On Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:17:18 -0500
Dmitri Pal <d...@redhat.com> wrote:

> On 12/12/2014 01:07 PM, Simo Sorce wrote:
> > On Thu, 11 Dec 2014 18:30:06 -0500
> > Dmitri Pal <d...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On 12/11/2014 06:32 PM, free...@pettyvices.com wrote:
> >>> I'd like to be able to require 2FA on *certain* hosts and allow
> >>> just passwords on others.
> >>>
> >>> It seems you can check both "passwords" and "2FA" under the user.
> >>>
> >>> I was hoping I could create a HBAC such that certain hosts would
> >>> only allow 2FA, but I can't see an obvious way to do that.
> >>>
> >>> Is it possible?  Help on how would be great.  If not, feature
> >>> request?
> >>>
> >>> thanks,
> >>>
> >>> -t
> >>>
> >> We have several tickets:
> >>
> >> https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/433
> >>
> >> https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/3659
> >>
> >> https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4498
> >>
> >> If you see https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4498#comment:6
> >> we discussed this use case.
> >> And I was about to fork it as said but then I realized that there
> >> is not good way on the KDC to determine the host you are coming
> >> from. So IMO it should be a policy decision on SSSD.
> >> There are two options:
> >> - short term solution: allow SSSD to have a local overwrite to
> >> require OTP if server offers different options.
> >> - longer term solution: actually have a per host policy that is
> >> centrally managed that is fetched per host and enforced by SSSD.
> >>
> >> Before filing tickets I would like to hear opinions on the matter.
> > If we are using a FAST channel using the credentials of the host
> > then you may be able to know (probably requires changes in the KDC
> > to internally retain/convey the information).
> > This is possible via SSSD, but will not work via kinit done by a
> > generic user, so normal kinit's would require 2FA all the time.
> >
> > Simo.
> >
> Can kinit do FAST? Is there some kind of kinit flag to use FAST?

Yes kinit can do FAST, but is cumbersome to manually do it.

> May be in such setup we will require all clients to use FAST for the 
> accounts that have several options configured.

It won't help, users do not have access to the host keys so they can't
do FAST with *those* keys.

> Then we will know the principal used to armor the connection and can 
> make policy decisions based on it.

We can do this with SSSD because it has access to the host key, being a
privileged process. Normal user's can't.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York

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