New: iPhone 5S (iPhone 5NSA) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSJqBJ1TF-E I have got to get me one of these!!! Maybe not!
> -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: Freedombox-discuss Digest, Vol 38, Issue 31 > From: [email protected] > Date: Tue, September 17, 2013 3:57 pm > To: [email protected] > > > Send Freedombox-discuss mailing list submissions to > [email protected] > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss > > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > [email protected] > > You can reach the person managing the list at > [email protected] > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Freedombox-discuss digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Onion Pi (Petter Reinholdtsen) > 2. Re: What is Freedombox? (Petter Reinholdtsen) > 3. Re: Onion Pi (Tim Retout) > 4. Re: JURI wants citizens to regain control over their personal > data and communication with Free and Open Source Software > ([email protected]) > 5. Re: What is Freedombox? (Jonas Smedegaard) > 6. Re: Onion Pi (Nick Daly) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 16:31:28 +0200 > From: Petter Reinholdtsen <[email protected]> > To: freedombox list <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] Onion Pi > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > [Sandy Harris] > > Raspberry Pi as a TOR proxy > > > > http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/06/onion-pi-turns-raspberry-pi-into-tor-proxy-and-wireless-access-point/ > > This look like something that would be trivial to replicate on the > Freedombox. It is a just simple Tor configuration and some iptables > rules, combined with a wifi access point setup. > > We could either use the recipes on > <URL: http://learn.adafruit.com/onion-pi/install-tor > and > <URL: https://raw.github.com/breadtk/onion_pi/master/setup.sh > to > replicate the Onion Pi setup (using Tor as the DNS server and TCP proxy) > or by configuring privoxy, dnsmasq and redsocks with iptables to pass > all traffic passing through the Freedombox via Tor. > > Is there some reason not to do this by default? If so, perhaps it > should be a selectable option in the plinth web interface to enable it? > > -- > Happy hacking > Petter Reinholdtsen > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 16:42:41 +0200 > From: Petter Reinholdtsen <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] What is Freedombox? > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > > > [Jonas Smedegaard] > > I would love to answer your question but don't understand it. Seems > > you quote different parts than what you actually ask me questions > > about. If so, please include adequate context in your quote. > > Probably just a misunderstanding on my part. I got the impression that > you had identified some parts of the Freedombox that were "exclusive" > for the Freedombox, and that the existence of these parts worried you. > I thus hoped you could let me know which parts this was, to let me have > a look at them too. > > But I now suspect you only talked about plinth, and not what I > understood at all. Never mind, just forget about it. :) > > -- > Happy hacking > Petter Reinholdtsen > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 17:45:06 +0100 > From: Tim Retout <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] Onion Pi > Message-ID: > <cadc0ge9hy090sp2cigmygzoe9kxbk87tmrcgq1chywok7wm...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > On 17 Sep 2013 15:32, "Petter Reinholdtsen" <[email protected]> wrote: > > or by configuring privoxy, dnsmasq and redsocks with iptables to pass > > all traffic passing through the Freedombox via Tor. > > > > Is there some reason not to do this by default? > > Hi! > > There are some good reasons not to run unencrypted traffic through Tor: > > - malicious exit nodes will be studying all unencrypted traffic passing > through them - badly-secured websites still send session cookies > unencrypted, for example. > - the exit node can very easily inject arbitrary Javascript into the web > page. This is bad. I don't think Javascript-enabled browsers should use > Tor. (Ditto for Flash/Java.) > > For fully encrypted traffic, you still need to be careful of MITM attacks. > Again this is easy for a malicious exit node. You can think of Tor as > subjecting yourself to a deliberate MITM. :) > > I have heard anecdotal evidence that the above is happening routinely on > Tor, FWIW. > > Tim > -------------- next part -------------- > An HTML attachment was scrubbed... > URL: > <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/freedombox-discuss/attachments/20130917/ffeedddb/attachment-0001.html> > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 09:50:53 -0700 > From: <[email protected]> > To: <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] JURI wants citizens to regain > control over their personal data and communication with Free and > Open > Source Software > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > > Cloud computing, was that a joke? > > -----Original Message----- > From: Freedombox-discuss > [mailto:freedombox-discuss-bounces+cgw993=aol....@lists.alioth.debian.org] > On Behalf Of JOSEFSSON Erik > Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 1:45 AM > To: [email protected] > Subject: [Freedombox-discuss] JURI wants citizens to regain control over > their personal data and communication with Free and Open Source Software > > Just a short report from the European Parliament. > > The Legal Affairs Committee just voted unanimously to promote that citizens > regain control over their personal data and communication with Free and Open > Source Software: > > > > > > Calls on the Commission to promote the development, jointly with > stakeholders, of decentralised Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) based > services which would help to harmonise practices across cloud providers and > enable European citizens to regain control over their personal data and > communication, for example by means of point-to-point encryption. > > > More info here: > http://icg.greens-efa.eu/pipermail/hub/2013-September/000070.html > > > :-) > > > //Erik > > > > -- > Erik Josefsson > Advisor on Internet Policies > Greens/EFA Group > <http://www.greens-efa.eu/36-details/josefsson-erik-138.html> > GSM: +32484082063 > BXL: PHS 04C075 TEL: +3222832667 > SBG: WIC M03005 TEL: +33388173776 > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 5 > Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 19:49:47 +0200 > From: Jonas Smedegaard <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] What is Freedombox? > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Quoting Petter Reinholdtsen (2013-09-17 16:42:41) > > [Jonas Smedegaard] > > > I would love to answer your question but don't understand it. Seems > > > you quote different parts than what you actually ask me questions > > > about. If so, please include adequate context in your quote. > > > > Probably just a misunderstanding on my part. I got the impression > > that you had identified some parts of the Freedombox that were > > "exclusive" for the Freedombox, and that the existence of these parts > > worried you. I thus hoped you could let me know which parts this was, > > to let me have a look at them too. > > Ah, makes sense now. > > I do feel that some pieces are currently being pushed for FreedomBox > only, even if they do seem to me as being usable broader. If it isn't > obvious which ones those are, then I'd be happy to try enumerate them. > > That said, in this thread I was talking another somewhat opposite issue, > where I see "constraint" as a positive quality: Some pieces considered > for FreedomBox (disregarding whether targeted wider or not) may have > some limiting design choices related to being runtime arch-independent. > > One Laptop Per Child has such design choice, for educational reason: any > kid should be able to just "look under the hood" and see how some code > is expressed - without having to chase sources somewhere else. > > CDBS has such design choice, for practical reason: Packaging a Debian > package is centered around composing debian/rules which is a makefile so > makes sense for reusable patterns to be make code too, not abstract away > from that (as dh sequencer does). > > I believe Freedom-maker has such design choice -that it is written in > shell so as to stay close to its purpose of "just a sequence of stuff > that could in principle be executed on a command-line. When Bdale > started that script in 2011 he emphasized not wanting to approach it too > complex. It has arguably grown more complex since, but my competing > "boxer" tool is, in comparison, far over-engineered and is not yet in a > useable state :-P > > Specifically I reflected on Plinth perhaps in its choice of Python had a > conscious design decision of being easier able to verify its logic e.g. > when being super cautious about security. > > > > But I now suspect you only talked about plinth, and not what I > > understood at all. Never mind, just forget about it. :) > > Ok. Didn't do well at that, it seems :-) > > > - Jonas > > -- > * Jonas Smedegaard - idealist & Internet-arkitekt > * Tlf.: +45 40843136 Website: http://dr.jones.dk/ > > [x] quote me freely [ ] ask before reusing [ ] keep private > -------------- next part -------------- > A non-text attachment was scrubbed... > Name: signature.asc > Type: application/pgp-signature > Size: 490 bytes > Desc: signature > URL: > <http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/freedombox-discuss/attachments/20130917/f7783d09/attachment-0001.sig> > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 6 > Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2013 14:57:12 -0500 > From: Nick Daly <[email protected]> > To: Tim Retout <[email protected]> > Cc: freedombox list <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] Onion Pi > Message-ID: > <cam-yhhamqxkztmsfessw1ys7vcjsd+tjnmrq61+xff5u5ss...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > Long story short: this should be configurable, selectively-disableable > by the end-user, or the end-user should be informed of the potential > disadvantages of this connection method. > > If your destinations are using SSL (like they should) MITM is less of > an issue. The lovely HttpsEverywhere Firefox/Iceweasel extension > makes this as simple as possible (and should definitely be installed > on any client device). > > The unexpected trouble you might need to worry about is infrastructure > services (like online banking, Paypal, etc.) freaking out because > you're connecting from a known exit node, and assuming that your > account is under attack [0]. Some service providers are good about > this (Google will mark your account as a Tor-using account if you sign > in from a non-exit node IP and then sign in from a known exit-node IP, > without clearing cookies [1]), but /I don't know/ which service > providers are bad about it. > > Nick > > 0: personal communication with primary source. > > 1: a libtech email from a Google employee that I don't have time to > find right now. Check the libtech list. > > On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Tim Retout <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 17 Sep 2013 15:32, "Petter Reinholdtsen" <[email protected]> wrote: > >> or by configuring privoxy, dnsmasq and redsocks with iptables to pass > >> all traffic passing through the Freedombox via Tor. > >> > >> Is there some reason not to do this by default? > > > > Hi! > > > > There are some good reasons not to run unencrypted traffic through Tor: > > > > - malicious exit nodes will be studying all unencrypted traffic passing > > through them - badly-secured websites still send session cookies > > unencrypted, for example. > > - the exit node can very easily inject arbitrary Javascript into the web > > page. This is bad. I don't think Javascript-enabled browsers should use Tor. > > (Ditto for Flash/Java.) > > > > For fully encrypted traffic, you still need to be careful of MITM attacks. > > Again this is easy for a malicious exit node. You can think of Tor as > > subjecting yourself to a deliberate MITM. :) > > > > I have heard anecdotal evidence that the above is happening routinely on > > Tor, FWIW. > > > > Tim > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Freedombox-discuss mailing list > > [email protected] > > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss > > > > ------------------------------ > > Subject: Digest Footer > > _______________________________________________ > Freedombox-discuss mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss > > ------------------------------ > > End of Freedombox-discuss Digest, Vol 38, Issue 31 > ************************************************** _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss
