Hello all, Last week me, Jakub and Stef discussed a design for a candidate for a FreeIPA&Gnome keyring related thesis:
https://thesis-managementsystem.rhcloud.com/topic/show/219/gnome-keyring-storage-in-freeipa Apparently, there was a misunderstanding when crafting the topic proposal, it is not about storing Gnome Keyring *secrets* in FreeIPA tree, but only about storing a *master key*/AUTHTOK in FreeIPA so that keyring can be unlocked by SSSD on user log on even in non-password authentication case (like SSO). With SSO, Gnome keyring cannot grab the long term secret to unlock the keyring, the keyring also cannot re-encrypt itself when the long term password changes on the server (this is no problem locally as Gnome keyring is hooked to PAM password change module). Thus, there is the idea to store the master key/AUTHTOK centrally on the server. Given the sensitivity of the password, it would be best to store it in the upcoming FreeIPA Password Vault/KRA: http://www.freeipa.org/page/V4/Password_Vault However, here comes the problem with how to authorize the operation on SSSD level. To make it working, SSSD, host/[email protected] would need to be able to retrieve and decipher a key from (any) user's Vault, which is probably not what we want to allow. We may add S4U2Proxy rules so that host/[email protected] can get vault/[email protected] for the client, but then SSSD could grab any user's secret when he logs in. Are there any ideas how to overcome this issue? Otherwise, it seems that the Vault idea is not the right way. Maybe centralizing access to Gnome keyring is not a good idea at all, we will see. Thank you. -- Martin Kosek <[email protected]> Supervisor, Software Engineering - Identity Management Team Red Hat Inc. _______________________________________________ Freeipa-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-devel
