>Number: 188745 >Category: bin >Synopsis: FreeBSD base OpenSSL puts private keys to RNG seeds >Confidential: no >Severity: non-critical >Priority: low >Responsible: freebsd-bugs >State: open >Quarter: >Keywords: >Date-Required: >Class: sw-bug >Submitter-Id: current-users >Arrival-Date: Fri Apr 18 04:00:00 UTC 2014 >Closed-Date: >Last-Modified: >Originator: Kenji Rikitake >Release: 10.0-STABLE >Organization: >Environment: FreeBSD minimax.priv.k2r.org 10.0-STABLE FreeBSD 10.0-STABLE #33 r264285: Wed Apr 9 09:25:02 JST 2014 [email protected]:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/K2RKERNEL amd64 >Description: OpenBSD devs report OpenSSL puts RSA private keys as they are for seeding the PRNG. See http://freshbsd.org/commit/openbsd/e5136d69ece4682e6167c8f4a8122270236898bf for the details.
On 10.0-STABLE, I've found the same practice under /usr/src/crypto/openssl/crypto at: rsa/rsa_crpt.c 229: RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0); evp/evp_pkey.c 153: RAND_add(p8->pkey->value.octet_string->data, pem/pem_lib.c 391: RAND_add(data,i,0);/* put in the RSA key. */ >How-To-Repeat: Recompile the userland. (Note: the similar source code may exist in the Port OpenSSL too) >Fix: OpenBSD team has already removed the problematic code as described in http://freshbsd.org/commit/openbsd/e5136d69ece4682e6167c8f4a8122270236898bf I think the same security audit on FreeBSD is seriously required. >Release-Note: >Audit-Trail: >Unformatted: _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-bugs To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"
