Clifton Royston wrote:
On Tue, Jul 22, 2008 at 09:39:20AM -0700, Doug Barton wrote:
cpghost wrote:
Yes indeed. If I understand all this correctly, it's because the
transaction ID that has to be sent back is only 2 bytes long,
2 bits, 16 bytes.
^^^^ ^^^^^ Think you mean those the other way!
Oops, ELACKOFCAFFEINE
and if the query port doesn't change as well with every query, that
can be cracked in milliseconds: sending 65536 DNS queries to a
constant port is just way too easy! The namespace is way too small,
and there's no way to fix this by switching to, say, 4 bytes or
even more for the transaction ID without breaking existing
resolvers; actually without breaking the protocol itself.
That's more or less accurate, yes.
Doug
I just saw mention in Infoworld - adequate details of the exploit
were guessed by another developer and then confirmed. They're now
circulating, so I think we can expect engineered attacks soon.
All:
Upgrade your servers today, do not wait.
Agreed on both counts.
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