> On 8 Jun 2012, at 13:51, Dag-Erling Smørgrav wrote:
>
> > We still have MD5 as our default password hash, even though known-hash
> > attacks against MD5 are relatively easy these days.
*collision* attacks are relatively easy these days, but against 1 MD5,
not against 1000 times MD5
w.r.t. password hashes, a successful preimage attack would be threatening,
which publications are you referring to?
I found one preimage attack on reduced MD5, but it's theoretical (2^96 steps)
"Preimage Attacks on 3-Pass HAVAL and Step-Reduced MD5*"
eprint.iacr.org/2008/183.pdf
> > We've supported
> > SHA256 and SHA512 for many years now, so how about making SHA512 the
> > default instead of MD5, like on most Linux distributions?
there is a NIST hash competition running, the winner will soon be announced
(and it won't be SHA256 or SHA512 ;-)
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/timeline.html
so my suggestion would be to use all of the finalists - especially
the winner - for password hashing
* BLAKE
* Grøstl
* JH
* Keccak
* Skein
see, for example, http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/sha3_010511.cfm
--
Damian Weber, <http://www-crypto.htw-saarland.de>_______________________________________________
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