The "upstream" root certificate and intermediate CA certificates would
be stored in LDAP for distribution to clients, with the root CA having
an ipaKeyTrust value of trusted and intermediate CAs having a value of
unknown (see CA certificate renewal).
Note that currently it's the IPA CA that is trusted by default, not any
of the external (root or intermediate) CAs. I think it should stay this
way, as we don't need to trust any of the external CAs for IPA to work
It should be mentioned here that the primary CA is also handled by this
I would like to propose two additional fields:
* subject (required) - subject name of the CA, to be able to look up
sub-CA that issued a certificate from its issuer name.
* issuer_ca (optional) - name of the sub-CA which issued certificate
for this CA, to have information about the sub-CA hierarchy. If there is
no sub-CA entry for the issuer, it would be unset.
Subject Distinguished Name
When creating a sub-CA, the subject DN is constructed by copying the DN
of the parent CA, then setting the CN to the name. More control could be
implemented if there is a clear case for it.
Note that adding the ability to override the CN in the subject name of
the IPA CA certificate was requested a long time ago:
The default validity could be the default validity used by
ipa-server-install. TODO what is the default duration?
ATM the default duration is 10 years.
Specify the CA certificate validity. Something human-friendly should be
used, e.g. a duration spec that supports 5y, 365d, etc. TODO is there a
precendent for this sort of duration interpretation in FreeIPA? If so,
Currently there is (IIRC) only krbmaxticketlife (seconds) and
krbmaxrenewableage (seconds) in the krbtpolicy plugin and krbmaxpwdlife
(days) and krbminpwdlife (hours) in the pwpolicy plugin. If you are
going to invent something generic, it would be nice if it worked for
them as well.
For FreeIPA, Dogtag will provide the IPACustodiaKeyRetriever class,
which implements the KeyRetriever interface. It invokes a Python script
that performs the retrieval, reusing existing FreeIPA Custodia client code.
Will this be distributed with Dogtag or with IPA?
The Python script bit sounds like an implementation detail rather than
an actual design. Ideally the whole thing would be done in Java, right?
The Python script shall be installed at
/usr/libexec/pki-ipa-retrieve-key and shall be executed as pkiuser.
Could you please use a subdirectory? Like /usr/libexec/pki (if the
script is going to be distributed with Dogtag) or /usr/libexec/ipa (if
the script is going to be distributed with IPA).
pkiuser does not have read access to either of these locations, so a new
service principal shall be created for each Dogtag CA instance for the
purpose of authenticating to Custodia and retrieving lightweight CA
private keys. Its principal name shall be
dogtag-ipa-custodia/<hostname>@REALM. Its keytab and Custodia keys shall
be stored with ownership pkiuser:pkiuser and mode 0600 at
Don't forget to update this paragraph with the new principal name.
A CA object for the top-level CA will initially be created, with DN
I would rather not use punctuation for the short name, as it can be
easily overlooked (think logs). (Also it should be '/' if anything, not
'.', which usually means "current".)
Above you stated that the subject name will be derived from the short
name of the sub-CA. The top-level CA has subject name of the form
"CN=Certificate Authority,$SUBJECT_BASE", so its short name should be
ipa ca-del <shortname>
Delete the given certificate authority. This will remove knowledge of
the CA from the FreeIPA directory but will not delete the sub-CA from
Dogtag. Dogtag will still know about the CA and the certificates it
issued, be able to act at a CRL / OCSP authority for it, etc.
What is the use case for this? Will the certificates issued by the
sub-CA still be valid after delete or not? Will the sub-CA certificate
be explicitly distrusted on delete or not?
IMO it should be possible to delete only a leaf sub-CA, i.e. anything
but the top-level CA in the current design.
ipa cert-find [shortname]
Optional positional parameter to specify a sub-CA to use (omit to
specify the top-level CA). The special shortname * is used to search in
This should be "ipa cert-find [--ca=<shortname>]". At some point,
cert-find should be fixed to be consistent with every other -find
command and have an optional 'criteria' positional argument, and there
can't be two optional positional arguments, as it creates an ambiguity.
I would prefer a separate argument (e.g. --all-cas, or --cacat=all)
rather than a magic value for an all-CA search. Magic value might work
for cert-find alone, but you are creating a precedent for the whole
ipa cert-show [shortname]
Optional positional parameter to specify a sub-CA (omit to specify
the top-level CA).
Request the certificate chain (when saving via --out <file>, PEM
format is used; this is the format uesd for the end-entity certificate).
This should be "ipa cert-show [--ca=<shortname>]", for consistency with
cert-find, see above.
IMO it would make sense to add --chain to cert-request as well, it
should be useful for certmonger.
How is a certificate going to be requested from a specific sub-CA using
the getcert command?
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