On 03/29/2013 07:57 AM, Petr Viktorin wrote:
On 03/27/2013 04:40 PM, John Dennis wrote:
On 03/27/2013 11:23 AM, Petr Viktorin wrote:
I don't want to check the subject because this RFE was prompted by IPA's
normal CA rejecting valid wildcart certs. Is there a reasonable way to
ask NSS if it will trust the cert?
Yes. NSS provides a variety of tools to test validation.
Going just on memory here, our current version of python-nss has a
simple call to test validation. Sometime in the last year I added a fair
amount of new support for certificate validation including getting back
diagnostic information for validation failures, however if I recall
correctly the extended functionality in python-nss has not been released
Does the new code include downloading and importing CRLs?
Cert verification is a complex topic. This is further exacerbated by the
introduction of PKIX. My understanding is NSS had "classic" verification
code and later introduced PKIX. There has been an evolution between
classic verification and PKIX. This is outside my domain of expertise.
How and when CRL's are loaded in NSS is not something I can give advice
on, especially in an area undergoing change.
I'm going to have to defer to an expert in this area, Bob Relyea, I've
CC'ed him on this email.
Bob, to put this in context  the functionality in python-nss being
discussed is the binding of the CERT_VerifyCertificate() function,
something I added recently. Now the question arises as to how CRL's are
meant to play into the verification process. Can you please explain how
NSS expects this to be done? Pointers to existing documentation and code
examples would also be helpful.
It would also be helpful to understand the PKIX roadmap and how this
might affect coding decisions at the API level.
 Some additional context, the original motivation for exposing NSS
cert verification to IPA was to solve the following problem. If someone
wants to make the IPA CA a sub-CA (as opposed to a self-signed CA) we
want to validate the externally provided CA cert *before* proceeding
with the IPA installation. This is because if the CA cert is invalid
everything will hugely blow-up (because we use the CA cert to sign all
the certs issued in IPA, especially those used to validate cooperating
components/agents, if those certs do not work nothing in IPA works). In
addition to this narrow goal we in general want to be able to perform
cert verification correctly in other contexts as well so the extent to
which you can educate us in general on this topic will be appreciated.
John Dennis <jden...@redhat.com>
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