On 2015-07-22 20:38, Nathaniel McCallum wrote: > On Wed, 2015-07-22 at 20:34 +0200, Christian Heimes wrote: >> On 2015-07-22 20:23, Nathaniel McCallum wrote: >>> Related: CVE-2015-5159 >> >> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1245200 >> >> The patch prevents a flood attack but I consider more a workaround >> than >> a solution. I'll update kdcproxy tomorrow. > > The problem is that while we can provide a sane default, special > applications might require different sizes (either smaller or larger). > I think this fix is acceptable since it keeps the solution entirely > within the configuration domain.
The python-kdcproxy package may be used by other parties with different web servers. I also like to see a countermeasure in kdcproxy. Other installations should not fall victim to the same issue. How about we set the default maximum size to a rather large value (like 5 or 10 MB) and make it configurable in kdcproxy.conf? 5 MB is very, very large for a Kerberos request but still prevents DoS and OOM killer Christian
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