This message is from the T13 list server.
On the other hand,
a) Before SECURITY ERASE UNIT is allowed to be executed,
the drive must successfully execute an SECURITY ERASE PREPARE cmd
b) and before SECURITY ERASE PREPARE can be executed, the
drive must be unlocked
c) therefore, SECURITY ERASE UNIT must have been unlocked with a password.
----------------
The state diagram (ata7: clause 4.7.4) does have some significant omissions
* it does not show the SECURITY ERASE PREPARE command
(except in text for Transition SEC5b:SEC1
* it does not show the differences between HIGH and MAX levels
* it does not show SRST and DEVICE RESET interactions
That should be corrected - - with a similar degree of detail as
the SET MAX feature set was recently updated by Phoenix Technologies.
--------------
Thank You !!!
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Hatfield
Seagate Technology LLC
e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
s-mail: 389 Disc Drive; Longmont, CO 80503 USA
voice: 720-684-2120
fax....: 720-684-2711
==========================================
"Mark Overby"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]
om> To
No Phone Info "Steve Livaccari"
Available <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Joseph Chen
- SISA" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc
05/17/2005 01:36 <[email protected]>,
PM <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Thomas
Jansen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject
RE: [t13] Back to the main problem.
Please read
I see what Steve is saying.
6.44.8 (first paragraph) indicates that a password is required to execute
SECURITY ERASE UNIT in any condition.
4.7 (third paragraph) indicates the behavior of SECURITY ERASE UNIT when
the security level is set to high or maximum. (Basically security is
enabled by specifying a user password on a SECURITY SET PASSWORD command)
I would state that the state machine text in 4.7 could use a little touch
up to indicate the transitions on SECURITY ERASE UNIT from the locked
condition only happen when a password is successfully presented. Also, the
text on transitioning from the unlocked to locked state needs to be
clarified as well.
I'll make a note to write up a proposal when I get done with some of my
others.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve
Livaccari
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 11:41 AM
To: Joseph Chen - SISA
Cc: [email protected]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Thomas Jansen
Subject: RE: [t13] Back to the main problem. Please read
Sorry, but the standard clearly states that if the password does not match
the password perviously saved by the device the device shall abort the
command.
Regards,
Steve Livaccari
Hard Drive Engineering
IBM Global Procurement
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Phone (919) 543.7393
Joseph Chen - SISA
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To
Thomas Jansen
05/17/2005 02:27 PM <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[email protected]
cc
Subject
RE: [t13] Back to the main
problem. Please read
This message is from the T13 list server.
My understanding on the spec is one can do Security Erase without
password.
Regards,
Joseph
-----Original Message-----
From: Thomas Jansen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 9:50 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [t13] Back to the main problem. Please read
This message is from the T13 list server.
Curtis Stevens wrote:
>This message is from the T13 list server.
>
>
>Pat
>
> Currently the ATA through SCSI community is not affected
because
>there is no real translation from SCSI to ATA security. This could be an
>issue in the future when ATA pass-though is implemented.
>
> I think that we should also note that the drive need not
be
>returned. Security Erase is used to clear the password along with the
data.
>This does give the user a way to retrieve the drive if it gets
passworded.
>
>
>
Not as far as I understand the standard. The drive will only accept the
Security Erase command when either the master or user password is
supplied.
In case of a virus both passwords will be set to random. This was the
original question I asked.... :-)
Sincerely,
Thomas
