On 11/04/09 16:16, Nalin Dahyabhai wrote:
On Wed, Nov 04, 2009 at 04:39:40PM -0500, Rob Crittenden wrote:
Alternatively you can specify which host(s) can request a
certificate for a given service. Use the service-add-member command
to add hosts that can request certs for it.
That sounds reasonable. Is this new post-1.9.0? I can add members to
various groups, but there's no service-add-member command yet.
A couple of tidbits:
- In 1.9.0 we'll issue a certificate for any subject requested.
dogtag has a fix that we will be able to use once it's released that
will let us pull the CN from the request and use just that with the
subject and use a fixed value for the rest.
That sounds good -- the default request subject is just 'CN=hostname'
unless it's told different.
- The management framework doesn't do anything to the CSR right now,
it literally just passes it onto the CA for processing.
- The whole ugly client IP thing has been ripped out post 1.9.0.
- I still compare the hostname in the subject with the hostname of
the service. This is unfortunately currently broken in python
2.4-based systems.
If we're requiring that every certificate has an associated principal
name, then ensuring it agrees with the hostname in the subject field
makes a lot of sense. I'd kind of like to see both a dnsName and a
Kerberos principal name added to the subjectAltName fields in the issued
certificate, but that's as much because we can as anything else.
- I'm not opposed to including more "stuff" into the CSR itself we
just need to be sure the average admin who doesn't want to use
certmonger can still make a request too.
NSS's certutil can trivially add dns and email subjectAltName (SAN)
values and extendedKeyUsage (EKU) values. I don't see a flag for adding
a Kerberos principal name. OpenSSL's req command doesn't do most of
that by default, but the configuration file can be used to tell it to do
any of that. It could be scripted, for sure.
Right now the bar is pretty
low to understanding what is required IMHO with the exception of
pasting in the ugly one-line CSR :-(
Yeah, it took me a while to figure out that that was how we were
supposed to pass it in.
Passing entire CSR as a parameter to ipa command could avoided if
XML-RPC framework would provide pre and post processing callbacks on the
client side. Parameters could be used to describe CSR (instead of
passing entire CSR), pre-processing callback could generate CSR based on
provided description, then XML-RPC call could submit generated CSR and
finally post-processing callback could properly place obtained certificate.
Regards,
Andrew
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