Related to design:
Currently there are some operations that hit the CA that involve a
number of privileged operations against the CA, but for which there
is only one associated IPA permission. Deleting a CA is a good
example (but it is one specific case of a more general issue).
Summary of current ca-del behaviour:
1. Disable LWCA in Dogtag (uses RA Agent cert)
2. Delete LWCA in Dogtag (uses RA Agent cert)
3. Delete CA entry from IPA (requires "System: Delete CA" permission)
So there are two things going on under the hood: a modify operation
(disable CA) and the delete.
When we implement proxy authentication to Dogtag, Dogtag will
enforce the IPA permissions on its operations. Disable will map to
"System: Modify CA" and delete to "System: Delete CA". So to delete
a CA a user will need *both* permissions. Which could be
There are a couple of reasonable approaches to this.
1. Decouple the disable and delete operations. If CA is not
disabled, the user will be instructed to execute the ca-disable
command separately before they can disable the CA. This introduces
an additional manual step for operators.
2. Just improve the error reporting. In my WIP, for a user that has
'System: Delete CA' permission but not 'System: Modify CA', the
reported failure is a 403 Authorization Error from Dogtag. We can
add guards to fail more gracefully.
I lean towards #2 because I guess the common case will be that users
either get all CA admin permissions, or none, and we don't want to
make more work (in the form of more commands to run) for users in
the common case.
I welcome alternative views and suggestions.
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