On 05/04/2015 09:23 PM, Simo Sorce wrote: > On Mon, 2015-05-04 at 16:41 +0200, Martin Kosek wrote: >> On 05/04/2015 03:01 PM, Fraser Tweedale wrote: >>> On Mon, May 04, 2015 at 10:50:15AM +0200, Martin Kosek wrote: >>>> Hello, >>>> >>>> Please let me promote the design for one of the major FreeIPA 4.2 >>>> features, the >>>> (user) certificates and Smart Card integration: >>>> >>>> http://www.freeipa.org/page/V4/User_Certificates >>>> >>>> The design went through couple interim discussions between developers >>>> outside >>>> of this list, so there should not be too many objections. But still, please >>>> free to comment or improve the design yourself. >>>> >>>> For FreeIPA 4.2, I think this resolves in following, quite limited, scope >>>> of work: >>>> * Adding eq, pres indices for userCertificate >>>> * Applying new policy of storing certificate in userCertificate attribute, >>>> based on upcoming Certificate Profile feature by Fraser. >>>> * Making sure that multiple certificates can be added to userCertificate >>>> attribute manually by CLI and UI >>>> >>>> The "Certificate Identity Mapping" part will probably be moved to 4.3+, >>>> unless >>>> there is extra pool of development resources. >>>> >>>> There is still something to be resolved - how should the certificates be >>>> revoked in object-del or object-disable actions? Currently, certificate is >>>> always stored in userCertificate and it's serial is used for revoke >>>> operation >>>> in Dogtag. But that will not be true in 4.2+ since some certificates will >>>> not >>>> be stored in accounts. >>>> >>>> Do we only want to revoke those that have policy to be stored in the >>>> userCertificate attribute? Does not sound right to me. Or do we need a >>>> Dogtag >>>> API that would allow us to query (or even revoke directly) all certificates >>>> generated for a user/service/host and revoke them, regardless whether they >>>> are >>>> stored in userCertificate attribute or not? >>>> >>> If the DN or other searchable attributes bear a principal name, >>> existing APIs should be sufficient (if a little awkward). But >>> Dogtag does not know about principals, it only knows what is on the >>> cert (and a few other things, like the profile that was used). >> >> Kerberos principal SAN is added when the certificate is requested via >> Certmonger, but we do not add it when requested via cert-request command >> (yet). >> So we cannot depend on it. >> >>> Later, when we implement GSSAPI and ACL enforcement in Dogtag >>> (https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/5011) we can also store the >>> principal that issued the certificate for a concrete association in >>> Dogtag, which can be used to locate certificates for a principal. >> >> Right, sounds as something we should do. I commented in the ticket. >> >>> Considering known use cases in which one would not want to store the >>> issued cert in IPA, some of these have short lived certs so >>> revocation is not an issue. With that in mind I think it would be >>> OK, for 4.2 at least, to not provide a way in IPA to revoke a cert >>> that was issued via IPA but not stored; it can still be revoked >>> using Dogtag directly, and we could provide pointers to Dogtag >>> documentation. The important thing is to manage the user >>> expectations for 4.2. >> >> Hm, maybe - Simo, if you disagree, please shout. In this case, we would need >> to >> make sure this side effect of the userCertificate policy is very well >> documented. > > I do not disagree, in most cases when a user (or computer object) is > deleted, there is really no need to actually revoke the cert. > Keep in mind that revocation list growth is also a concern.
Right. IIRC some of our users had problems with CRL list size also, making us to create ticket https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4048 > So I am fine *not* revoking certs automatically and instead documenting > best practices for certs lifecycle management (ie deleting certs when > not useful) and how to manually/explicitly revoke certs only when > actually compromised (for hosts), or when needed (user leaves > organization and may retain a copy of the private key, unlikly when the > cert was in a Smart Card which has been returned and wiped). Well, makes sense to me. I added a section to the design: http://www.freeipa.org/page/V4/User_Certificates#Revocation_of_the_Certificates We just need to be cautious here because this would be a change in behavior compared to FreeIPA 4.1 and older. Should this be another global/per-profile policy setting that administrator could set up? -- Manage your subscription for the Freeipa-devel mailing list: https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-devel Contribute to FreeIPA: http://www.freeipa.org/page/Contribute/Code