On Fri, 14 Sep 2012 17:25:59 +0100 Ben Laurie wrote: > On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 3:46 PM, RW <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Fri, 14 Sep 2012 14:43:53 +0100 > > Ben Laurie wrote: > > > >> On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 2:38 PM, Bjoern A. Zeeb <[email protected]> > >> wrote: > >> > 7) send all data to the kernel and hash (arch dependent?) it + > >> > counter value into the buffer on overflow, as in b[n] = H(b[n] + > >> > c > >> > + i[n]) in the kernel > >> > (can control when buffer full and only then take action when > >> > needed, indepedent on how seed data is chosen, uses standard > >> > technology) > >> > >> IMO, this is the only good option. > > > > No it isn't. I means that the hashing is unconditional, so anyone > > that needs a faster boot needs to patch the kernel. > > Has anyone measured the cost of doing this? Also, if you really want > to turn it off, we could provide a flag.
Yes, read the thread. > > It has no advantage > > whatsoever over a minor change to initrandom. > > It absolutely has. It applies to all inputs to /dev/random, not just > those that come from initrandom. If the rc script are written correctly it shouldn't matter, there no need to write to /dev/random after the boot - it wont do anything useful. It has no advantage over hashing the low-grade entropy in userland which is is just couple of lines difference in a shell script. > Also, should something get to write > to it before initrandom, initrandom's input would still be used. There's no reason to do that, so why do you think it matter? _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"
