On 04/02/2013 11:33 AM, Petr Viktorin wrote:
On 04/02/2013 02:14 AM, Robert Relyea wrote:
On 03/29/2013 07:40 AM, John Dennis wrote:
On 03/29/2013 07:57 AM, Petr Viktorin wrote:
On 03/27/2013 04:40 PM, John Dennis wrote:
On 03/27/2013 11:23 AM, Petr Viktorin wrote:
I don't want to check the subject because this RFE was prompted by
IPA's
normal CA rejecting valid wildcart certs. Is there a reasonable way to
ask NSS if it will trust the cert?

Yes. NSS provides a variety of tools to test validation.

Going just on memory here, our current version of python-nss has a
simple call to test validation. Sometime in the last year I added a
fair
amount of new support for certificate validation including getting back
diagnostic information for validation failures, however if I recall
correctly the extended functionality in python-nss has not been
released
yet.

Does the new code include downloading and importing CRLs?

Cert verification is a complex topic. This is further exacerbated by
the introduction of PKIX. My understanding is NSS had "classic"
verification code and later introduced PKIX. There has been an
evolution between classic verification and PKIX. This is outside my
domain of expertise. How and when CRL's are loaded in NSS is not
something I can give advice on, especially in an area undergoing change.

I'm going to have to defer to an expert in this area, Bob Relyea, I've
CC'ed him on this email.
It's hard to get the context in the middle, and and John had noted, NSS
is transitioning from the old Cert_Verify interface to the new PKIX_ code.

I'll answer the question for the traditional CERTVerify code, which is
the only you get in SSL by default, and the one most people still use:

No, CRLs are not downloaded and imported automatically, but if you
download and import CRL's, NSS will use them. There's an installable
PKCS #11 module which can be configured to download and install CRLs,
then provide them to NSS. It's call mod_revocator.

The expected revocation strategy NSS uses is OCSP, and you can turn on
automatic OCSP fetching.

Bob, to put this in context [1] the functionality in python-nss being
discussed is the binding of the CERT_VerifyCertificate() function,
something I added recently. Now the question arises as to how CRL's
are meant to play into the verification process. Can you please
explain how NSS expects this to be done? Pointers to existing
documentation and code examples would also be helpful.

There's a separate CERT_ImportCRL() which will import the CRL into the
database. mod_revocator() can also be used to do the fetching for you,
Matthew has examples on how various servers set them up (I believe the
only NSS set up is installing the module in your secmod.db/pkcs11.txt
with modutil.


It would also be helpful to understand the PKIX roadmap and how this
might affect coding decisions at the API level.

the PKIX interface is available now, and is actually used by Chrome (for
all certs) and Firefox (for ev processing). Firefox is in the process of
moving to libpkix for everything.  There is an environment variable you
can set (I don't remember it specifically, but I could look it up for
you if you want) that will cause the transitional
CERT_VerifyCertificate() interface to use the libpkix engine, but it
keeps the old CERT_VerifyCertificate semantics (like no CRL or AIA cert
fetching)..

With libpkix, the revocation options are quite broad and complexed. We
really expect people would use a set of preconfigured policies, though
libpkix API allows for quite some variance. It would take me some time
to dig up all the descriptions, but I can if you want them.

[1] Some additional context, the original motivation for exposing NSS
cert verification to IPA was to solve the following problem. If
someone wants to make the IPA CA a sub-CA (as opposed to a self-signed
CA) we want to validate the externally provided CA cert *before*
proceeding with the IPA installation. This is because if the CA cert
is invalid everything will hugely blow-up (because we use the CA cert
to sign all the certs issued in IPA, especially those used to validate
cooperating components/agents, if those certs do not work nothing in
IPA works). In addition to this narrow goal we in general want to be
able to perform cert verification correctly in other contexts as well
so the extent to which you can educate us in general on this topic
will be appreciated.
OK, thanks. I'd go ahead and start with CERT_VerifyCertificate() unless
you specifically need some of the advanced libpkix features.

The original context is sanity checking: is a SSL server cert we get
from a user valid? If it is then we install the corresponding server.
Requirements here are:
- No extra information from the user, other than the cert itself (the
admin gives us a cert, we don't want to ask how to find out if it's valid)
- It needs to be a simple call/tool, since there's little gain over just
documenting that we want good certs.
So it looks it's not worth it to go there.


The new context, as far as I understand, is cert validation in *clients*.
We connect to a server; how to find out if its cert is valid?
In contrast to the sanity checking, we can have complexity and config
options here. This is important to get right, and we don't want any
assumptions (other than that everything is under some wacky corporate
policy).

It looks like libpkix is the way to go here. I assume Python bindings
aren't available for it yet?

We have python bindings for CERT_VerifyCertificate (I'm pretty sure that API has been in the python bindings for a while now). Bob can correct me if I'm wrong but I believe that CERT_VerifyCertificate is more than adequate for client's which want to validate a certificate, especially if the CRL is loaded or OCSP is enabled.

The environment variable Bob is referring to is NSS_ENABLE_PKIX_VERIFY. However PKIX verification can also be enabled via the CERT_SetUsePKIXForValidation() entry point, which is part of the current python-nss bindings (but I don't think that's been released yet, I'd have to double check.).

python-nss currently does not have entry points for enabling/disabling OCSP checking but it would be trivial to add.




--
John Dennis <jden...@redhat.com>

Looking to carve out IT costs?
www.redhat.com/carveoutcosts/

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