Slawa Olhovchenkov <[email protected]> writes: > On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 08:08:49PM -0400, Lowell Gilbert wrote: > >> Slawa Olhovchenkov <[email protected]> writes: >> >> > ftpd from FreeBSD-10 and up don't record ftp logins to utmpx database >> > (for case of chrooted login). >> > This is lack security information. >> > I found this is done by r202209 and r202604. >> > I can't understand reason of this. >> > Can somebody explain? >> >> Having a jail log into the base system is a security issue in the >> making. Can't you do this in a safer way by doing remote logging to the >> base system rather than having the jail hold on to a file handle that >> belongs outside the jail? > > Jail? Why I you talk about jail?
Because the principle is the same for any method of imprisoning a process inside a particular file tree, whether it be chroot(8) or jail(8) or a virtualized machine. The principle is: don't give the imprisoned process access to any resources outside of its prison. >> It's certainly possible to maintain these kinds of capabilities, but >> you would have to convince code reviewers that the same results can't be >> achieved some other way that's easier to secure. > > Can you explain some more? > A im lost point. You can always try to limit the ways that direct access outside the chroot (et. al.) can be used (or abused). However, it is much easier to make sure that there are no ways to break out of the chroot if the direct access does not exist in the first place. _______________________________________________ [email protected] mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail to "[email protected]"
