On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 02:41:34PM +0100, Martin Babinsky wrote:
> On 11/16/2016 02:33 PM, Petr Spacek wrote:
> > On 16.11.2016 14:01, Stijn De Weirdt wrote:
> > > hi all,
> > >
> > > we are looking how to configure whatever relevant policy to minimise the
> > > impact of compromised IPA hosts (ie servers with a valid host keytab).
> > >
> > > in particular, it looks like it possible to retrieve any user token once
> > > you have access to a valid host keytab.
> > >
> > > we're aware that the default IPA policies are wide open, but we are
> > > looking how to limit this. for us, there's no need that a hostkeytab can
> > > retrieve tokens for anything except the services on that host.
> > What "token" do you have in mind?
> We discussed this in another thread.
> In the case that the host is compromised/stolen/hijacked, you can
> host-disable it to invalidate the keytab stored there but this does not
> prevent anyone logged on that host to bruteforce/DOS user accounts by trying
> to guess their Kerberos keys by repeated kinit.
But the password policy should at least mitigate this by blocking the
account for some time after a number of wrong password are used.
> Martin^3 Babinsky
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