Aren't the implementations of name constrains generally buggy, and therefore 
not usable in real life?

On Sep 9, 2013, at 9:02 AM, Nalin Dahyabhai <na...@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 10:32:08AM -0400, John Dennis wrote:
>> Good point. Isn't there an X509 extension (possibly part of PKIX?) which
>> restricts membership in the chain path to a criteria. In other words you
>> can require your sub-CA to be present in the chain. Sorry, but my memory
>> is a bit fuzzy on this.
> 
> If you're talking about Name Constraints, they seem to be geared more
> toward allowing a CA to limit what a sub CA that it issues can be
> trusted to do, and not the other way around.
> 
> I don't think I know of anything that deals with this that doesn't
> eventually end up setting up library-specific configuration for the
> library that's going to be verifying the certificate.
> 
> Nalin
> 
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------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
henry.b.h...@jpl.nasa.gov, or hbh...@oxy.edu


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