On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 11:48:39AM +0100, Martin Kosek wrote:
> On 02/10/2017 10:37 AM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 09:23:10AM +0100, Martin Kosek wrote:
> >> On 02/09/2017 10:44 PM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 08:37:23AM +0100, Martin Kosek wrote:
> >>>> On 02/09/2017 02:12 AM, Fraser Tweedale wrote:
> >>>>> On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 10:19:54AM +0200, Alexander Bokovoy wrote:
> >>>>>> On ke, 08 helmi 2017, Martin Kosek wrote:
> >>>>>>> Hi Fraser and the list,
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I recently was in a conversation about integrating OpenShift with 
> >>>>>>> FreeIPA. One
> >>>>>>> of the gaps was around generating a wildcard certificate by FreeIPA 
> >>>>>>> that will
> >>>>>>> be used in the default OpenShift router for applications that do not 
> >>>>>>> deploy own
> >>>>>>> certificates [1].
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Is there any way that FreeIPA can generate it? I was thinking that 
> >>>>>>> uploading
> >>>>>>> some custom certificate profile in FreeIPA may let us get such 
> >>>>>>> certificate...
> >>>>>>> Or is the the only way we can add it by adding a new RFE in FreeIPA, 
> >>>>>>> tracked in
> >>>>>>> [2]?
> >>>>>> Yes, we need a new RFE. There are checks in IPA that prevent wildcard
> >>>>>> certificates to be issued:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - we ensure subject 'cn' of the certificate matches a Kerberos 
> >>>>>> principal
> >>>>>>   specified in the request
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - we validate that host object exists in IPA when the Kerberos
> >>>>>>   principal is host/...
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> We could lift off these two limitations for 'cn=*,$suffix' but there is
> >>>>>> still a need to apply proper ACLs when issuing the cert -- e.g. some
> >>>>>> object has to be used for performing access rights check. The wildcard
> >>>>>> certificate does not need to be stored anywhere in the tree, but a
> >>>>>> check still needs to be done.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> For example, for Kerberos PKINIT certificate which is issued to KDC we
> >>>>>> don't store public certificate in LDAP either but we do two checks:
> >>>>>> - a special KDC certificate profile is used to issue the cert
> >>>>>> - a special hostname check is done so that only IPA masters are able to
> >>>>>>   request this certificate
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> For the wildcard certificate I think we could have following:
> >>>>>> - use a separate profile for the wildcard, associated with a sub-CA
> >>>>>> - hardcode CN default in the profile to always be 'CN=*, 
> >>>>>> O=$SUB_CA_SUBJECT' so that
> >>>>>>   actual certificate ignores requested CN.
> >>>>>> - a special check to be done so that only wildcard-based subject
> >>>>>>   alternative names can be added to a wildcard certificate request
> >>>>>> - all Kerberos principal / hostname checks are skipped.
> >>>>>> - actual ACL check is done by CA ACL.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> Issuing wildcard certs is a deprecated practice[1].  I am not
> >>>>> dismissing the needs of OpenShift (or PaaS/IaaS solutions in
> >>>>> general) but I'd like to have a discussion with them about how
> >>>>> they're currently dealing with certs and whether a different
> >>>>> direction other than wildcard certs is feasible.  Martin, who should
> >>>>> I reach out to?  Feel free to copy them into this discussion.
> >>>>
> >>>> Right now, I am talking to a Solution Architect, i.e. someone who is 
> >>>> building
> >>>> GAed solutions, not developers. This is not something we would change
> >>>> short-term anyway, this is how current OpenShift v2 or v3 behaves, 
> >>>> despite the RFC.
> >>>>
> >>>> While I understand why having certificate *.lab.example.com and using it 
> >>>> for my
> >>>> lab machines is a bad idea and increases the attack vector, I do not see 
> >>>> it
> >>>> that way for OpenShift. There, applications get URL like
> >>>> "<app-dom>.myopenshift.test" and all is routed by one entity, the 
> >>>> OpenShift
> >>>> broker. So the key.cert is on one location, just serving different names 
> >>>> that
> >>>> are provisioned with OpenShift.
> >>>>
> >>>> I can understand that issuing a new certificate for every application
> >>>> provisioned by OpenShift and then renewing it complicates the design
> >>>> significantly. I am trying to be creative and see if current OpenShift 
> >>>> could
> >>>> leverage FreeIPA CA and issue the broker cert, with current profile
> >>>> capabilities or with small change.
> >>>>
> >>> I believe OpenShift supports per-application certificates (i.e. when
> >>> app developers/maintainers supply their own cert for a custom
