David Schultz wrote: > Some colleagues and I have a paper in submission that addresses > the issue of key-dependent control flow, much as you describe.
Care to send me a pre-print? > If you're willing to wait a day or two, you don't even need to > have a local account: > > http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/ssl-timing.html 1. The Boneh-Brumley attack is specific to a particular method of performing large integer arithmetic (and thus only applies to RSA, DH, and DSS). My attack applies to essentially all code -- both crypto and non-crypto -- although I picked RSA/OpenSSL as a good demonstration platform. 2. The Boneh-Brumley attack was fixed two years ago. > I'm just reading Colin's paper now---so as you say, it sounds like > the punchline is that having a local account buys you a few orders > of magnitude in attack time. Kewl. No. On hyperthreaded systems which don't run FreeBSD or SCO, having a local account buys you an attack which would otherwise be impossible. (Unless you're running a really old version of OpenSSL.) Colin Percival _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
