On Thu, 2012-04-19 at 14:18 +0200, Ondrej Hamada wrote:
> On 04/18/2012 08:30 PM, Rich Megginson wrote:
> >>> * Credentials expiration on replica should be configurable
> >> What does this mean ?
> We should store credentials for a subset of users only. As this subset
> might change over time, we should flush the credentials for users that
> haven't showed up for some while (even despite the credentials are not
> expired yet).
This should be determined through group membership or similar mechanism,
talking about 'expiration' seem wrong and confusing, perhaps just a
language problem ?
> > fractional replication had originally planned to support search
> > filters in addition to attribute lists - I think Ondrej wants to
> > include or exclude certain entries from being replicated
> Yes, my point is, that the Consumer should strore credentials only for
> users that are authenticating against him, so we need to exclude some
> attributes, but just for specific subset of users.
I am not sure we can achieve this, with just a fractional replication
filter, not easily anyway. A search filter singles out entire entries.
In order to have different sets of attributes replicated we need an
additional, per-filter attribute exclusion list.
> >>> 3) find master dynamically - Consumers and Hubs will be in fact
> >>> master
> >>> servers (from 389-DS point of view), this means that every
> >>> consumer or hub
> >>> knows his direct suppliers a they know their suppliers ...
> >> Not clear what this means, can you elaborate ?
> Replication agreements posses the information about suppliers. It means
> we can dynamically discover where are the masters by going through all
> nodes and asking who's their supplier. Thinking about it again, it will
> be probably very slow and less reliable. The lookup of dns records in
> LDAP would be better.
Neither, we have the list of masters in LDAP in the cn=etc subtree for
these uses, it's a simple search, and it is the authoritative list.
Remember we may not always control the DNS, so relying on a manually
maintained DNS would be bad.
> >>> * SSSD must be improved to allow cooperation with more than one LDAP
> >>> server
> >> Can you elaborate what you think is missing in SSSD ? Is it about the
> >> need to fix referrals handling ? Or something else ?
> I'm afraid of the situation when user authenticates and the information
> is not present on Consumer. If we'll use referrals and the
> authentication will have to be done against master, would the SSSD be
> able to handle it?
Currently SSSD can handle referrals, although it does so poorly due to
issues with the openldap libraries. Stephen tells me there are plans to
handle referrals in the SSSD code directly instead of deferring to
openldap libs. When that is done we should have no more issues.
However, for authentication purposes I am not sure referrals are the way
For the Kerberos case referrals won't work, because we will not let a
consumer have read access to keys in a master (besides the consumer will
not have the same master key so will not be able to decrypt them), so we
will need to handle the Krb case differently.
For ldap binds, we might do referrals, or we could chain binds and avoid
that issue entirely. If we chain binds we can also temporarily cache
credentials in the same way we do in SSSD so that if the server get cut
off the network it can keep serving requests. I am not thrilled about
caching users passwords this way and should probably not enabled by
default, but we'd have the option.
> >>> * authentication policies, every user must authenticate against master
> >>> server by
> >>> default
> >> If users always contact the master, what are the consumers for ?
> >> Need to elaborate on this and explain.
> As was mentioned earlier in the discussion, there are two scenarios - in
> the first one the consumer serves only as a source of
> information(dns,ntp,accounts...), the second one allows distribution of
> credentials and thus enables the authentication against the consumer
> locally. The first one is more secure since the creds are not stored on
> consumers that might be more easily corrupted.
Ok, makes sense, but I would handle this transparently to the clients,
as noted above. Trying to build knowledge in clients or rely on
referrals is going to work poorly with a lot of clients, making the
solution not really useful in real deployments where a mix of machines
that do not use SSSD is present.
> >>> - The policy must also specify the credentials expiration time. If
> >>> user tries to
> >>> authenticate with expired credential, he will be refused and
> >>> redirected to Master
> >>> server for authentication.
> >> How is this different from current status ? All accounts already have
> >> password expiration times and account expiration times. What am I
> >> missing ?
> Sorry, I wrote it unclear. I meant that the credentials, we store on
> Consumer should be there available only for a specified period of time.
> After that time they should be flushed away (means they are still valid,
> just not stored on the Consumer), no matter what is their expiration
I do not see what's the point. If we are replicating the keys to a
consumer why would it try to delete them after a while ?
> This is mainly for the scenario when someone authenticates against
> our Consumer on some occasion and then he never gets back - it's
> worthless storing his credentials any more, so I think that the it
> should be possible to define some limit for storing credentials.
Ok so we are mixing things here.
I guess the scenario you are referring to here, is the one where we do
not replicate any key to the consumer, and some user does an ldap bind
against with chained-binds and we do decide to cache the password as a
hash if auth is successful. This is a rare corner case in my mind.
Note that we cannot do this with Kerberos. we can't "cache" kerberos
keys, we either have a copy permanently (or until the policy/group
membership of the consumer is changed) or never have them.
> >>> Because
> >>> of the removal of expired creds. we will have to grant the
> >>> Consumer the
> >>> permission to delete users from the Consumer specific user group
> >>> (but only
> >>> deleting, adding users will be possible on Masters only).
> >> I do not understand this.
> When user hasn't authenticated against Consumer for a long time and his
> credentials were flushed from Consumer, his credentials should be also
> omitted from being replicated to the Consumer. This might be solved by
> the proposed plugin as well.
Either the user is marked as part of the location server by this
consumer, and therefore we replicate keys or we do not. We cannot delete
keys, as nothing would replicate them back to us until a password change
occurs. Also, you have no way to tell the master what it should
I would remove this point, it is not something we need or want, I think.
> >>> - to be able to do that, both Consumers and Hubs must be
> >>> Masters(from
> >>> 389-DS point of view).
> >> This doesn't sound right at all. All server can always write locally,
> >> what prevents them from doing so are referrals/configuration. Consumers
> >> and hubs do not and cannot be masters.
> But what about the information of account getting locked? We need to
> lock the account locally immediately and also tell the master (and thus
> every other node) that the specific account is locked.
For account lockouts we will need to do an explicit write to a master.
(probably yet another plugin or an option to the password plugin). We
cannot use replication to forward this information, as consumers do not
have a replication agreement that go from consumer to master.
> >>> When the Master<->Consumer connection is
> >>> broken, the
> >>> lockup information is saved only locally and will be pushed to
> >>> Master
> >>> on connection restoration. I suppose that only the lockup
> >>> information
> >>> should
> >>> be replicated. In case of lockup the user will have to authenticate
> >>> against
> >>> Master server only.
> >> What is the lookup information ? What connection is broken ? There
> >> aren't persistent connections between masters and consumers (esp. when
> >> hubs are in between there are none).
> typo there probably - by lock up information I mean reporting the
> situation, when the account gets locked due to too many failed logins.
This will be hard indeed.
> Broken connection - when it is not possible to tell the master, that the
> account got locked.
Ok replace with "when the masters are unreachable".
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
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