but what about
While ( more data items)
{
copy data items onto end of buffer
if full{
write out buffer
clear buffer, copy in rest of last item.
}
}
I'd certainly not want to use xxprintf() for that
On Thu, 15 Jul 1999, Mike Smith wrote:
> > On Thu, 15 Jul 1999, Mike Smith wrote:
> >
> > > Ugh. Take the first example in the paper; it rewrites as
> > >
> > > len = asprintf(&path, "%s/.foorc");
> > >
> > > as opposed to
> > >
> > > strlcat(path, homedir, sizeof(path));
> > > strlcat(path, "/", sizeof(path));
> > > strlcat(path, ".foord", sizeof(path));
> > > len = strlen(path);
> > >
> > > Yes, they're a better str*cat/cpy, but they're not the solution that
> > > they claim to be.
> >
> > I don't think that anyone has intended them to be anything other than a
> > better replacement for strcpy/strcat than strncpy/strncat (which they
> > certainly are). Sure, you could go around telling people "use snprintf
> > instead" or "use asprintf instead", but is that the issue at hand?
>
> In context, yes it is.
>
> The paper talks about dealing with the construction of composite
> strings into static buffers, and points out that there's a real problem
> when you hit the edge of the buffer (overflow, truncation, etc.)
>
> But they don't address the core of the problem, which is the use of a
> static buffer in the first place. This and other habitual programming
> style items are what's at the real core of the "C is an insecure
> language" argument; people are so used to these idiomatic programming
> techniques they refuse to look for better solutions to the larger
> problem.
>
> Going back to the example they gave, let's put it in context. You
> probably have something like this:
>
>
> {
> struct passwd *pw;
> char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
> FILE *fp;
>
> pw = getpwuid(getuid());
> strlcpy(buf, pw->dir, sizeof(buf));
> strlcat(buf, "/.appname/", sizeof(buf));
> strlcat(buf, conffilename, sizeof(buf));
> if (strlen(buf) >= sizeof(buf))
> return(error);
> fp = fopen(buf, "r");
> ...
>
> That works, as long as MAXPATHLEN is actually long enough. In this
> particular case it will be (because fopen will fail otherwise), but
> there's no guarantee that you're going to know in advance.
>
> OTOH, here it is with asprintf:
>
> {
> struct passwd *pw;
> char *buf;
> FILE *fp;
>
> pw = getpwuid(getuid());
> if (asprintf(&buf, "%s/.appname/%s", pw->dir, conffilename) == -1)
> return(error);
> fp = fopen(buf, "r");
> free(buf);
> ...
>
> The latter has a few really clear advantages:
>
> - you can see what the string is meant to look like.
> - it doesn't matter how long any of the components are.
> - the constructed value is on the heap, so you can return it (just
> imagine how much nicer ctime() would be if it did this).
>
> --
> \\ The mind's the standard \\ Mike Smith
> \\ of the man. \\ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> \\ -- Joseph Merrick \\ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>
>
>
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