On 2015-07-22 20:38, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
> On Wed, 2015-07-22 at 20:34 +0200, Christian Heimes wrote:
>> On 2015-07-22 20:23, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
>>> Related: CVE-2015-5159
>> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1245200
>> The patch prevents a flood attack but I consider more a workaround 
>> than
>> a solution. I'll update kdcproxy tomorrow.
> The problem is that while we can provide a sane default, special
> applications might require different sizes (either smaller or larger).
> I think this fix is acceptable since it keeps the solution entirely
> within the configuration domain.

The python-kdcproxy package may be used by other parties with different
web servers. I also like to see a countermeasure in kdcproxy. Other
installations should not fall victim to the same issue.

How about we set the default maximum size to a rather large value (like
5 or 10 MB) and make it configurable in kdcproxy.conf? 5 MB is very,
very large for a Kerberos request but still prevents DoS and OOM killer


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