On 04/15/2014 04:55 PM, Petr Viktorin wrote: > Hello, > At Devconf, we decided what most of the default read permissions should look > like, but we did not get to user. > Here is a draft of 4 read permissions. Please comment. > > > Basic info (anonymous): > [top] > objectclass > [person] > cn, sn, description > [organizationalPerson] > title > [inetOrgPerson] > uid > displayName, givenName, initials > manager > [inetUser] > memberOf
<== We originally specifically hidden memberOf attribute from anonymous users. I think we should continue hiding it. > [ipaObject] > ipaUniqueID > [ipaSshUser] > ipaSshPubKey > [ipaUserAuthTypeClass] > ipaUserAuthType > [posixAccount] > gecos, gidNumber, homeDirectory, loginShell, uidNumber > > > Details (all authenticated): > [person] > seeAlso, telephoneNumber > [organizationalPerson] > fax, l, ou, st, postalCode, street > destinationIndicator, internationalISDNNumber, physicalDeliveryOfficeName, > postalAddress, postOfficeBox, preferredDeliveryMethod, > registeredAddress, teletexTerminalIdentifier, telexNumber, x121Address > [inetOrgPerson] > carLicense, departmentNumber, employeeNumber, employeeType, > preferredLanguage, mail, mobile, pager > audio, businessCategory, homePhone, homePostalAddress, jpegPhoto, > labeledURI, o, photo, roomNumber, secretary, userCertificate, > userPKCS12, userSMIMECertificate, x500UniqueIdentifier > [inetUser] > inetUserHttpURL, inetUserStatus > [ipaUser] > userClass I would personally not divide the attributes as basic and detailed. IMO it is our artificial distinction and may vary between deployments. Why would we for example show inetUserHttpURL to authenticated only and ipaSshPublicKey to everyone? My proposal would be to have a permission "Read User Information" for all attributes above. > Kerberos/login-related (all authenticated): > [krbPrincipalAux] > krbPrincipalName, krbCanonicalName, krbPrincipalAliases, > krbPrincipalExpiration, krbPasswordExpiration, krbLastPwdChange > [+] > nsAccountLock Ok. So permission "Read User Kerberos Attributes"? > > > Kerberos-related (user admins only): > [krbPrincipalAux] > krbLastSuccessfulAuth, krbLastFailedAuth, krbLastPwdChange So permission "Read User Kerberos Login Attributes"? I think this group should also have: krbLastAdminUnlock krbLoginFailedCount > No read permission: > [person] > userPassword ok > [krbPrincipalAux] > krbPrincipalKey, krbExtraData, krbPwdHistory ok > krbLastAdminUnlock, Move this one. > krbLoginFailedCount Move this one. > krbPrincipalType Simo? I know we do not user this attribute, but wouldn't it fit in "Read User Kerberos Attributes" permission? > krbPwdPolicyReference This could contain DN to user's password policy attribute. IMO somebody should have a right to read it. Simo, should all authenticated users be able to read it? > krbTicketPolicyReference, krbUPEnabled I would treat those the same as krbPwdPolicyReference. > [krbTicketPolicyAux] > krbMaxRenewableAge, krbMaxTicketLife, krbTicketFlags Ok. This will be readable by people with "System: Read User Kerberos Ticket Policy" permission. > [mepOriginEntry] > mepManagedEntry This is used to bind user to it's private group. We use it for example in group-detach command to distinguish between managed and non-managed groups. We may want to show it to all authenticated users. Martin _______________________________________________ Freeipa-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-devel
