On 04/09/2013 01:28 PM, Martin Kosek wrote:
> Hello FreeIPA users!
> We would like to give you a heads up about a OCSP/CRL certificate validation
> issue introduced in FreeIPA 3.1 release (ticket 3074) we have discovered.
> Certificates issued by FreeIPA server 3.1 and later contains 2 CRL/OCSP URIs
> server by Dogtag CA configured by FreeIPA:
> Certificate:
>     Data:
>         Version: 3 (0x2)
>         Serial Number: 17 (0x11)
>     Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
>         Issuer: O=EXAMPLE.COM, CN=Certificate Authority
>         Validity
>             Not Before: Apr  8 10:16:15 2013 GMT
>             Not After : Apr  9 10:16:15 2015 GMT
>         Subject: O=EXAMPLE.COM, CN=testcert.example.com
>         ...
>         X509v3 extensions:
>             X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
> keyid:9F:25:93:2F:20:2A:79:9A:A8:88:CF:CC:EB:D0:F5:43:E7:3B:B1:EE
>             Authority Information Access:
>                 OCSP - URI:https://ipa-ca.example.com/ca/ocsp
>                 OCSP - URI:https://server1.example.com/ca/ocsp
>             X509v3 Key Usage: critical
>                 Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data
> Encipherment
>             X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
>                 TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
>             X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
>                 Full Name:
>                   URI:https://ipa-ca.example.com/ipa/crl/MasterCRL.bin
>                 CRL Issuer:
>                   DirName: O = ipaca, CN = Certificate Authority
>                 Full Name:
>                   URI:https://server1.example.com/ipa/crl/MasterCRL.bin
>                 CRL Issuer:
>                   DirName: O = ipaca, CN = Certificate Authority
>         ...
> One OCSP/CRL URI points to the original CA issuing the certificate and one
> points to a general URL (managed by FreeIPA) pointing to any other FreeIPA CA
> via CNAME/A DNS record that can serve the OCSP/CRL URI in case if the original
> FreeIPA CA was decommissioned or unavailable at the moment.
> However, we have discovered that there are 2 issues related to this change:
> 1) Having https in the URIs requires client (e.g. a web browser) validating 
> the
> request to validate the machine serving the CRL/OCSP response itself even
> though the CRL/OCSP response is already signed by the CA and thus verifiable.
> Clients will fail to retrieve the CRL/OCSP in case of the general address as 
> it
> is just a CNAME for a FreeIPA server whose certificate does not allow it to
> serve this address.
> 2) Even though we have 2 OCSP URIs in the certificate, the Firefox browser 
> will
> not fail over to the general URI due to limitation in NSS which only tries the
> last OCSP and then fail when it is not available.
> Issue 1) is being fixed by converting https in OCSP/CRL URIs to plain http as
> the responses are already signed and verifiable. This will allow FreeIPA CAs 
> to
> serve the general URI ipa-ca.example.com.
> Relevant upstream tickets:
> https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3547
> https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3552
> When the issue is fixed in FreeIPA server, client certificates containing a
> wrong OCSP/CRL URIs can be fixed by requesting new certificates from FreeIPA
> CA. This task can be simplified by asking certmonger to request a new
> certificate for given service ("ipa-getcert resubmit" command).
> We plan to prepare a script automating this task on clients for your 
> convenience.
> Issue 2) is more difficult to fix as it requires an enhancement to Firefox and
> NSS to support an OCSP fail over when a certificates contains multiple OCSP
> URIs. There is an open Mozilla Bugzilla with a request for this feature:
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=797815
> You are welcome to support our case and add your comments or use cases to this
> Bugzilla.
> If you have concerns or a question about this plan, please just add a comment.
> We will inform you about our next steps.
> Thank you.

Update from the field: given the resistance we received from NSS/Firefox to
implement OCSP fail over ability as a default and given our aim to address this
issue for as most platforms as possible, we decided to abandon the original
plan to have multiple OCSP/CRL URIs in the certificates.

Instead, we plan to issue FreeIPA certificates with just one OCSP/CRL URI
pointing to the general DNS name. This DNS name will contain A DNS records to
all FreeIPA CAs and it will be automatically maintained by FreeIPA if it
manages your DNS. Otherwise, administrator would need to maintain this DNS name
on his own if he wants to keep the OCSP/CRL links functional.

Upstream tickets were updated to match the new plan:


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