On 12/19/2016 04:41 PM, Standa Laznicka wrote: > On 12/19/2016 03:07 PM, John Dennis wrote: >> On 12/19/2016 03:12 AM, Standa Laznicka wrote: >>> On 12/16/2016 03:23 PM, Rob Crittenden wrote: >>>> Standa Laznicka wrote: >>>>> Hello, >>>>> >>>>> I started a design page for FreeIPA on FIPS-enabled systems: >>>>> https://www.freeipa.org/page/V4/FreeIPA-on-FIPS >>>>> >>>>> Me and Tomáš are still investigating what of all things will need to >>>>> change in order to have FreeIPA on FIPS-enabled RHEL. So far I >>>>> managed >>>>> to install and run patched FreeIPA server and client and connect them >>>>> together. >>>>> >>>>> There are some issues with NSS when trying to create an HTTPS request >>>>> (apparently, NSS requires an NSS database password to set up an SSL >>>>> connection). I am actually thinking of removing NSSConnection from >>>>> the >>>>> client altogether. >>>> Can you expand on this a bit? NSS should only need a pin when it needs >>>> access to a private key. What connection(s) are you talking about, and >>>> what would you replace NSSConnection with? >>>> >>>> rob >>> >>> Hello Rob, >>> >>> Thank you for this excellent question, in order to cut the email >>> short I >>> seem to have omitted quite a few information. >>> >>> One of the very first problems I had with FreeIPA with FIPS was that >>> NSS >>> was always asking for password/pin. I was discussing this with the NSS >>> guys on their IRC chat last week and it turns out that NSS tries to >>> create a private key every time you want to use it as a backend for an >>> SSL connection on FIPS. I still don't think this is quite right so I >>> may >>> open a bugzilla for that. >> >> I don't understand, I thought the case you were having problems with >> was the FreeIPA client, not the server. I assume when you use the >> term "backend" you mean server, and yes when NSS is in server mode it >> will access to keys. So isn't the problem NSS is not being >> initialized correctly so that it recognizes it is in client mode and >> not server mode? >> > What I meant was "a client backend for an SSL connection" - we're > using NSS implementation of SSL (via python-nss) for HTTPS connections > from client to server during which we're getting a CA cert from an NSS > database but this eventually leads to a password prompt. >>> >>> Anyway, the guys suggested me that we could try to create the database >>> with an empty password and everything will work. I don't quite like >>> that, too, but it's at least something if you don't want the `ipa` >>> command to always bug you for password you have no way knowing if >>> you're >>> just a regular user. >>> >>> What I think would be a better way to go is to use >>> httplib.HTTPSConnection. We have the needed certificates in >>> /etc/ipa/ca.crt anyway so why not use them instead. We had a discussion >>> with Honza this morning and it seems that with this approach we may get >>> rid of the NSSConnection class altogether (although I still need to >>> check a few spots) and start the process of moving away from NSS which >>> was discussed some year ago in an internal mailing list (for some >>> reason). >>> >>> Will be happy to hear thoughts on this, >>> Standa >> >> I'm not a big fan of NSS, it has it's issues. As the author of the >> Python binding I'm quite aware of all the nasty behaviors NSS has and >> needs to be worked around. I wouldn't be sad to see it go but OpenSSL >> has it's own issues too. If you remove NSS you're also removing the >> option to support smart cards, HSM's etc. Perhaps before removing >> functionality it would be good to assess what the requirements are. >> > I'm sorry I generalized too much, the original topic was moving away > from python-nss (of which I am even more sorry as you're the author). > We could use some ideas on how to handle replica installations in FIPS.
We might use some flag in LDAP to indicate that a topology is FIPS-enabled. It seems like a good idea to force all servers in FIPS-enabled topology to also be FIPS-enabled. At the start of replica installation, a check could be performed to verify the FIPS topology status is the same as the current system's FIPS status. However, this proposal has a flaw. It is possible to simply install a FIPS-enabled replica and then turn FIPS off. This would result in non-FIPS systems being part of a FIPS-enabled topology. So we have a couple questions: Does it make sense to require all the servers in the topology to be either FIPS-enabled or FIPS-disabled? What would be a good approach to achieve this? Simply checking during installation does not guarantee that FIPS will stay turned on. -- Tomas Krizek -- Manage your subscription for the Freeipa-devel mailing list: https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-devel Contribute to FreeIPA: http://www.freeipa.org/page/Contribute/Code
