Around 2012[1] we made the brave switch from md5crypt to sha512. Some people 
were asking for bcrypt to be default, and others were hoping we would see 
pbkdf2 support. We went with compatible. Additionally, making password hashing 
more

In light of this new article[2] I would like to rehash (pun intended) this 
conversation and also mention a bug report[3] we've been sitting on in some 
form for 12 years[4] with usable code that would make working with password 
hashing algorithms easier and the rounds configurable by the admin.

I'd also like to see us to pull in scrypt if cperciva doesn't have any 
objections. It's good to have options.

PS: Why does "compatibility" matter for a default algorithm? Having a default 
different than Linux or Solaris isn't a bad thing as long as we implement the 
industry's common hashes which would permit any management tools twiddling the 
master.passwd manually to still be able to insert the password hashes in a 
common format...

[1] https://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-security/2012-June/006271.html
[2] 
https://pthree.org/2018/05/23/do-not-use-sha256crypt-sha512crypt-theyre-dangerous/
[3] https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=182518
[4] https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=75934 is the original 
report about the issue

-- 
  Mark Felder
  ports-secteam & portmgr member
  f...@freebsd.org
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