage and played a major role
in convincing Milosevic to negotiate. World War II-style strategic bombing
proved far more effective than the Pentagon's new high-tech, whiz-bang
weapons.
*The war showed the US lacked sufficient stores of smart weapons and was
short of electronic jamming aircraft. Communications were often
inadequate; operations lacked coordination. Recon was insufficient. Even
so, the US Air Force, which flew 75% of all strikes, showed itself a full
generation ahead of all air forces, and a master of that American
specialty, long-ranged logistics. But the conflict imposed enormous stress
on the Air Force and Air Force, which have been ravaged by budget cuts,
and showed clearly that the Pentagon's cherished claim to be able to fight
2.5 wars at the same time, or even 1.5, was wishful thinking.
*Kosovo revealed shocking military weakness in NATO's non-US powers. They
had to rely on the US for jamming, refueling, munitions, logistics,
command and control. The conflict showed that none of NATO's members,
save the US, could move troops or aircraft in large numbers outside of
their home areas, supply them, or wage modern, high-tech war. Canada's
handful of aging CF-18's, for example, lacked modern communications and
radars, and had to be fitted with laser targeting pods.
*Heavy bombers, only recently dismissed as dinosaurs, showed their value
as cruise missile launchers and precision attackers. The hugely expensive
B-2 Stealth bomber proved remarkably deadly; the B-1 an effective carpet
bomber; the venerable, majestic B-52 indispensable after more than 50
years of service. However, to the Air Force's chagrin, Kosovo
demonstrated that precision weapons are more important than the aircraft
that carry them.
As impressive as cruise missiles are, nothing replaces sustained artillery
fire and ground assault by armor and infantry. Two NATO armored divisions
would have swept the Serb Army from Kosovo in a week, something all NATO's
aircraft and laser technology could not do.
*The deployed but never-used US Apache attack helicopters were a huge
embarrassment. The Pentagon feared to send the US $13 million Apaches
against the Serb Army. The US has put too much emphasis on attack
helicopters, which may terrify tribesmen and Iraqi bashi-bazouks, but are
sitting ducks when used on their own against a modern force with AA guns
and missiles.
The object of war is peace. Unfortunately, NATO made a hash of the peace,
leaving Kosovo in turmoil, its status unresolved, the Russians entrenched
in the Balkans, and Serbia waiting for revenge. Unfinished wars
inevitably lead to new ones.
Copyright: E. Margolis, September 1999
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