On 01/08/2016 02:24 PM, Christian Heimes wrote:
> On 2016-01-08 13:26, Martin Kosek wrote:
>> Hi Fraser and other X.509 SMEs,
>> I wanted to check with you on what we have or plan to have with respect to
>> certificate/cipher strength in FreeIPA.
>> When I visit the FreeIPA public demo for example, I usually see following
>> errors with recent browsers:
>> * Your connection to ipa.demo1.freeipa.org is encrypted using obsolete cypher
>> - The connection uses TLS 1.2
>> - The connection is encrypted ising AES_128_CBC, with HMAC-SHA1 for message
>> authentication and RSA as the key exchange mechanism
>> I usually do not see the common
>> * Certificate chain contains a certificate signed with SHA-1
>> error, but I am not sure if we are covered for this one.
>> When I tested the FreeIPA demo with
>> (and ignore the trust issues), we get the mark B with following warnings:
>> * This server accepts RC4 cipher, but only with older protocol versions.
>> capped to B.
>> * The server does not support Forward Secrecy with the reference browsers.
>> What do we miss to turn out Grade A, which is obviously something expected
>> security solution like FreeIPA? Is it just about ECC support
>> (https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3951) or also maybe some change to
>> default certificate profiles?
> The cert has another issue. It relies on Subject CN for host name
> verification. This feature has been deprecated by RFC 2818 more than a
> decade ago. Instead of Subject CN modern certs should use dNSName in
> SubjectAltName x509v3 extension.
Right. Fraser should have it in his queue already:
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