W dniu 27.01.2026 o 21:09, Shawn Webb pisze:
On Tue, Jan 27, 2026 at 09:01:53PM +0100, Guido Falsi wrote:
On 1/27/26 20:17, Shawn Webb wrote:
On Tue, Jan 27, 2026 at 07:27:28PM +0100, Guido Falsi wrote:
On 1/27/26 19:17, Shawn Webb wrote:
On Tue, Jan 27, 2026 at 03:35:16AM +0330, Pouria Mousavizadeh Tehrani wrote:
Hi everyone,
With `net.inet6.ip6.use_stableaddr` now available, I believe we should
enable it by default in CURRENT at least.
As you may already know, we currently use the EUI64 method for generating
stable IPv6 addresses, which has serious privacy issues.
IMHO, trying to maintain backward compatibility defeats the purpose of a
privacy RFC.
To be clear, we don't want to change the ip addresses of existing servers.
However, it's reasonable for users to expect changes during a major upgrade
(15 -> 16), a fresh install of a new major release, or living on CURRENT.
So, for obvious reasons, changing the default value would not be MFCed.
What do you think?
I think this would be a good step for FreeBSD. In HardenedBSD, we set
net.inet6.ip6.{prefer,use}_tempaddr to 1, which creates completely
random IPv6 addresses (scoped to the prefix, of course).
The one thing I would hope is that support for completely random IPv6
addresses via SLAAC does not go the way of the dodo.
(If net.inet6.ip6.use_stableaddr becomes the default, we will likely
keep it at 0 in favor of the other aforementioned sysctl nodes.)
Those are two orthogonal things.
stableaddress enabled replaces the current algorithm for deriving the main
interface address, that stays attached to the interface indefinitely.
tempaddr creates additional addresses for the interface that are used (and
preferred if the prefer flag is enabled) for outgoing connections, and are
generated again periodically, with old ones remaining attached to the
interface, since old connections could still use them, till reboot.
The two can live together, there is no reason to disable one of them.
BTW while developing my patch, in one of the first iterations, I did break
the tempaddr mechanism, so I can assure you I took special care for them to
not interfere with each other.
Seems I was indeed a bit confused. Thank you for the explanation.
So looking at one of my current SLAAC systems, I see:
==== BEGIN LOG ====
bridge0: flags=1008843<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST,LOWER_UP> metric
0 mtu 1500
options=10<VLAN_HWTAGGING>
ether 58:9c:fc:10:d7:7e
inet 192.168.1.251 netmask 0xfffff000 broadcast 192.168.15.255
inet6 fe80::5a9c:fcff:fe10:d77e%bridge0 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x3
inet6 2001:470:4001:1:5a9c:fcff:fe10:d77e prefixlen 64 autoconf
pltime 14400 vltime 86400
inet6 2001:470:4001:1:c001:f868:c587:cdd7 prefixlen 64 deprecated
autoconf temporary pltime 0 vltime 44033
inet6 2001:470:4001:1:c139:85be:79b3:e3ec prefixlen 64 autoconf
temporary pltime 12610 vltime 86400
id 00:00:00:00:00:00 priority 32768 hellotime 2 fwddelay 15
maxage 20 holdcnt 6 proto rstp maxaddr 2000 timeout 1200
root id 00:00:00:00:00:00 priority 32768 ifcost 0 port 0
bridge flags=0<>
==== END LOG ====
From what I understand now, the only thing that would change is the
2001:470:4001:1:5a9c:fcff:fe10:d77e address. Instead of incorporating
the MAC address in that IP address, it would be the stableaddr
address.
Amy I understanding that correctly?
You are correct.
AFAIK the relevant RFCs implemented here were studied to be compatible with
one another.
To give some details:
The net.inet6.ip6.use_stableaddr sysctl changes the algorithm that
incorporates the MAC address in the IPv6 address with one deriving the IPv6
address with an hash (sha256 HMAC) of the concatenation of various sources,
as described in RFC 7217, specifically:
- the network prefix
- MAC address, interface name or interface id (configurable via
net.inet6.ip6.stableaddr_netifsource, default uses MAC address)
- hostid (this is a UUID, constant on the machine)
- a counter, usually 0, incremented if there are DAD conflicts (another host
with same address is detected on the network, counter incremented and a new
address is checked, by default for 3 times, configurable via
net.inet6.ip6.use_stableaddr)
- we use an additional counter to cater for the very rare case the algorithm
should generate an invalid address, in such a case the counter is
incremented and another address generated and verified.
Way cool! For when there might be a conflict: is any jitter applied to
the new address generation? If we made it to this point (where the
counters actually matter), if the conflicting systems don't apply a
random jitter, there could be a chance of counter exhaustion.
The interface ID in a stable privacy address has to remain the same
within the same network (the same prefix). Applying jitter will not fix
it. This patch was tested and works fine. Making it the default is a
good step, as well as doing an MFC of stable privacy to stable/15
(without making it default there).
The only possible clash between systems could happen when a lazy admin
clones a system, uses the same interface name, and does not regenerate
the host UUID. To narrow the impact, I suggest switching to the MAC
address as the default key source instead of the interface name.
Sometimes MAC addresses are cloned as well, but that usually depends
more on the virtualizing host than on the sysadmin who clones the system.
--
Marek Zarychta
I would highly doubt that would happen in practice. I suspect the
stars would have to align and we would have already learned how to
speak fluent Dog with our furry friends. ;-)
Thanks,
