On 09/30/2014 09:59 AM, Jan Cholasta wrote: > Dne 29.9.2014 v 18:09 Rob Crittenden napsal(a): >> Jan Cholasta wrote: >>> Dne 29.9.2014 v 15:05 Rob Crittenden napsal(a): >>>> Jan Cholasta wrote: >>>>> Dne 26.9.2014 v 17:13 Rob Crittenden napsal(a): >>>>>> Jan Cholasta wrote: >>>>>>> Dne 23.9.2014 v 20:39 Rob Crittenden napsal(a): >>>>>>>> Jan Cholasta wrote: >>>>>>>>> Hi, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the attached patches fix various bugs and shortcomings in the CA >>>>>>>>> management and renewal code. Related tickets: >>>>>>>>> <https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4416>, >>>>>>>>> <https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4460>. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (Patch 319 was originally posted at >>>>>>>>> <http://www.redhat.com/archives/freeipa-devel/2014-September/msg00132.html>.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Only two of the patches includes what ticket(s) they address. Most >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>> the tersest of commit messages. If got more and more difficult to see >>>>>>>> why the changes were needed at all, as you'll see. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sorry, fixed (hopefully). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Note that most of these patches fix stuff I didn't have time to fix >>>>>>> before I posted the original CA management patches, hence the missing >>>>>>> tickets. >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, the policy is that every commit should have a ticket. So I guess >>>>>> re-open the old tickets or open new ones. This will help someone in the >>>>>> future know the "why" of a patch. I've certainly been guilty >>>>> >>>>> OK, I will reopen the related tickets. >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is a new set of reviews as trying to intermingle was making my >>>>>> eyes >>>>>> cross: >>>>>> >>>>>> 319: >>>>>> >>>>>> I guess I still don't understand why you can't pull the certs out of >>>>>> LDAP when creating this database. When this code runs, we know that the >>>>>> client is configured, so we have access to authentication. Why can't >>>>>> create_ipa_nssdb pull the certs directly? It seems more robust to me, >>>>>> and the code is already written in ipa-client-install to do this. >>>>> >>>>> Well, I don't understand why do you want them to be updated so much, as >>>>> nothing will break if they are not. Also try to imagine what would >>>>> happen if, say, 10k clients were updated at the same moment... >>>> >>>> What's the point of a database missing certificates? >>> >>> It won't be missing any certificates if /etc/pki/nssdb was not missing >>> any certificates before the update. >>> >>> As I said, the update will not break anything. It will not fix anything >>> either, but I don't think this kind of fixing should be done during >>> client RPM upgrade. It is not consistent with anything else we do during >>> client RPM upgrade, it does not scale well and it just does not feel >>> right to me in overall. >> >> Ok, I'll concede the point that there is no difference post-update, but >> it doesn't do what ipa-certupdate does. You can potentially end up with >> a completely diffferent set of certificates. So why the difference? > > If you end up with a *completely* different set of certificates, it's because > the admins screwed up, so it's theirs responsibility to fix it, not ours IMHO. > >> >> Post install of new client bits: >> >> # certutil -L -d /etc/ipa/nssdb/ >> >> IPA CA CT,C,C >> >> After running ipa-certupdate: >> >> # certutil -L -d /etc/ipa/nssdb/ >> >> CN=Primary CA,O=example.com,C=US ,, >> CN=Secondary CA,O=example.com,C=US ,, >> GREYOAK.COM IPA CA CT,C,C >> >> Quite the difference. > > Not much of a difference when you realize that "IPA CA" and "GREYOAK.COM IPA > CA" are the same certificate and the rest are there just for completeness. > >> >> I'll ACK for now since this doesn't materially change anything and >> shouldn't break any installs but it begs the question of why it is >> acceptable now but not acceptable to make ipa-certupdate do the same. > > I have changed the NSS database used by the RPC code from /etc/pki/nssdb to > /etc/ipa/nssdb. What the RPM update does is a necessary configuration update > to > keep RPC working. ipa-certupdate on the other hand fetches new policy from the > server, which is quite a different thing IMO. > >> >> So ACK for 319, 324-331, 340. > > Thanks! > >> >>> >>> The LDAP update happens in renew_ca_cert. Are there any relevant errors >>> in /var/log/messages? Is there caRenewalMaster in ipaConfigString of the >>> master entry of the master where you run ipa-cacert-manage renew? >> >> Sep 25 16:06:44 grindle renew_ca_cert: Traceback (most recent call last): >> File "/usr/lib64/ipa/certmonger/renew_ca_cert", line 214, in <module> >> main() >> File "/usr/lib64/ipa/certmonger/renew_ca_cert", line 79, in main >> ca = cainstance.CAInstance(host_name=api.env.host, ldapi=False) >> File >> "/usr/lib/python2.7/site-packages/ipaserver/install/cainstance.py", line >> 357, in __init__ >> self.ra_agent_pwd = self.ra_agent_db + "/pwdfile.txt" >> TypeError: unsupported operand type(s) for +: 'NoneType' and 'str' >> Sep 25 16:06:44 grindle certmonger: Certificate named "caSigningCert >> cert-pki-ca" in token "NSS Certificate DB" in database >> "/etc/pki/pki-tomcat/alias" issued by CA and saved. > > One of the KRA patches broke this. I assumed you'd be testing on top of > ipa-4-1, so I didn't fix it, sorry. See the attached patch 342 for a fix. > Martin, can you please review it? > >> >> rob >> > > The patches needed a rebase, attached. >
Thanks to both for this work! I pushed all patches that Rob reviewer to master and ipa-4-1. I also checked Jan's fix up patch 342 and it looks good to me as well. ACK for that and pushed to master. Martin _______________________________________________ Freeipa-devel mailing list Freeipa-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-devel
