On 03/04/2014 11:14 PM, Petr Spacek wrote: > On 4.3.2014 22:53, Simo Sorce wrote: >> On Tue, 2014-03-04 at 22:38 +0100, Petr Spacek wrote: >>> On 4.3.2014 22:15, Simo Sorce wrote: >>>> On Tue, 2014-03-04 at 21:25 +0100, Petr Spacek wrote: ... >> I guess my only reservation is about whether DRM storage is replicated >> or not. Although both the K/M and DNS cases do not require the Vault to >> be online at all times because the keys will be downloaded and stored >> locally and only needs to be accessed when they changed, there is the >> problem of having all keys in a SPOF, that should not happen. > According to http://www.freeipa.org/page/V4/Password_Vault#Replication the > replication is available for DRM, we just need to use it. > > IMHO a vault without replication is not useful anyway. Users are not happy > when > their passwords disappear ;-) > >> The additional thing about the Vault is that we can use key escrow there >> as a mechanism to re-encrypt automatically system relevant keys when a >> new server is joined to the realm. > So we agree that Vault offers what we want so we should use it, right? > > I think we should determine if we can use Vault for K/M. It would be another > reason why we should use Vault instead of a custom solution. >
Do we really want to use the heavy machinery Vault for DNSSEC keys? I would personally like to avoid it and use something more lightweight. Vault seems to me as a too heavy requirement for FreeIPA server with DNS. It needs Tomcat and all the Java machinery, special installation, replication scheme, difficult debugging etc. In my mind, Vault is a specialized heavy component that solves specific problems that not every admin may want and thus may cause a lot of grief to such admins who just want CA-less FreeIPA and DNS(SEC). Marti _______________________________________________ Freeipa-devel mailing list Freeipa-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-devel