On Tue, 2013-01-15 at 15:53 -0500, Rob Crittenden wrote:
> Dmitri Pal wrote:
> > On 01/15/2013 08:48 AM, Simo Sorce wrote:
> >> On Mon, 2013-01-14 at 16:46 +0100, Tomas Babej wrote:
> >>> Hi,
> >>> Since in Kerberos V5 are used 32-bit unix timestamps, setting
> >>> maxlife in pwpolicy to values such as 9999 days would cause
> >>> integer overflow in krbPasswordExpiration attribute.
> >>> This would result into unpredictable behaviour such as users
> >>> not being able to log in after password expiration if password
> >>> policy was changed (#3114) or new users not being able to log
> >>> in at all (#3312).
> >>> https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3312
> >>> https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3114
> >> Given that we control the KDC LDAP driver I think we should not limit
> >> the time in LDAP but rather 'fix-it-up' for the KDC in the DAL driver.
> > Fix how? Truncate to max in the driver itself if it was entered beyond max?
> > Shouldn't we also prevent entering the invalid value into the attribute?
> I've been mulling the same question for a while. Why would we want to
> let bad data get into the directory?
It is not bad data and the attribute holds a Generalize time date.
The data is valid it's the MIT code that has a limitation in parsing it.
Greg tells me he plans supporting additional time by using the
'negative' part of the integer to represent the years beyond 2038.
So we should represent data in the directory correctly, which means
whtever date in the future and only chop it when feeding MIT libraries
until they support the additional range at which time we will change and
chop further in the future (around 2067 or so).
If we chopped early in the directory we'd not be able to properly
represent/change rapresentation later when MIT libs gain additional
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
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