over. Similarly, I'd rather see worm attempts to infect
[EMAIL PROTECTED] result in the worm failing to send the email in
the first place, rather than having it send it successfully only to have
distributed.net's mailserver send a helpful bounce to an innocent
purported sender (remember, worms lie about sender habitually) containing a copy
of the infection vector.
Speaking on behalf of the poor distributed.net mailserver in question, this is only half the story when it comes to the damage done by qmail's behavior in this case. Not only is the accept-then-bounce behavior generating annoying and irrelevant bounces for innocent email addresses, it's also generated an outbound queue of bounces to domains and emails which don't exist which numbers in the tens of thousands. These mails clog up the outbound queue for 7 days with qmail dutifully attempting delivery periodically never quite coming to grips with the fact that the addresses are pure bunk.
I switched my home server to postfix this past weekend and plan to do the same to the distributed.net servers now that I know how the conversion is done.
-- David McNett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.slacker.com/~nugget/
