On 8.1.2016 16:57, Christian Heimes wrote:
> On 2016-01-08 16:49, Petr Spacek wrote:
>> On 8.1.2016 13:56, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jan 08, 2016 at 01:26:57PM +0100, Martin Kosek wrote:
>>>>> Hi Fraser and other X.509 SMEs,
>>>>> I wanted to check with you on what we have or plan to have with respect to
>>>>> certificate/cipher strength in FreeIPA.
>>>>> When I visit the FreeIPA public demo for example, I usually see following
>>>>> errors with recent browsers:
>>>>> * Your connection to ipa.demo1.freeipa.org is encrypted using obsolete
>>>>> - The connection uses TLS 1.2
>>>>> - The connection is encrypted ising AES_128_CBC, with HMAC-SHA1 for
>>>>> authentication and RSA as the key exchange mechanism
>> HMAC-SHA1 reminded me recently published paper:
>> It claims that all MD5 and SHA1 uses should be eliminated if feasible.
> MD5 and SHA-1 should no longer be used for signatures. MACs are a
> completely different story. HMAC-SHA1 and even HMAC-MD5 are still fine
> and believed to be secure.
Christian, have you read the page (or even better the paper) I linked above?
The page starts with this:
> In response to recent high-profile attacks that exploit hash function
> collisions, software vendors have started to phase out the use of MD5 and
> SHA1 in third-party digital signature applications such as X.509
> certificates. However, weak hash functions continue to be used in various
> cryptographic constructions within mainstream protocols such as TLS, IKE, and
> SSH, because practitioners argue that their use in these protocols relies
> only on second preimage resistance, and hence is unaffected by collisions. We
> systematically investigate and debunk this argument.
> We identify a new class of transcript collision attacks on popular
> cryptographic protocols such as TLS, IKE, and SSH, that significantly reduce
> their expected security. Our attacks rely on the use of obsolete hash
> constructions in these protocols.
If you open the paper, it has this on the very first page:
> This leaves open the question of what to do about
> other uses of MD5 and SHA-1 in popular crypto-
> graphic protocols. Practitioners commonly believe that
> collisions only affect non-repudiable signatures (like
> certificates), but that signatures and MACs used within
> protocols are safe as long as they include unpredictable
> contents, such as nonces , .In these cases,
> protocol folklore says that a second preimage attack
> would be required to break these protocols, and such
> attacks are still considered hard, even for MD5.
> Conversely, theoretical cryptographers routinely as-
> sume collision-resistance in proofs of security for
> these protocols. For example, various recent proofs of
> TLS , ,  assume collision-resistance even
> though the most popular hash functions used in TLS
> are MD5 and SHA-1. Whom shall we believe? Either it
> is the case that cryptographic proofs of these protocols
> are based on too-strong (i.e. false) assumptions that
> should be weakened, or that practitioners are wrong and
> collision resistance is required for protocol security.
> This paper seeks to clarify this situation by systemat-
> ically investigating the use of hash functions in the key
> exchanges underlying various versions of TLS, IPsec,
> and SSH. We demonstrate that, contrary to common
> belief, collisions can be used to break fundamental secu-
> rity guarantees of these protocols.
One thing I remember from my cryptography courses I had on university is that
I should not try to outsmart professional cryptographers when it comes to
assessing security properties :-D
Judging from this: Claims on the Wikipedia page are not sufficient guarantee
for me, sorry.
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