> >>> domain).  So it might be possible in v2 or v3 to provision a cert
> >>> for every app.
> >>
> >> Right, it supports this. But then issuing the certificate and renewal is a
> >> responsibility of app developer, AFAIK. I do not think if OpenShift has 
> >> all the
> >> needed hooks to do this automatically and call certmonger for example.
> >>
> >> TLDR; adding a support of certmonger and issuing a certificate for every 
> >> new
> >> application is a whole another degree of complexity than just issuing a
> >> Wildcard certificate for the router. I am not saying it should not be 
> >> done, I
> >> am just saying that being able to generate a wildcard certificate with 
> >> FreeIPA
> >> would let us integrate with OpenShift much better than now and with 
> >> (hopefully)
> >> low effort involved, i.e. faster.
> >>
> >>> An automated solution does not yet exist but that
> >>> doesn't mean it can't be built out of what's currently GA.
> >>>
> >>>>> [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-7.2
> >>>>>
> >>>>> If we do go ahead with wildcard cert support in FreeIPA, some of my
> >>>>> initial questions are:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - For the OpenShift use case, what is the "parent" domain name and
> >>>>>   is it the same as the IPA domain name?  Is it a subdomain of the
> >>>>>   IPA domain name?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - Do we need to support issuing "*.${IPA_DOMAIN}"? i.e. wildcard
> >>>>>   cert under entire IPA domain name.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - Do we need to support issuing "*.${IPA_HOSTNAME}"?  i.e. wildcard
> >>>>>   certs under names of IPA host principals.
> >>>>
> >>>> I do not know, but I can ask if it is important for you :-)
> >>>>
> >>> It's important to know what I actually need to do if we proceed with
> >>> implementing this :)
> >>
> >> We do not need to jump on implementing it right away, you already have a 
> >> lot on
> >> your plate. Right now, I must just want to know:
> >>
> >> - is there any way how I can generate wildcard cert with current FreeIPA, 
> >> using
> >> a custom certificate profile. I assume the answer is no.
> >>
> > I have an idea.
> > 
> > - Assume there exists a FreeIPA host `foo.example.com', the "parent"
> >   domain name for the desired wildcard name `*.foo.example.com'.
> > 
> > - Create a profile with the config:
> > 
> >     
> > policyset.serverCertSet.<N>.constraint.class_id=subjectNameConstraintImpl
> >     policyset.serverCertSet.<N>.constraint.name=Subject Name Constraint
> >     policyset.serverCertSet.<N>.constraint.params.accept=true
> >     policyset.serverCertSet.<N>.constraint.params.pattern=CN=[^,]+,.+
> >     policyset.serverCertSet.<N>.default.class_id=subjectNameDefaultImpl
> >     policyset.serverCertSet.<N>.default.name=Subject Name Default
> >     
> > policyset.serverCertSet.<N>.default.params.name=CN=*.$request.req_subject_name.cn$,
> >  o=EXAMPLE.COM
> > 
> > - Set up CA ACLs to constrain use of this profile for issuance only
> >   to hosts for which a wildcard cert *under* their hostname is
> >   allowed.
> > 
> > - Issue wildcard cert.
> > 
> > I'm not 100% sure if that last directive from the snippet above is
> > valid.  Worth a shot.
> 
> This is exactly what I was looking for, as a workaround! Do you think you 
> would
> be able to try it (not necessarily right now, but in several days)? Just so
> that we know it would work.
> 
It works.  I wrote it up in a blog post:
http://blog-ftweedal.rhcloud.com/2017/02/wildcard-certificates-in-freeipa/

> >> - how complex would it be to add support of Wildcard certificate support to
> >> FreeIPA (rough scope).
> >>
> > It really depends on the answers to my earlier questions :)  Need to
> > know *exactly* what is needed for OpenShift in terms of how the
> > domain(s) to include in the cert relate to IPA domain or
> > host/service principals defined therein.
> 
> We should not make feature too specific to OpenShift anyway, so I do not think
> the answers to these questions need to come from OpenShift, but rather from 
> our
> understanding of how to make this feature useful for FreeIPA users.
> 
> But if you check OpenShift documentation:
> https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/3.4/install_config/router/default_haproxy_router.html#using-wildcard-certificates
> you will see that the domain for the wildcard is configurable. So AFAIK, the
> OpenShift may join a realm EXAMPLE.COM and have the wildcard cert for
> '*.cloudapps.example.com.
> 
After my exploration of what we can do with FreeIPA, I'd now be
surprised if we need to do anything else at all, besides perhaps
some official doc e.g. a KBase article.

Please pass the info along and see if the OpenShift folks are happy
with what they can do with a custom profile.

Cheers,
Fraser

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